U.S. Copyright Transfer Termination Provisions as Internationally Mandatory Rules: Reconciling Vetter with Morricone

Image by <a href="https://pixabay.com/users/joa70-16807463/?utm_source=link-attribution&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=image&utm_content=9872747">Joachim Schnürle</a> from <a href="https://pixabay.com//?utm_source=link-attribution&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=image&utm_content=9872747">Pixabay</a>

Earlier this year, many experts had hoped that the U.S. Supreme Court would grant certiorari and review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Vetter v. Resnik. But four justices recused themselves, causing the Court to lack a quorum to review the decision, and therefore the Vetter interpretation continues to govern in the Fifth Circuit. According to Vetter, an author who is terminating a copyright transfer may terminate the transfer under U.S. copyright law (17 U.S.C. 304(c)) not only as to the author’s copyright in the United States (“U.S. rights”), but also as to the copyrights in other countries (“foreign rights”). A review of the Vetter interpretation is acutely needed because Vetter deviated from the U.S. standard interpretation and practice that had understood the effects of a termination under U.S. law to be limited to U.S. rights.

Many experts were surprised by Vetter and consider its interpretation to be erroneous; the Copyright Act seems to be clear when it provides that the copyright termination provision “in no way affects rights arising under any … foreign laws” (17 U.S.C. 304(c)(6)(E)), which copyrights under the laws of other countries would clearly seem to be. However, the plaintiffs in Vetter successfully argued that another part of the same subsection, which provides that a termination “affects … those rights covered by the grant that arise under this title,” means that the section applies to terminations of copyright transfers for any country in the world, as long as the copyright arose under the U.S. Copyright Act.

Vetter leaves several questions open; for example, does the “arise under” language refer only to the initial vesting of copyright in the United States? Or does it refer to any copyright that is protected under the U.S. Copyright Act, even if copyright to the work initially vested outside the United States? Reflecting on the principle of national treatment, the Fifth Circuit Court described how “[c]opyright protection … granted under the U.S. Copyright Act … was to be recognized by other [copyright treaty] countries across the globe,” and “[t]herefore, [Vetter’s] rights would continue to be recognized across the globe consistent with the principle of national treatment when Vetter recaptured them upon termination.” This statement suggests that the U.S. termination provisions would apply extraterritorially to transfers of copyrights only when the works are subject to national treatment in other countries, meaning works for which the United States is the country of origin under the Berne Convention.

Among the questions that remain open is whether the Vetter decision can be reconciled with Morricone v. Bixio Music Group. This 2019 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concerned a termination of transfer under a different section of the U.S. Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. 203, applying to post-1977 transfers) than Vetter, but the wording in the two sections on the affected rights is identical (17 U.S.C. 203(b)(5) and 304(c)(6)(E)). In Morricone, the court did not address the question of the territorial reach of section 203 because the question was not at issue in the case; unlike the parties in Vetter, the parties in Morricone contested the termination of copyright transfer only for the United States, and the court in Morricone accepted, without discussion, that U.S. law governed the termination of that transfer.

To some extent, Morricone is a mirror image of Vetter; while Vetter involved a U.S. author, a work created in the United States, and a transfer effectuated by a contract governed by U.S. law, Morricone involved an Italian author, a work created in Italy, and a transfer effectuated by a contract governed by Italian law. If the Fifth Circuit Court’s interpretation is to be considered correct, and a copyright “spreads” from a work’s country of origin to other countries while remaining subject to the country of origin’s rules on termination of transfers, Italian rules (if any) should have governed the termination of transfers of copyright everywhere in the world in Morricone, including in the United States, as did the U.S. rules in Vetter.

From this choice-of-law perspective, Vetter and Morricone seem irreconcilable, but there could be one approach to the choice of the law applicable to copyright transfer terminations that would make both outcomes possible. The U.S. termination provisions could be declared to be internationally mandatory rules that require U.S. courts always to apply the U.S. provisions to terminations of transfers whenever a strong U.S. public policy justifies the application of U.S. law, which would be (a) to the termination of transfers of copyrights everywhere in the world when the author is a U.S. domiciliary (Vetter), or (b) to the termination of transfers of U.S. rights when the author is not a U.S. domiciliary but U.S. rights are at issue (Morricone).

Could attaining the status of internationally mandatory rules be justified in the case of the U.S. copyright transfer termination provisions? Internationally mandatory rules (also referred to as overriding mandatory provisions) are a country’s rules that are underpinned by the country’s public policy that is so strong that no court of the country may depart from the rules, even if the court’s choice-of-law rules would otherwise direct the court to apply a rule of another country. The U.S. copyright termination provisions prohibit parties from contracting around the termination rights, which makes the provisions mandatory, but not necessarily internationally mandatory; however, some additional characteristics of termination rights under U.S. law might justify internationally mandatory status, such as the link between the rights and authors’ remuneration. The U.S. termination rules were designed “to protect authors and their heirs against unremunerative agreements by giving them an opportunity to share in the later economic success of their works” (U.S. Copyright Office), and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described the U.S. copyright renewal rights (which, with respect to their link to authors’ remuneration, were the predecessors of termination rights) as “reflect[ing] a vital policy of United States copyright law” (Corcovado Music).

Some countries’ provisions—such as certain provisions in Germany and the Netherlands—that seek to ensure a certain level of remuneration for authors, whether adequate, appropriate, proportionate, equitable, just, or fair remuneration, are considered internationally mandatory because they pursue those countries’ strong public policies. For example, the Dutch provisions on “exploitation agreements,” which include a provision that implements EU DSM Directive Article 22 on authors’ and performers’ right of revocation of licenses, are internationally mandatory when “a. the agreement would be governed by Dutch law in the absence of a choice of law, or … b. the acts of exploitation take place or are to take place wholly or predominantly in the Netherlands.” (Auteurswet, Article 25h(2))

It should not be necessary to decide whether the U.S. copyright transfer termination provisions are internationally mandatory. Many arguments support the interpretation that the U.S. termination provisions apply only to terminations of transfers for U.S. copyrights, and before Vetter most experts understood this interpretation to be correct. Among the arguments against the Vetter interpretation is the potential unworkability of situations in which other countries would assert extraterritorial application of their own diverse rules that enable authors or their successors to recapture the authors’ rights. But it should be recognized that when such rules are in place because they implement a country’s strong public policy, the status of the rules—whether expressly stated or implied—as internationally mandatory rules must be considered; the status of the different national rules will complicate any future international agreement that attempts to coordinate the applicability of the rules in cross-border cases.

 


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