Securing the European Research Area: Why the Text and Data Mining Exception Requires Overriding Mandatory Status in the International Arena
November 11, 2026
Drawing upon the findings of a recent study published by Communia, this post explores the impact of Private International Law (PIL) on the text and data mining (TDM) exception under Article 3 of the DSM Directive. While the introduction of this exception marks an important milestone for modern scientific discovery, allowing research organisations with 'lawful access' to freely analyse digital corpora, cross-border licensing practices and PIL mechanisms may significantly complicate its consistent operation.
Indeed, the delicate statutory equilibrium established by the European legislator is currently facing structural pressure from the contractual and technological arrangements promoted by major academic publishers. While rightsholders naturally utilise standard contractual frameworks and technological measures to manage how their datasets are accessed, these practices create a structural friction with the objectives of the exception of Article 3. The core of this legal complexity, however, transcends mere contractual interpretation; it lies at the intersection of copyright exceptions and European Private International Law (a problem that has historically been observed in other areas of copyright contract law).
The Triad of Substantive Evasion
It has been observed that academic publishers tend to embed mandatory arbitration agreements, exclusive choice-of-court clauses, and third-country choice-of-law clauses within their licensing agreements with European research organisations and cultural heritage institutions. When a European university engages in TDM activities on a subscribed database, these cross-border clauses heavily influence how and where any resulting disputes are resolved.
Arbitration clauses privatise the dispute resolution process, removing TDM conflicts from the public purview of European Member State courts. Simultaneously, choice-of-court agreements redirect European research organisations and cultural heritage institutions into foreign procedural arenas, potentially distancing them from domestic judicial protections. Finally, choice-of-law clauses designate third-country legal frameworks (such as US state law) to govern European research activities, introducing rules that may lack statutory guarantees similar to those provided by the European copyright acquis.
Relying on traditional jurisdictional and choice-of-law categorisations may provide insufficient protection for the European scientific community. EU Private International Law does not prevent arbitration or choice-of-court agreements in favour of third country venues in copyright disputes. In the area of applicable law, even when a dispute is correctly characterised by a researcher as a non-contractual copyright infringement claim governed by the Rome II Regulation and the lex loci protectionis (the law of the country where protection is claimed), the indispensable preliminary question of whether that researcher possessed "lawful access" inevitably resurrects the underlying license.
Because "lawful access" to academic journals is often predicated on a commercial subscription agreement, the non-contractual copyright question (including the applicability of Article 3 of the DSM Directive and its national transpositions) is inextricably tethered to a contract. To ascertain whether the European researcher can benefit from the statutory exception, the European judge is forced to apply foreign contract law under the Rome I Regulation to determine the terms of access. Through this contractual interplay, the statutory safeguards of Article 7(1) of the DSM Directive, which render contractual provisions that undermine the exception of Article 3 unenforceable, might be circumvented, potentially exposing researchers to divergent foreign standards.
The Antidote: Overriding Mandatory Provisions
A systemic solution to this jurisdictional bypass may lie in the characterisation of Articles 3 and 7 of the DSM Directive as overriding mandatory provisions, within the meaning of Article 9 of the Rome I and 16 of the Rome II Regulations. In the architecture of European PIL, an overriding mandatory provision is a rule deemed so crucial for safeguarding public interests that a Member State court must apply it, irrespective of whatever foreign law would have otherwise been applicable in a dispute.
Guided by the teleological methodology of the CJEU (in cases such as Ingmar, Unamar, HUK-COBURG and Da Silva Martins), it could be argued that the TDM exception in favour of European research organisations and cultural heritage institutions serves a function beyond mundane secondary copyright law. Rooted deeply in the primary EU law imperatives of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 3 of the DSM Directive defines the essential socioeconomic and strategic priorities of the European Union, balancing intellectual property monopolies against the freedom of scientific research. The provision serves pressing and important public interests.
In addition, the explicit prohibition of contractual overrides in Article 7(1) DSM Directive, provides another statutory confirmation that the European legislature did not intend for this critical scientific infrastructure to be negotiated away by the asymmetrical bargaining power of global institutional rightsholders.
This mirrors the logic applied to the fair remuneration provisions in Title IV, Chapter 3 of the DSM Directive. Recital 81 of the DSM Directive connects the mandatory character of those remuneration provisions directly to the prohibition of contractual deviations (for the Private International Law implications of Recital 81 of the DSM Directive, see in detail Lundstedt, 2025). Historically, this has been a structural element identified by the CJEU in Ingmar as a strong indication of an overriding mandatory provision, beyond the requirement that a provision serves public interests. Given that the exact same statutory preclusion anchors the TDM exception for scientific research, doctrinal symmetry dictates assigning identical mandatory status to Articles 3 and 7 of the DSM Directive.
A Targeted Intervention
Although national courts or the CJEU might eventually interpret Articles 3 and 7 as overriding mandatory provisions, relying on piecemeal judicial clarification invites prolonged uncertainty. To more effectively foster legal certainty within the European Research Area, a measured legislative response appears preferable. Rather than initiating a broad and potentially complex revision of the existing copyright framework, the European legislator could clarify the status of the TDM exception through a targeted, incremental adjustment.
Because recitals carry significant interpretative weight before the CJEU and national courts, a new recital could be purposefully incorporated into the DSM Directive to explicitly codify the overriding mandatory nature of Articles 3 and 7 of the DSM Directive. This would mirror the approach of the already existing Recital 81. Such a Recital could be worded as follows:
"The mandatory exception for text and data mining for the purposes of scientific research provided for in this Directive seeks to address legal uncertainty surrounding text and data mining operations in scientific research and support innovation in the European research area. In order to ensure the effective application of this exception, research organisations and cultural heritage institutions should not be deprived of the protection granted by this Directive through the application of the law of a third country. Where researchers have lawful access to content, there is a risk that contractual arrangements or the application of technological measures could prevent text and data mining. Consequently, where the law applicable to such contractual arrangements, or to a related non-contractual claim, designates as applicable the law of a third country, the national provisions implementing both the mandatory exception and the unenforceability of contrary contractual terms should apply as overriding mandatory provisions pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 and, where appropriate, Regulation (EC) No 864/2007. This ensures that the statutory freedoms established for research organisations and cultural heritage institutions are fully safeguarded across cross-border digital and computational environments."
The wording aims to encompass the entirety of the legal characterisation spectrum. By explicitly invoking both the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations, the proposed recital purports to capture the full spectrum of potential cross-border litigation scenarios. This approach is designed to preserve the core statutory safeguards of the Directive across divergent procedural pathways, aiming for consistent application irrespective of whether a matter is litigated strictly as a contractual dispute under Rome I or as a non-contractual claim under Rome II.
Systemic Coherence in European PIL
Utilising an interpretative recital to suggest overriding mandatory status for Articles 3 and 7 of the DSM Directive could provide a doctrinally refined alternative to rigid statutory prohibitions against choice-of-law or choice-of-court agreements.
This approach also appears to align with the broader architecture of European PIL. As Recital 40 of the Rome I Regulation indicates, it is generally desirable to unify conflict-of-law rules within the Rome frameworks rather than scattering substantive choice-of-law prohibitions throughout sectoral EU law. Triggering the established mechanisms of Article 9 of Rome I and Article 16 of Rome II would arguably respect this systemic coherence.
Furthermore, strict jurisdictional prohibitions have traditionally been reserved for socioeconomically vulnerable individuals, such as consumers or employees. While major universities and national libraries may possess sophisticated legal departments, they often face a "take-it-or-leave-it" reality when negotiating with monopoly holders of indispensable datasets. However, because these institutions do not easily fit the traditional profile of structurally weaker parties under the EU PIL acquis, attempting to categorically invalidate their contractual clauses might require a complex re-evaluation of established PIL principles.
This is not to suggest that the question of explicit protective privileges for research organisations is entirely resolved. It remains plausible that addressing asymmetric power dynamics in copyright contracts may eventually warrant deeper reflection and direct legislative adjustment within PIL to better reflect the realities of the modern data economy.
Until such broader discussions mature, however, a clarifying recital could serve as a viable bridge. It might help secure the Union's research priorities with minimal systemic intrusion, seeking to balance the preservation of established legal frameworks with the need to foster European scientific innovation.
This post was first published on the COMMUNIA blog.
You may also like