Here to Stay: The EU FSR's Third Year Between Simplification and Enforcement

belgian and EU flag by  Petrit Nikolli

A report on the second EU FSR Conference, "Growing Pains and Growing Powers: The EU FSR Comes of Age", organised by PwC's Global EU FSR Group (Brussels, 3 November 2026)

 

Introduction

Three years after the notification obligations under Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the "FSR") became applicable, the instrument can no longer be regarded as a novelty awaiting interpretation. It has become a stable component of the Commission's enforcement toolbox, alongside merger control, State aid control and foreign direct investment (FDI) screening. The second EU FSR Conference, held on 3 November 2026 at the PwC campus in Brussels and organised by PwC's Global EU FSR Group, offered a timely opportunity to take stock of this evolution with Commission officials, in-house counsel, academics and practitioners.

The conference was opened by Claudio Valz, senior partner at PwC Tax and Legal Services Italy, together with Daniela Cedola, who leads PwC's work with the EU institutions. Valz recalled that the first edition, held in October 2025, had asked whether the FSR was an advantage or a burden for undertakings, and that the answer had been that it is both. Since then, the legal framework has developed considerably. In January 2026 the Commission adopted its first guidelines on the assessment of distortion, the balancing test and the call-in power for below-threshold transactions. On 14 July 2026 it presented its first review report, concluding that the instrument is "fit for purpose" and that only targeted amendments, expected in 2027, are required. Valz also stressed that the FSR, by its nature, requires an integrated approach across legal, tax and policy expertise and across jurisdictions.

The author took part in the conference as a speaker, moderating the session on public procurement, and also intervened from the floor in the session on mergers and acquisitions.

Two messages emerged from the five sessions. First, the FSR is here to stay: expectations of a radical scaling-back, prompted by the compliance burden, appear unfounded. Second, the Commission acknowledged the need to address administrative costs and announced measures aimed at reducing the burden, including higher notification thresholds and simplified notification forms. For undertakings, the question is no longer whether to comply, but how to do so efficiently.

 

Panel 1: The FSR in the geoeconomic landscape

Enrico Letta: independence as the third pillar of the single market

The first session, moderated by Francesca Micheletti, senior competition correspondent at Politico, opened with a video address by Enrico Letta, former Italian Prime Minister and President of the Jacques Delors Institute. Letta recalled that the single market of the 1980s and 1990s was built around two notions, opportunities and competitiveness, and argued that a third must now be added: independence. Europe has discovered that it is exposed to excessive dependencies in technology, energy, security and finance, while facing Chinese pressure on manufacturing and trade tensions with the United States.

Letta referred to the "One Europe, One Market" roadmap agreed in April 2026 by the Parliament, the Commission and the Council: 42 measures with binding deadlines between December 2026 and December 2027, focused on the three areas in which the single market remains incomplete, namely energy, connectivity and financial services. He also pointed to the six trade agreements recently signed or being implemented with India, Indonesia, Australia, Mexico, Mercosur and the Philippines, covering relations with one third of the world. His conclusion was that no Member State alone has the scale to compete with China and the United States, and that Europe needs companies able to grow at European scale, which is also in the interest of the SMEs that work with them.

Thomas Deisenhofer: subsidies as an instrument of geoeconomic power

Thomas Deisenhofer, Principal Adviser at the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition and newly appointed Director for Cartels, offered a geoeconomic reading of the FSR. Geoeconomic advantage, unlike comparative advantage in classical trade theory, concerns control over bottlenecks and essential resources. It can be offensive, as the ability to exert leverage over other states, or defensive, as freedom from such leverage, that is, strategic autonomy. Deisenhofer noted that the concept resembles market power in its basic mechanism, but differs as to the actors (states rather than firms), the objectives (international power rather than profit) and the constraints (political as well as economic).

Deisenhofer then reviewed recent empirical research. An International Monetary Fund study based on the accounts of 5,000 listed Chinese companies ("Industrial Policy in China: Quantification and Impact on Misallocation", August 2025) estimates Chinese subsidies at 4.4% of GDP, although on the basis of an extrapolation that Deisenhofer himself described as debatable. The OECD's 2026 report based on its MAGIC database (Manufacturing Groups and Industrial Corporations), covering the 525 largest manufacturing firms worldwide, finds that large Chinese groups receive subsidies three to eight times higher than their OECD competitors and attributes some 60% of their market-share gains to subsidies. Both studies have been criticised on methodological grounds, including by the Peterson Institute, in particular regarding the benchmark rates used to compare borrowing costs. The lesson for undertakings is that the existence of subsidies is established but their measurement remains complex, and that complexity is reflected directly in the FSR's information requirements.

On acquisitions, research by Luc Laeven and co-authors at the European Central Bank, tracing ownership chains of 160,000 companies in 159 countries, shows that Chinese control of foreign assets is far more extensive than official FDI statistics suggest and is concentrated in R&D and strategic supply chains; after acquisition, targets show lower profitability and stagnant patenting, while the acquiring parent's patenting rises sharply. Deisenhofer summarised the strategy for Europe in three verbs to be pursued together: defend, the area in which the FSR sits; diversify, through trade agreements and critical raw materials initiatives; and, above all, compete. No defensive instrument, he observed, can on its own secure the success of European industry in third-country markets.

Antonio Nicita: from market power to a "dependency test"

Senator Antonio Nicita, Professor of Economic Policy, who joined remotely because of parliamentary commitments, approached the subject from the perspective of competition law and policy. Antitrust doctrine, he noted, has been built around market power, market shares, barriers to entry, dominance and the relevant market, including its geographic dimension. Geoeconomic advantage escapes these categories: it does not necessarily belong to a single relevant market but may be built "in cascade" across several markets along a value chain, and through formally distinct undertakings ultimately subject to common ownership.

In Nicita's view, antitrust tools cannot and should not be bent to serve other objectives, since their robustness derives precisely from a specific economic foundation and from market definition. Competition policy should instead be complemented by other policies within a coherent framework in which the different layers interact and share the information needed for decisions. He therefore proposed developing an objective and transparent "dependency test", applied first to strategic sectors, to identify where Europe is exposed and how to invest to overcome such dependencies. Decisions, he stressed, should not be discretionary but based on priorities defined in advance and on clear political accountability.

Nicita further distinguished between advantages based on economies of scale, which international trade tends to rebalance, and advantages based on strategic dependency, which aim to influence the political and economic choices of other states. He cited Europe's dependency on US cloud services, asking whether this is a dependency on states or on large technology firms which themselves influence public policy. He also made a self-critical observation: Europe's commitment to internal competition and the single market, while other countries invested in their geoeconomic advantage, may have contributed to technological dependencies on third countries. While endorsing the "defend, diversify, compete" triad, he suggested starting from strategic sectors to build clear parameters for policy choices.

Claudio Valz: the tax dimension

Valz drew attention to an aspect often overlooked by undertakings. Relevant foreign financial contributions include not only loans and capital injections but also the foregoing of revenue otherwise due: preferential tax rates, tax holidays, tax settlements and even amnesties. Many tax directors of multinational groups lack a complete overview of the benefits received worldwide, partly because outside the EU there is no culture of systematic tracking. Valz highlighted a European paradox: Member States retain sovereignty over direct taxation but cannot grant selective tax aid, whereas third countries can use tax incentives with far fewer constraints. The management of FSR compliance therefore requires a multidisciplinary approach, and more generally a reduction of overlapping reporting obligations at EU level, an objective the Commission is pursuing through the Tax Omnibus and the recast of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation.

 

Panel 2: The review, the guidelines and the enforcement record

The second session, moderated by Peter Zalai (PwC Legal Hungary), brought together Iveta Stoyanova (DG COMP, co-leading the work on targeted amendments to the FSR procedural framework), Bonifacio García Porras (Head of the Foreign Subsidies Unit, DG GROW) and Professor Jan Blockx (University of Antwerp).

The figures
IndicatorFigure reported at the conference
Concentrations formally notifiedMore than 330 (close to 400 case-team allocation requests)
Concentrations closed after preliminary reviewMore than 310
In-depth investigations (concentrations)3 (e&/PPF Telecom, ADNOC/Covestro, JD.com/Ceconomy), all closed with commitments
Public procurement submissionsMore than 6,000 over three years, relating to approximately 1,000 procedures
Contracting authority complianceApproximately 45% of due submissions transmitted in 2025
Irregularity decisions (procurement)6
Below-threshold call-ins (procurement)4 (1 closed; 3 ongoing in Greece, Italy and Denmark)

 

Zalai noted that the number of merger notifications has been two to three times higher than the legislator's initial estimate, while in-depth investigations and ex officio proceedings remain very few, which limits the guidance available from decisional practice. Manufacturing is the sector most affected by M&A notifications. The review report identifies time as the principal burden: an in-depth review of a transaction or tender adds five to six months, increasing transaction costs and potentially reducing the attractiveness of the EU for investors.

Stoyanova provided updated figures for concentrations: close to 400 case-team allocation requests, the first contact with the Commission that opens pre-notification; more than 330 formal notifications; and more than 310 cases closed after preliminary review, the equivalent of "Phase 1" in merger control. There have been three in-depth investigations, at a pace of roughly one per year, all closed with commitments: e&/PPF Telecom (September 2024), ADNOC/Covestro (November 2025) and JD.com/Ceconomy, cleared on the very day of the conference. DG COMP has also opened ex officio in-depth investigations into Nuctech (December 2025) and Goldwind (February 2026) and proceedings for possible obstruction against Temu (July 2026) in connection with an inspection in Ireland.

Stoyanova drew attention to the order of the President of the Court in Nuctech, which she described as "very pedagogical" in providing some initial guidance on the issue of extraterritoriality and the Commission's ability to request information from sources outside the EU. Blockx observed that, despite the powers that the FSR grants the Commission in this respect, the first decisions show that obtaining information is not easy. He added that, in the spring of 2026, the Chinese government even issued an order that prohibits Chinese firms from cooperating with investigations under the FSR that are viewed as entailing extraterritorial investigative measures. Stoyanova acknowledged there were some difficulties in collecting information, but drew attention to the different investigative tools available to the Commission, including Article 16 FSR, which allows it to adopt decisions based on facts available.

García Porras recalled that public procurement represents about 15% of the EU economy and that FSR submissions concern approximately 1,000 procedures, normally above EUR 250 million, concentrated in construction, energy, healthcare, ICT and transport. DG GROW has published a transparency register, updated weekly, listing notified procurement procedures with the contracting authority, Member State, classification code, notification date and, where available, the TED link, but not the names of bidders. The register has a practical use: allowing the economic operators to understand whether their cases have been submitted to the European Commission .

The distortion test in light of the first cases

Stoyanova explained how the two-step test under Article 4, as specified in the guidelines, has been applied. At the first step, the Commission examines whether the foreign subsidies have improved the undertaking's competitive position in the internal market, distinguishing between targeted subsidies (those with a specific objective, intended or used for activities in the internal market) and non-targeted subsidies (those intended for activities outside the EU and those of a general nature). In e&/PPF Telecom, an unlimited State guarantee and general-purpose loans were both non-targeted; in ADNOC/Covestro, a capital increase was classified as targeted and the unlimited guarantee as non-targeted.

At the second step, the Commission assesses actual or potential negative effects on competition, first on the conduct of the subsidised undertaking and then on competitors. In e&, the guarantee reduced risk sensitivity and allowed financing on better terms than those available to competitors; in ADNOC/Covestro, the capital was intended to restart projects previously frozen for lack of funds. Under Article 19, distortion in concentrations covers both the acquisition process and the activities of the merged entity post-transaction: in e& distortion was found only at the post-transaction level, in ADNOC/Covestro at both levels. Blockx observed that the commitments in the ADNOC/Covestro case only addressed the distortion post-transaction (and even then, only partially), but not the distortion in the acquisition process.

Reform plans and the limits of simplification

The Commission has published planning documents for two initiatives: a delegated act by DG COMP raising the turnover threshold for merger notifications within the 20% ceiling allowed by the Regulation, and, jointly with DG GROW, targeted amendments to the Implementing Regulation and notification forms. Blockx and others noted that a 20% threshold increase would have modest effects and that the revision of the forms is decisive. The Commission confirmed that the simplified form envisaged by Article 47 is one of the targeted measures considered, and the proposals will soon be put to consultation. As for the simplified form, it may be introduced gradually, starting with more limited categories of cases. Nevertheless, there is confidence that, combined with the higher turnover threshold, it should " significantly" reduce the number of full notifications. The new form will focus on distortion rather than foreign financial contributions, which should help address the perceived administrative burden.

On one point Stoyanova was explicit: foreign financial contributions "are here to stay". Limiting reporting to subsidies would amount to asking undertakings to incriminate themselves, whereas the notion of financial contribution is neutral; nor is it possible to list exhaustively the forms of support that some 170 third countries may grant. García Porras added that some industrial sectors are in fact asking for the EUR 250 million procurement threshold to be lowered. DG GROW also stressed that a stronger Single Market requires both fairness and simplification, and that both objectives must be pursued in parallel.

Stoyanova clarified that the January guidelines, which are indicative, aim to provide guidance already at this early stage of implementation. Like for other instruments, they will be supplemented with time, as practice and enforcement experience develop, but she does not expect this to happen "any time soon": at least a double-digit number of in-depth investigations is needed first.

 

Panel 3: Mergers and acquisitions

The third session, moderated by Heiner Mecklenburg (PwC Germany), featured Professor Lena Hornkohl (University of Vienna, co-author of the study commissioned by the Commission for the review), Dr Hubert Klinger (Siemens) and Iveta Stoyanova (DG COMP).

Burden, thresholds and the industry's critique

Klinger voiced the position of European industry: supportive of the FSR in principle, but critical of the current burden. Reporting foreign financial contributions is not part of ordinary accounting processes; it must be built on top of them, maintained and supported by staff training, and falls only on compliant undertakings. With approximately 300 notifications, no prohibition and three commitment decisions, industry proposes limiting reporting to subsidies, extending the EUR 1 million per-contribution exemption to all obligations, raising thresholds by as much as 100%, excluding the target's foreign financial contributions from the threshold calculation and, ultimately, abolishing ex ante notification in favour of ex officio case selection. The review report, which rules out structural changes, was considered insufficient.

Hornkohl responded that the initial period served to fill an information gap about the extent of subsidised investment in Europe, and that the appropriate response now is higher thresholds and a simplified procedure, given that almost all notified transactions were also subject to merger control or FDI screening. An instrument should not be abolished because some do not comply: that is what enforcement is for. She also observed that, rather than "growing pains", the learning curve had been steepest at the beginning, and that established concepts from merger control and State aid have largely transferred to the FSR.

Presumption, balancing and the State aid parallel

For non-targeted subsidies, a presumption of improvement of the competitive position applies. Hornkohl considered this justified because undertakings hold the information needed to show the absence of cross-subsidisation. The presumption may be rebutted by legal or economic constraints, but the Commission favours arrangements involving a third party as guarantor that cannot be modified over time; internal rules alone are less convincing. The guideline factors (purpose, amount and type of subsidy) were considered reasonable but open-ended, while numerical thresholds appear impractical: in an auction, a bid just 1% higher, if made possible by a subsidy, may distort competition.

As to the apparent tension with merger control, where lower prices and more innovation are positive effects, Klinger located the distinction in the source of the advantage: an efficiency generated by the deal is legitimate, an advantage funded by a foreign state is not. Intervening from the floor, the author stressed that the correct parallel is not merger control but State aid control, and that it is in this perspective that a lower price may signal distortion; the FSR test is substantially akin to the State aid test, with a specific counterfactual. Hornkohl added that the objective is to protect competition in the internal market as a whole, not individual competitors or European champions.

The balancing test remains largely unexplored. In e& and ADNOC, the parties did not show that the benefits derived from the subsidies, which is essential since balancing concerns the subsidised transaction and not the transaction as such. Stoyanova invited undertakings to draw on the State aid guidelines, demonstrating incentive effect, proportionality and the effect of the subsidy in the internal market, and confirmed that clear evidence that a subsidy addresses a market failure would be taken into account, either in a non-objection decision or in a modulated intervention, when deciding on the appropriateness of commitments or redressive measures.

Call-in, FDI and remedies

The call-in power under Article 21(5) has not yet been exercised for concentrations. The Commission clarified that intervention requires a suspicion of foreign subsidies; undervaluation of the target or the strategic nature of the sector are indications of factors that the Commission may consider when deciding which case to pursue but are by themselves insufficient. Klinger noted that the threshold is nonetheless low, since nearly all large international groups receive some foreign public contributions, and the risk should therefore be allocated in the transaction documents, for instance through a condition precedent, as is already done for FDI and merger control. On concerns about encroachment on FDI screening, Hornkohl noted that the FSR still requires a subsidy-driven distortion, but helps fill the gap left by an FDI regime that remains national; she also observed that the 2026 FDI Screening Regulation introduces mandatory call-in powers at national level.

All commitments accepted to date have been behavioural. In ADNOC/Covestro they included renouncing the unlimited guarantee and licensing sustainability patents; according to Stoyanova, they address both distortion, by reducing effects on competitors. Harm to the acquisition process was considered limited because no clear interest from other bidders emerged. Stoyanova did not rule out structural remedies in future, for example a joint venture limiting the incentive to channel foreign subsidies into the internal market, whereas Klinger considered behavioral remedies or a prohibition more likely than structural remedies, since the distortion stems from financing rather than market overlaps. Hornkohl recalled that behavioural remedies require monitoring and are of limited duration and predicted that the debate will shift from foreign financial contributions to distortion and balancing.

 

Panel 4: Public procurement

The fourth session, which the author moderated, focused on the practical side of the procurement tool with Bonifacio García Porras (DG GROW), Vittorio Tommasone (IBM Italy), Gerung von Hoff (PwC Germany) and Just van Wijk (PwC Netherlands).

Enforcement and the Commission's view of the challenges

García Porras reported intensified enforcement. Besides the Lisbon metro case, closed by a commitment decision under Article 31, DG GROW has adopted four call-in decisions for tenders below the EUR 250 million threshold, in construction, energy and technical products: one has been closed and three are ongoing in Greece, Italy and Denmark. Where a submission is incomplete, the undertaking has ten days to complete it; failing that, the Commission may adopt an irregularity decision leading to exclusion, as has happened in six cases. García Porras was candid that the information provided by economic operators is often insufficient, triggering further requests for information that would have been unnecessary had the submission been complete from the outset, and that this may sometimes reflect an unwillingness to provide the required information.

The interface with contracting authorities

One of the most significant issues concerns the relationship between the Commission and contracting authorities in the Member States. After steady growth until early 2025, the number of submissions fell during that year, and contracting authorities transmitted only around 45% of the submissions they should have forwarded to the Commission. Monitoring of notices published on TED has also shown that a significant number of procedures make no reference to the FSR. García Porras attributed this to the size of national markets, centralised or decentralised procurement systems, and lack of awareness.

Von Hoff described an uneven picture in Germany. Alongside experienced contracting authorities that give clear instructions and answer questions promptly, there are "under-enforcers", which overlook the FSR, miscalculate the contract value or simply omit it from the tender documents, and "over-enforcers", which apply it below the thresholds without any legal basis or impose disproportionate formalities, such as requiring the completion of Annex II to the Implementing Regulation. The key point for undertakings is that the FSR applies whenever the thresholds are met, even if the tender documents are silent. The shared advice was to raise the issue early with the contracting authority, so as to restore a level playing field within the procedure.

In this context, García Porras referred to a recent Belgian Conseil d’ètat ruling suspending the award of the Brussels casino concession because the procedure, although within the scope of the FSR, had not been notified to the Commission. He indicated that in his view, and without prejudice to a potential future position of the European Court of Justice, the national court could indeed be right: FSR obligations fall not only on economic operators but also on contracting authorities, and failure to reflect them may call into question the legality of the procedure. As the FSR is a directly applicable regulation operating in parallel to the procurement directives, unsuccessful bidders may invoke non-compliance before national courts. In response, the Commission has set up an expert group with national contact points as a bridge with contracting authorities, has carried out missions to some Member States and plans awareness campaigns next year, albeit with limited resources. Von Hoff called for clearer Commission guidance to contracting authorities on admissible formalities and for feedback to compliant bidders, warning that if the missing 55% of submissions has no consequences, compliance rates are likely to fall further.

Framework agreements, consortia and confidentiality

Tommasone highlighted two operational difficulties. In framework agreements, the value relevant for the threshold is often merely a potential ceiling, split among several awardees and executed through small call-off contracts by different local bodies. In consortia, common in Italy and Belgium, if a single member has contributions to declare, all members must notify, raising coordination and confidentiality issues; any delay by one member may jeopardise the consortium's ability to notify. A practice has emerged whereby each member's data are placed in a password-protected annex, with the password provided directly to the Commission. García Porras confirmed in the session that this practice is acceptable.

After the decision: the Lisbon metro case

Van Wijk turned to the aftermath of Commission decisions. In the Lisbon metro case, CRRC's Portuguese subsidiary, the main subcontractor for the rolling stock, withdrew during the in-depth FSR investigation. The Commission then accepted the consortium’s commitment to replace it with another subcontractor, which it was told would be permissible under Portuguese law. Importantly, the Commission left the procurement consequences to the contracting authority. The decision states that it is the sole responsibility of Metropolitano de Lisboa to assess the new subcontractor under the tender documents and Portuguese and EU procurement law, and the commitments are without prejudice to its decisions. In other words, the Commission assesses the foreign subsidies, while the contracting authority remains responsible for determining whether the offer can still be accepted under the terms of the tender. Van Wijk noted that under Dutch and EU case law such a substitution of a main subcontractor after submission of the offer would likely be contested, since in general only minor changes are permitted, and this would raise level-playing-field concerns vis-à-vis other bidders.

Reform proposals

Proposals from the panel included excluding ordinary commercial transactions and generally available measures from FFC to be considered for the purpose of the FSR scope, allowing reuse of recent submissions for subsequent tenders (Tommasone), aligning the forthcoming Public Procurement Act, which would replace the three procurement directives into a single regulation, could make room for FSR commitments and decisions, for instance through an additional final round where necessary or clearer rules on modifications of tenders and replacing subcontractors (Van Wijk), and clearer guidance for contracting authorities and feedback to compliant bidders (von Hoff). García Porras indicated that the forthcoming consultation on the Implementing Regulation is the appropriate forum for these proposals.

 

Panel 5: Voices from outside the EU

The final session, moderated by Lewis Crofts, brought together Marc Oliver Heim (University College London), LinLin Liang (China Chamber of Commerce to the EU, speaking in a personal capacity), Will Morris (PwC US) and Peter Xiang, tax partner from PwC China.

Heim echoed the Commission's view that the FSR is fit for purpose, while noting that it is too early to say whether it delivers a genuine level playing field beyond its protective function, and that cases such as Nuctech raise questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Liang reported that FSR has raised concerns among Chinese businesses, which have nevertheless made compliance as a priority and incorporated the FSR considerations into their preliminary assessments. As a result, FSR has had a deterrent effect: Chinese investors may favour below-threshold mergers and acquisitions, greenfield investment and non-strategic sectors, while many companies refrain from bidding in above-threshold tenders, which she argued may lead to less competitive offers. She welcomed the engagement of DG COMP and DG GROW with Chinese businesses as well as the technical dialogue on the FSR agreed within the EU-China trade and investment consultation mechanism.

Liang also recalled that in early 2025 MOFCOM concluded that the Commission's FSR practice constituted a trade and investment barrier and reserved retaliatory measures. A Chinese blocking order was adopted the day after JD.com submitted its commitments, although it did not prevent the negotiations from continuing. The PwC China partner noted that limiting reporting to subsidies would substantially reduce the burden. Morris, for his part, saw no significant deterrent effect for US companies so far, but warned that the FSR, FDI screening and the Anti-Coercion Instrument could take on the character of trade tools if EU-US trade relations deteriorate; he called for coordination and simplification of reporting requirements across Directorates-General as part of the competitiveness agenda. Asked about the creative remedies in JD.com, Heim noted that FSR remedies aim at the distortion itself and therefore differ from those under the EU Merger Regulation.

 

Practical implications for undertakings

Several practical lessons for European and non-EU undertakings can be drawn from the discussions.

Permanent mapping of foreign financial contributions

The Commission has ruled out removing the obligation to report all foreign financial contributions, not merely subsidies. Undertakings should therefore move away from ad hoc data collection triggered by a specific transaction or tender and establish a permanent data-gathering system, integrated into accounting, treasury and tax processes. Such a system should record, for each group entity and third country, loans and guarantees from public entities, capital injections, contracts with foreign public undertakings and, above all, revenue foregone: preferential rates, tax holidays, settlements with tax authorities and amnesties.

Clear responsibilities and a multidisciplinary function

FSR compliance is not the exclusive domain of the legal function. The qualification of tax benefits requires tax expertise, the reconstruction of financing requires treasury input, and the assessment of effects in the internal market requires antitrust and regulatory expertise. A designated internal owner, written procedures and training of staff in foreign subsidiaries, who often hold the relevant information, are advisable.

Transaction planning and contractual risk allocation

In acquisitions, the FSR threshold analysis should run in parallel with merger control and FDI screening from the outset, and timetables should allow for the five to six additional months of an in-depth review. Pre-notification should be used actively: discussions are shorter when parties come with complete information and, where appropriate, with solutions to potential concerns. Since the call-in power requires only a suspicion of foreign subsidies, the risk should be addressed in the transaction documents even for non-notifiable deals, through conditions precedent, cooperation and information covenants, allocation of possible commitments and long-stop date provisions. Where counterparties are subject to rules restricting cooperation with foreign authorities, such as Chinese legislation, the conflict between duties towards the Commission and domestic prohibitions should be assessed in advance, bearing in mind that non-cooperation may lead to a decision on the basis of facts available under Article 16, which is generally less favourable.

Substantive defence: presumption, balancing and remedies

Investors benefiting from non-targeted subsidies, such as unlimited State guarantees or general-purpose financing, should be prepared to rebut the presumption of improved competitive position through verifiable safeguards, preferably guaranteed by third parties and not unilaterally modifiable. Balancing arguments should be framed according to State aid categories, demonstrating that the benefits derive from the subsidy, incentive effect, proportionality and the market failure addressed. Possible commitments, to date all behavioural, should be considered early.

Public procurement: completeness, vigilance and consortium arrangements

An incomplete submission may lead to exclusion, so accuracy from the first filing is also the fastest route to clearance. Before bidding, the estimated value, including that of framework agreements, and the position of all consortium members and main subcontractors should be checked. If the tender documents ignore the FSR despite the thresholds being met, or impose unwarranted formalities, clarification should be sought immediately; the DG GROW register allows bidders to verify notification and the running of the 20-day period. An award in a procedure that disregarded the FSR is exposed to challenge, while unsuccessful bidders may in turn invoke non-compliance. Consortium agreements should regulate data-transmission deadlines, liability for incomplete information and confidentiality, including the use of password-protected annexes, and should provide for the possible substitution of third-country subcontractors without altering the quality, specifications and price of the offer.

Engagement in the consultations

The forthcoming consultations on the simplified form and the revised Implementing Regulation offer an opportunity, including through trade associations, to identify with concrete data which information is genuinely necessary and which burdens could be removed, for instance for ordinary commercial transactions, general tax measures or repeated submissions for successive tenders.

 

Outlook

The coming months will be shaped primarily by the reform of the system: the delegated act raising the merger notification threshold by up to 20%; the simplified notification form under Article 47, which should substantially reduce full notifications and shift the focus from mapping contributions to assessing distortion; and the targeted revision of the Implementing Regulation and forms by DG COMP and DG GROW, preceded by public consultation. These measures will feed into the targeted amendments expected in 2027, while the January 2026 guidelines will remain unchanged until decisional practice is more substantial. In procurement, coordination with the reform of the EU public procurement framework remains open.

Enforcement will also provide guidance. The ex officio investigations into Nuctech and Goldwind and the obstruction proceedings against Temu will yield the first decisions in cases opened without notification, clarifying the Commission's investigative powers vis-à-vis non-EU entities and its recourse to facts available. JD.com/Ceconomy will add to the practice on remedies, and the three pending procurement call-ins will shed light on the use of the below-threshold call-in power. The question of contracting authorities' obligations may reach the Court of Justice, defining the role of national courts in FSR enforcement. The third edition of the conference, planned by PwC's Global EU FSR Group for 2027, will provide the forum to examine these developments in detail. The overall assessment is clear: For undertakings, the challenge is to move from emergency compliance to stable FSR governance capable of turning a compliance cost into a source of predictability, and fair and effective participation in the single market. 

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