Vivendi/Lagardère: Business communications on personal devices – where are the limits?

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The way businesses communicate has changed significantly. Work-related discussions increasingly take place across different channels, from corporate email accounts to messaging applications and mobile phones. This creates practical challenges not only for companies' internal document management, but also for competition investigations.

Businesses should not assume that moving a conversation from a corporate email account to a personal messaging application makes it inaccessible to competition authorities. But equally, the use of a personal device for business purposes should not mean that everything stored on that device is automatically open to scrutiny.

The EU General Court's judgments of 3 June 2026 in Vivendi (T-1097/23) and Lagardère (T-1119/23) address this increasingly relevant issue. They examine when the European Commission may require companies to produce work-related documents stored on employees' personal phones, email accounts and messaging applications, and what limits should apply.

 

1. Personal devices are not automatically outside the scope of an information request

The Commission's requests covered communications made through both professional and personal communication tools, including mobile phones, tablets, email accounts and messaging applications, provided that the relevant devices or accounts had been used at least once for professional purposes.

An important point in the judgments is how the Court approaches the concept of a personal or private phone. The General Court does not establish a separate, formal legal definition of a “private phone”. Instead, it uses the broader expressions “personal communication tools” and “personal mobile phones”. In practical terms, the distinction is between a device or account provided and managed by the employer and one that an individual owns or uses personally. However, private ownership is not, in itself, decisive.

The key criterion is whether the personal communication tool has been used for professional purposes. In Vivendi, the Court confirmed that personal communication tools fell within the scope of the contested decision only where they had been used at least once for professional purposes (paragraph 408). The same condition appeared in the Commission's definition of the documents to be collected, reproduced in paragraph 8 of the judgment, and was reiterated by the Court in its proportionality assessment (paragraph 435).

The words “at least once” are significant. The Court did not require professional use to be regular, predominant or exclusive. Accordingly, even occasional use of a personal phone, email account or messaging application for work-related communications may bring that tool within the potential scope of an information request. The approach is functional: what matters is the use of the communication tool, rather than its ownership or whether it is technically classified as a corporate or personal device.

The Court also recognised that relevant business exchanges may take place through channels other than professional communication tools. As it explained in paragraph 429, the Commission must be able to request necessary information held in professional and even personal communication tools, provided that the latter have been used for professional purposes and the requirements of Article 7 of the EU Charter are respected.

The requests were not entirely unrestricted. They identified particular individuals, covered a defined period and relied on specified topics and search terms.

However, their scope was not necessarily limited to individual messages matching those search terms. The requests could also capture exchanges between designated individuals where only one exchange contained a relevant term. This is an important practical consideration when assessing the potential volume of information involved.

The judgments therefore confirm that the private ownership of a device does not, by itself, exclude relevant business communications from an information request. At the same time, the fact that a personal device has been used for work does not automatically make all its contents accessible. The professional-use condition brings the device or communication tool within the potential scope of the request; it does not remove the need to assess the relevance, necessity and proportionality of the information sought.

In other words, occasional professional use does not turn an employee's entire private digital life into business material. The Commission's powers remain subject to the limits discussed below.

 

2. Privacy and proportionality remain important limits

The General Court's assessment of privacy is more nuanced than a simple confirmation that the Commission may request documents from personal devices. The Court expressly acknowledged that the collection, processing and communication of information held on personal communication tools may constitute a serious interference with the right to respect for private life.

The starting point is Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which protects private and family life, home and communications. Importantly, the Court recalled that Article 7 corresponds to Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Under Article 52(3) of the Charter, the protection afforded by Article 7 must therefore have the same meaning and scope as the corresponding right under the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Vivendi, paragraphs 387–388).

The Court also made clear that the interference does not depend on whether the information is particularly sensitive or whether the individuals concerned have suffered any tangible inconvenience. The communication of personal data to a public authority, as well as its retention or access by that authority, may itself constitute an interference with the right to privacy. This applies even where the information relates to professional activities (Vivendi, paragraph 389).

In assessing the seriousness of the interference, the Court recognised that the requests could capture a potentially wide range of personal information. This was particularly relevant because personal communication tools may contain information revealing more sensitive aspects of an individual's private life than corporate communication systems. Considered together, such information could allow relatively precise conclusions to be drawn about the private lives of the individuals concerned (Vivendi, paragraphs 393–396).

However, the existence of an interference does not automatically make the measure unlawful. The Court proceeded to assess whether it could be justified under Article 52(1) of the Charter. This provision requires any limitation on fundamental rights to be provided for by law, respect the essence of the right concerned and, subject to the principle of proportionality, be necessary to meet an objective of general interest recognised by the EU.

The Court found that these requirements were satisfied in the circumstances. In particular, the legal basis for the Commission's request was sufficiently clear and precise, and the measure did not undermine the essence of the right to privacy. The Commission was pursuing a legitimate objective: ensuring the effective application of EU competition rules. The Court considered that this objective could not reasonably be achieved just as effectively by less restrictive means, since relevant exchanges concerning potential competition infringements may take place through personal rather than corporate communication channels (Vivendi, paragraphs 397–409).

The Court's proportionality assessment also took account of the safeguards built into the requests. These included restrictions on the individuals concerned, the relevant period and the topics and search terms used to identify documents. Personal communication tools were covered only where they had been used at least once for professional purposes. The Court further emphasised that the Commission was not granted full and unchecked access to all information stored on the devices, nor was the measure equivalent to continuous, untargeted or systematic monitoring of employees.

Another important consideration was the purpose of the exercise. The Commission was seeking commercially relevant information to investigate potential infringements by the undertaking, not to collect information about employees' private lives as an objective in itself. Accordingly, information relating to private life was expected to be collected only incidentally, unless it was itself commercially relevant to the investigation (Vivendi, paragraphs 406–409 and 427–435).

The Court therefore accepted that the Commission's investigative powers would risk being rendered ineffective if companies could refuse to provide relevant business information simply because it was stored in a personal account or exchanged through a private communication application. That effectiveness, however, does not displace the requirement to respect fundamental rights. The Commission's requests remain subject to judicial review, and their scope and implementation must be capable of being assessed against the requirements of necessity and proportionality.

The practical message for businesses is therefore a balanced one: the use of a personal device for professional purposes may bring relevant communications within the scope of a Commission information request, but it does not give the Commission an unrestricted right to access an employee's private digital life. The authority must be able to justify the information sought, and the way in which it is collected must remain appropriately targeted and proportionate.

 

3. The procedural context matters

It is worth clarifying that these cases concerned formal requests for information under Article 11(3) of the EU Merger Regulation. They were not proceedings concerning the Commission's physical access to personal phones during an unannounced inspection.

This distinction matters. The judgments address the obligation imposed on companies to collect and provide specified information in response to a formal Commission decision. They should not be read as establishing a general right for competition officials to browse employees' private devices.

The Court also examined the Commission's obligation to explain the purpose and scope of its requests, the necessity of the information sought and the practical burden placed on the companies. In particular, the information requested must be sufficiently connected to the subject matter of the investigation to allow the legality and proportionality of the request to be assessed.

 

4. Sensitive communications require particular care

The Lagardère proceedings also raised an important question concerning the protection of journalistic sources. This issue goes beyond the privacy interests of individual employees: it concerns the role of source confidentiality in safeguarding freedom of expression and the media's ability to receive and impart information.

The General Court examined this issue under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which protects freedom of expression and information, read in conjunction with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Under Article 52(3) of the Charter, the protection afforded by Article 11 must have at least the same meaning and scope as the corresponding right under the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Lagardère, paragraphs 215–220).

The Court recalled the ECtHR's case law recognising that the compulsory disclosure of journalistic material capable of identifying sources constitutes an interference with freedom of expression. In particular, it referred to Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, in which the ECtHR considered that an order requiring the surrender of journalistic material containing information capable of identifying sources interfered with Article 10 ECHR. The protection of journalistic sources is therefore not simply a matter of professional confidentiality; it is an important component of press freedom and the public's right to receive information (Lagardère, paragraph 221).

At the same time, the General Court distinguished the circumstances of Lagardère from cases involving measures specifically intended to identify or disclose journalistic sources. Referring to the ECtHR's decision in Weber and Saravia v. Germany, it observed that surveillance measures not intended to disclose journalistic sources do not necessarily constitute a particularly serious interference with freedom of expression. The Commission's request was directed at investigating a suspected infringement of EU merger control rules, not at identifying sources. Any disclosure of information capable of identifying journalistic sources would arise only incidentally, if the safeguards put in place were not implemented. On that basis, the Court considered that the limitation on freedom of expression was not particularly serious in the circumstances (Lagardère, paragraphs 222–223).

The procedural safeguards were therefore central to the Court's assessment. Following concerns raised by Lagardère, the Commission proposed a procedure similar to the one used to protect communications covered by legal professional privilege. The Commission subsequently confirmed the arrangements in a letter of 6 December 2023, and incorporated them into a further decision adopted on 24 January 2024.

Under that procedure, individuals covered by the request who held a press card could review the documents identified by the Commission's search criteria, identify information capable of revealing journalistic sources and provide versions in which the identifying information had been redacted. Where effective redaction was not possible, the relevant document could be withheld from the material submitted to the Commission. Lagardère was nevertheless required to provide the remaining documents, together with a table describing the nature of the information redacted or the documents withheld (Lagardère, paragraphs 201–203 and 224).

An interesting aspect of the judgment is the Court's emphasis on the practical effectiveness of these safeguards. Drawing on the ECtHR's judgment in Vinci Construction and GTM Génie Civil et Services v. France, the General Court stressed that safeguards must be practical and effective, rather than theoretical or illusory, particularly where a large volume of electronic documents and messages is involved (Lagardère, paragraph 226).

Lagardère argued that the procedure would require 14 individuals to review approximately 77,000 documents, amounting to an average of 5,500 documents per person. It considered that the resulting workload would make the protection of journalistic sources ineffective. The Court nevertheless rejected this argument. In particular, it noted that Lagardère had not provided sufficient information about the additional workload involved in preparing the required table summarising the redactions and withheld documents. It therefore found that the company had not demonstrated that the safeguards were merely theoretical or illusory (Lagardère, paragraphs 225–228).

The Court also noted that Lagardère had itself proposed excluding documents capable of revealing journalistic sources where the consent of the journalists concerned could not be obtained. This formed part of the procedural background to the safeguards ultimately put in place (Lagardère, paragraphs 200 and 229).

Although the issue arose in the specific context of a media group, the broader lesson is relevant to any business handling information subject to enhanced legal protection. A company's obligation to respond to a competition authority's information request does not remove the need to identify and protect privileged, confidential or otherwise specially protected material. Importantly, safeguards must work in practice: their design should take account not only of the legal protection at stake, but also of the volume of documents, the review process and the time and resources available to implement it.

 

What should businesses take away?

For businesses, the practical implications are worth considering before an investigation begins.

Employees increasingly use mobile phones and messaging applications to conduct everyday business. Companies should therefore have clear internal policies on the use of personal devices and communication channels for professional purposes, together with sensible document-retention practices.

It is also important to understand that a business communication does not necessarily lose its relevance simply because it takes place outside the corporate email system. At the same time, companies should not assume that every personal communication becomes accessible to an authority merely because an employee has occasionally used a private device for work.

When faced with an information request, businesses should carefully examine its legal basis, scope, relevance, time limits and practical implications. They should also consider whether the request adequately distinguishes between potentially relevant business information and unrelated personal material. Where a request appears to capture unrelated private information or imposes an excessive burden, the available procedural and legal safeguards should not be overlooked.

 

The story is not over

Both Vivendi and Lagardère have appealed the General Court's judgments to the Court of Justice of the European Union (Cases C-862/26 P and C-861/26 P, respectively).

The appeals will provide an opportunity for further clarification of the balance between effective competition enforcement and the protection of fundamental rights, particularly where business communications overlap with employees' private lives.

For businesses, the key question is not simply where a communication is stored, but also whether the information requested is relevant, necessary and proportionate to the investigation.

 

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