CJEU on continuity, heritage, and deceptive trademarks – Fauré Le Page Paris 1717

To which extent can a sign invoke heritage, age, and prestige before it crosses into deception? In the luxury sector, a trademark’s reference to a long history can signal continuity, know-how, and quality, making the line between genuine legacy and misleading branding especially thin. On 26 March 2026, the CJEU drew that boundary by stating that the difference lay in whether a business had been acquired as a whole or whether only the trademark had changed hands (C‑412/24).

Background: the company Maison Fauré Le Page was founded in Paris in 1716, but its business came to an end in 1992 when it was dissolved and its assets were transferred to its sole shareholder, Saillard. Saillard had already registered the “Fauré Le Page” trademark in 1989, covering goods as ‘edged weapons; firearms and their parts; ammunition and projectiles; explosives; shooting aids; cartridge boxes; leather and imitations of leather; trunks and suitcases’. That mark was later transferred in 2009 to a new company Fauré Le Page Paris, which acquired only the trademark rights but not the historic undertaking itself. It was this new company that then filed the “Fauré Le Page Paris 1717” trademark in 2011 for leather goods and related luxury products.

The question referred to the CJEU was whether, for the purposes of Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95/EC, a trademark containing a fanciful date can convey false information about the age, prestige, and know-how of the manufacturer, and whether that would be sufficient to establish deception or a sufficiently risk of deception for consumers.

This issue is significant because a historical date in a trademark may suggest continuity, inherited know-how, and the quality associated with a long-standing tradition. The Court held that adding a number that will be understood as indicating a year going as far back as “1717” can suggest continuity by implying a transfer of know-how from the original Fauré Le Page to the current owner. In the luxury goods sector, such a message can strongly affect consumers, who often associate heritage with craftsmanship, quality, and prestige. At the same time, the Court emphasised that deception must relate to a characteristic of the goods or services covered by the mark. A false impression about the proprietor alone is not enough. This approach is reinforced by earlier case law. In Copad v Dior (C-59/08), the Court held that, in the luxury sector, quality was not limited to material characteristics but also included the prestige image attached to the goods. By contrast, in the case concerning the trademark and name Elizabeth Emanuel (C-259/04), the CJEU had ruled that a mark was not deceptive merely because it mislead consumers about the person behind it. The distinction between the Emanuel and the present case lies in the fact that, in Emanuel, the whole business, goodwill, and trademark had been transferred, whereas in the present case, only the trademark itself was acquired.

The judgment shows that historical references in trademarks are not merely decorative; they can shape consumer expectations in a legally relevant way. At the same time, the Court leaves room for a case-specific assessment by the national court, which must examine each mark as a whole and determine how it is likely to be understood by the relevant public. In doing so, the court must pay particular attention to the presence of the word “Paris” alongside the number 1717 and to the overall message conveyed by the mark. That balance is what makes the decision important beyond the facts of Fauré Le Page: it confirms that heritage can be a source of trademark value, but only so long as it reflects reality.