An Alternative, Not an Exception: Valeo v. Bosch and the Redistribution of Cases Within the UPC

On 22 June 2026, the Court of Appeal of the UPC handed down two closely connected orders in the dispute between Valeo Systèmes d'Essuyage and the Bosch group.1 Read together, they do something more consequential than settling a venue quarrel between Paris and Düsseldorf: they settle the grammar of Article 33(1) UPCA — and, with it, part of the internal geography of the Court.

From Paris to Düsseldorf, and back

The facts follow the ordinary morphology of group litigation. On 16 September 2025, Valeo sued a constellation of Bosch entities — the German parent, together with French, Belgian, Serbian and Chinese companies — before the Paris seat of the Central Division, on the basis of EP 2 671 766, for acts of infringement alleged in Germany, Belgium and France. The claimant relied on the third subparagraph of Article 33(1) UPCA, which opens the Central Division to actions against defendants domiciled outside the territory of the Contracting Member States.

The judge-rapporteur read that subparagraph as an exception. By orders of 23 December 2025 and 21 January 2026, he held that it applies only where all defendants are domiciled outside the UPC territory, declined jurisdiction, referred the case to the Düsseldorf Local Division and designated English as the language of the proceedings.2 A French claimant, suing several Bosch companies, including a French subsidiary, for acts committed in part in France, thus found itself exported to Germany, in English — by construction, not by choice.

A second front had meanwhile opened. On 12 December 2025, Valeo brought a parallel action before the Paris Local Division, on the basis of EP 4 144 599, against essentially the same defendants. Bosch answered with the mirror-image objection: this time it was the anchor mechanism of Article 33(1)(b) itself that was said to fail, for want of a “commercial relationship” between the defendants and of the “same alleged infringement”. The judge-rapporteur and then the panel of the Paris Local Division dismissed the objection and granted leave to appeal.

On 22 June 2026, the Court of Appeal decided both appeals the same way, in French: it set aside the referral to Düsseldorf and confirmed the jurisdiction of the Central Division (Paris seat), with French as the language of the proceedings; and it upheld the jurisdiction of the Paris Local Division in the parallel action.

The grammar of the third subparagraph

The Court begins where the difficulty begins: with the architecture of Article 33(1). The provision governs the internal allocation of cases between the divisions of the Court of First Instance; it is distinct from the rules on international jurisdiction and must be construed autonomously. For infringement actions, it offers two alternative connecting factors — the place of the infringement and the domicile of the defendant — between which it establishes no hierarchy.

On the domicile side, the Court distinguishes three configurations. Where a defendant is domiciled in a Contracting Member State hosting a local division or participating in a regional one, that division has jurisdiction. Where a defendant is domiciled outside the UPC territory, the Central Division has jurisdiction — not, the Court insists, as an exception, but as an alternative forum, the functional equivalent of a local or regional division.3 And where the Member State concerned hosts no division, the Central Division again steps in.

The decisive move lies in the treatment of mixed configurations, where co-defendants sit on both sides of the border. The judge-rapporteur had resolved them by a rule of priority: the presence of a single defendant domiciled within the territory would pull the entire action toward a local division. The Court of Appeal refuses the category itself. The third subparagraph is not a derogation to be construed narrowly; it is a device ensuring the unity and effectiveness of the jurisdictional framework. Where the coherence of the proceedings so requires, the Central Division may take the whole case, precisely to avoid the fragmentation — parallel proceedings, irreconcilable decisions — that would otherwise follow from the first-instance construction. Any systematic priority of local divisions that would defeat procedural economy is rejected. One notes, in passing, a discreet but useful clarification: an order on a preliminary objection binds only the parties who lodged it, not the co-defendants who stood aside.

The anchor, loosened

The second order completes the picture from below.4 Bosch had argued for a strict reading of Article 33(1)(b): the anchor defendant would have to participate in every relevant supply chain, and the “same alleged infringement” would require each defendant's involvement with the same product or process, individually assessed. The Court of Appeal holds otherwise, on both conditions.

The commercial relationship may be direct or indirect; it may arise from the development, the manufacture or the marketing of the allegedly infringing products; and membership of the same corporate group may suffice, provided each defendant is involved in activities concerning the products at issue. The anchor need not stand at the center of every chain. As for the same alleged infringement, it is enough that the action concerns the infringement of the same patent in respect of the same product or product range: structural identity prevails over differences in commercial designation, market segment or territory.

Two features of the reasoning deserve emphasis. The first is the standard of review: at the preliminary-objection stage, the assessment is prima facie — a limited review of the parties' submissions, without prejudgment of the merits. Jurisdictional objections are thereby returned to their proper size: a threshold filter, not a first trial. The second is almost ironic: Bosch's own reliance on intra-group links to plead for the Düsseldorf Local Division sat uneasily with its attempt to deny any commercial relationship between the same entities. A group cannot be united for the purposes of the forum it prefers and atomized for the forum it fears.

Redistribution, not concentration

The doctrinal holding carries a cartographic consequence, and it is there that these orders matter most. Since the opening of the Court, the internal distribution of cases has gravitated, as is well known, toward the German divisions. Two levers feed that gravitation: the language of proceedings and the construction of the anchor mechanism. The judge-rapporteur's reading operated both levers in the same direction — a French claimant, French acts, a French co-defendant, and yet Düsseldorf, in English, by operation of law. The Court of Appeal releases them both.

For a French claimant, the practical meaning is simple: suing a global group — including entities domiciled in China and Serbia — in Paris, in French, may be a lawful configuration, whether the relevant connecting factor leads to the Central Division or to the Local Division. This is not parochialism. A jurisdiction whose legitimacy rests on being common cannot allow its internal map to be drawn by default settings. Multilingualism and polycentricity are not frictions the UPC must tolerate; they are part of its constitutional justification. I have argued in these columns that the UPC is best read as infrastructure: the rules of allocation are its switching points, and the Court of Appeal has just reset one of them — toward Paris, and more fundamentally toward the claimant's choice architecture that Article 33 makes available.

What the orders do not decide

The limits of the holding should nevertheless be kept in view. The Court of Appeal ruled only on the allocation of the two actions within the UPC. It did not decide whether EP 2 671 766 and EP 4 144 599 are valid or infringed; those questions remain to be determined on the merits. Nor does the interpretation adopted necessarily favor Paris. The same flexibility may tomorrow benefit claimants choosing Munich, Milan or Düsseldorf. The orders therefore redistribute procedural options, not cases themselves.

The durable question is therefore not doctrinal but institutional: whether this opening will translate — through speed, quality of reasoning and predictability — into a lasting redistribution of the Court’s traffic. A related question already looms: with two Valeo actions on technically related but legally distinct wiper-system patents now pending before two Paris divisions, the anti-fragmentation rationale invoked by the Court of Appeal may yet have to prove itself in case management, where consolidation and coordination are decided. Article 33 has ceased to be a corridor toward a single destination; it is again what its structure permits — a network. The task now falls to the Court as a whole to ensure that traffic can move effectively across that network.

• 1UPC Court of Appeal, orders of 22 June 2026, UPC_CoA_4/2026 and UPC_CoA_13/2026, Valeo Systèmes d'Essuyage v. Robert Bosch GmbH and others; UPC Court of Appeal, order of 22 June 2026, UPC_CoA_50/2026, Robert Bosch GmbH and others v. Valeo Systèmes d'Essuyage. All three appeals were decided in French, the language of the proceedings.
• 2Central Division (Paris seat), orders of the judge-rapporteur of 23 December 2025 and 21 January 2026, UPC_CFI_809/2025 (EP 2 671 766).
• 3Article 33(1), third subparagraph, UPCA: actions against defendants domiciled outside the territory of the Contracting Member States “shall be brought before the local or regional division in accordance with point (a) of this paragraph or before the central division”.
• 4Paris Local Division, order of the judge-rapporteur of 17 February 2026 and order of 23 March 2026, UPC_CFI_1963/2025 (EP 4 144 599).