The Court of Justice Rules on Interest in Competition Law Damages Claims - Wenzel Logistics (Case C-191/25)

The Court of Justice rules on the request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) concerning the application of Article 3 of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (Damages Directive), and the date from which interest accrues in actions for damages arising from anti-competitive conduct.

In its judgment of 30 April 2026 (the Judgment), the Court of Justice responded to a preliminary ruling request in follow-on proceedings arising from the European Commission’s Decision of 19 July 2016 (Case AT.39284 – Trucks). The Court concluded that Article 3 of the Damages Directive applies to any action for damages brought after December 2014, regardless of when the damage occurred, and that interest accrues from the moment the damage occurred. Interest forms part of full compensation regardless of when the damage occurred.

Background of the case

In January 2021, Wenzel Logistics GmbH (Wenzel Logistics) brought a damages claim against Mercedes-Benz Group AG for the alleged overcharge it had paid when purchasing Mercedes-Benz trucks during the infringement period. According to the claimant, interest on the overcharge amount accrued from the date the damage occurred, as provided for in Section 37 of the Austrian Federal Competition Act (AFCA), as amended following the transposition of the Damages Directive. The defendant argued that the date from which interest should accrue is the date of the legal claim, in accordance with the wording of the Austrian Civil Code applicable at the time of the trucks’ purchase.

At first instance, the Graz Regional Civil Court confirmed the defendant's reasoning and held that interest should accrue from the date of the legal claim. On appeal, the Graz Higher Regional Court for Civil and Criminal Matters dismissed Wenzel Logistics’ appeal, holding that the Court of First Instance had reached the correct conclusion by setting the starting point as the date specified by the applicable legislation at the time the damage occurred.

Questions referred to the Court of Justice

Wenzel Logistics appealed the judgment to the Austrian Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court, Article 3 of the Damages Directive, which states that interest forms part of the concept of compensation for the harm suffered, reflects the previous case law of the Court of Justice. However, the Supreme Court did not disregard the rules on the temporal application of Austrian civil law and the transposition measure of the Damages Directive. It therefore referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:

1. Whether Article 3 of the Damages Directive could apply to Wenzel Logistics’ claim even though it relates to purchases made at a time when the national provision transposing it was not yet in force; and

2. At what point interest begins to accrue (i.e. from the date of the contract, the date on which the price becomes due, or the date on which the price is actually paid) if Article 3 of the Damages Directive applies to Wenzel Logistics’ claim.

On the application of Article 3 of the Damages Directive to the Wenzel case

The Court of Justice notes that the provisions of the Damages Directive codifying its case law are immediately applicable (paragraph 39), and that Article 3 of the Damages Directive, which states that full compensation entails compensation for actual loss, loss of profit and interest, codifies the Court of Justice’s established case law. Article 3 is therefore immediately applicable to actions brought after 26 December 2014 (paragraphs 40–42).

Given that Section 37 of the AFCA transposes Article 3 of the Damages Directive and Wenzel Logistics' claim was brought in January 2021, the Court concludes that Section 37 of the AFCA applies to the main proceedings (paragraph 44). This is so regardless of whether the applicability of the provisions transposing the Damages Directive into Austrian law has been limited to damage occurring after 26 December 2016. Otherwise, the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU would be undermined, particularly as these actions require a complex factual and economic analysis, and there is often a long period between the discovery of the infringement and the moment the action for damages is brought (paragraphs 46 and 48).

On the starting date for the accrual of interest

The second question concerns the point from which interest begins to accrue. The Court notes that “[t]he occurrence of harm gives rise to a position which is fundamentally different from the position in which the person concerned would have been had the infringement in question not been committed, with the result that all components of the compensation (…) must be determined on the basis of the date on which the harm occurred” (paragraph 55). As is apparent from the above and from the Court of Justice’s own case law, interest (which compensates for the passage of time) is one of those components. The Court of Justice points out that the starting point for the accrual of interest has not been harmonised by the Damages Directive and must therefore be determined by the Member States in a manner that ensures the Damages Directive's effectiveness (paragraphs 56 and 57).

In analysing the Wenzel Logistics case, the Court identifies various equally relevant facts that may be considered as the moment at which the damage occurred (the contract date, the date on which the price becomes due, or the date when the price is actually paid). In view of this, it considers that the starting point for the accrual of interest must be the event that occurred first (paragraph 58) and, where the damage occurred in different stages, this first point in time must be identified for each of them (paragraph 59). In an obiter dictum, the Court of Justice considers that, in the Wenzel Logistics case, the point at which interest might begin to accrue (and, therefore, when the loss occurs)  is “the time when the funds became unavailable as a result of paying those prices”, without prejudice to subsequent verification by the national court (paragraph 60).

Comment

In the Judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed a point already established in its previous case law:

• Full compensation is achieved through the award of actual loss, loss of profit and interest (see, for instance, the judgments of 2 August 1993 (Marshall, C-271/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:335), paragraph 31, and ,13 July 2006 (Manfredi, joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04) paragraph 100); and

•  Interest must accrue from the moment the damage occurred.

In the context of antitrust damages, there are three possible points in time at which the damage may be deemed to have occurred and which may be relevant for determining when interest should begin to accrue: the date of the contract for the purchase of the products, the date from which the price is payable, or the date of actual payment. Each of these should be readily identifiable from the relevant transaction documents (such as the contract or invoice) or banking documents (such as the payment receipt).

In its response to the referring court, the Court of Justice does not expressly rule in favour of any of them. However, in an obiter dictum, it opts for the third: the date of actual payment. This seems to be the most consistent with the aim of compensating the harm caused (without overcompensating), because it is based on the moment when the funds are disposed of to pay the price of the product or service affected by the competition law infringement.

However, courts may face significant practical difficulties in quantifying the award (including interest) if they apply this solution strictly. For instance, where the alleged overcharge is paid in instalments or where none of these points can be easily identified. The following examples illustrate this difficulty and how it has been overcome:

• The Spanish Supreme Court, in its judgments of 21 January 2025 (ECLI:ES:TS:2025:211) and 27 January 2026 (ECLI:ES:TS:2026:165) (amongst others), delivered on a damages claim for harm caused by the purchase of trucks through a leasing contract. The Supreme Court ruled that the starting point for calculating interest would be the date the contract was signed (rather than the date of payment of each instalment) on two grounds. First, this avoids distinguishing between claimants who purchased trucks and paid at once and those who financed the acquisition, because neither of these situations should alter the moment the harm was suffered. Secondly, the overcharge allegedly paid applies to the truck’s price and the higher cost of financing the purchase; calculating interest from the payment of each instalment (rather than from the date the contract was signed) would not compensate for the full extent of the loss suffered, as it would not cover the higher financing cost.

• The Provincial Court of Barcelona, for instance, in its judgment of 2 February 2026 (ECLI:ES:APB:2026:426) in the dairy industry follow-on litigation, concludes that it is difficult to identify a clear date to start the accrual of interest because the damage arose in the framework of a prolonged raw milk supply relationship between dairy farmers and the defendants (companies in the dairy industry) rather than a single or an easily identified number of transactions.

These solutions, albeit imperfect, are consistent with the aim of full (but not over-) compensation that lies in the heart of the Judgment, and Article 3 of the Damages Directive.

It is worth noting that the Court of Justice reminds us in the Judgment that the Damages Directive provides for only a partial harmonisation of competition law damages claims regime. The Court of Justice confirms that Member States may maintain divergent national provisions and regimes compatible with the Damages Directive and EU law, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected.

The Judgment illustrates these potential divergences with the dies a quo for the accrual of interest, but other examples include the interest rate and its accrual method (simple or compound).

In Spain, until the judgments of the Supreme Court of 5 June 2025 (ECLI:ES:TS:2025:2621) and 17 June 2025 (ECLI:ES:TS:2025:2857), courts applied simple interest in light of general (and by-default) Spanish civil law provisions in antitrust damages awards. However, in those judgments, the Supreme Court ruled that, in light of the infringement and exclusively for competition law damages claims, it could be appropriate to apply, depending on the circumstances of the claimant’s case, the compound accrual method instead.

This debate, which remains open in Spanish courts, is no trivial matter. Depending on the type of infringement, when the harm occurred and when the claim is brought, the amount of interest accrued may be less than, equal to or greater than the harm allegedly suffered. In any event, it is unlikely that the Court of Justice will deliver a judgment positioning itself in favour of a certain interest rate or a certain accrual method provided that the effectiveness of competition law is not put in jeopardy. On this topic, it is worth reading Magnus Strand, Lucrezio Figurelli and Filippo Nezzi working paper ‘Competition Damages in Europe: Comparing national rules on interest and limitation’ where the authors examine the impact of the lack of harmonisation concerning interest, its rate, its accrual date and the accrual method across the EU Member States (plus England and Wales, and Norway), together with the potential impact of absolute limitation periods (where applicable) in damages claims.

Final thoughts

This Judgment is the best evidence that apparently clear-cut concepts (such as when interest starts accruing) may not be as straightforward as they seem. The impact of the Judgment on antitrust damages litigation will not be significant in those jurisdictions where interest was already considered to accrue from the moment the harm was suffered, understood as the moment of purchase of the goods or services affected by the infringement. However, the Judgment may have a greater impact in those jurisdictions where interest accrued from a later date (e.g. when the claim is brought). Sooner or later, practitioners and academics will see the real impact of the Judgment, and particularly whether it will foster private enforcement of competition law in certain Member States or, at least, make others more attractive jurisdictions in which to bring these damages claims.

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The author is part of a team active in competition law private litigation in Spain, such as the follow-on Trucks litigation and the dairy industry follow-on litigation. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of Uría Menéndez or any of its clients. The author thanks his colleagues for their comments to an earlier version of this short paper, as well as the editors of the Kluwer Competition Law Blog.