No-Poach Agreements in EU: The Delivery Hero/Glovo Case and Emerging National Enforcement

Imagine you’re a top-performing employee, ready for your next career move. You update your LinkedIn profile, polish your CV and start applying to competitors in your industry. But no matter how qualified you are, the offers never come. Why? Because your employer and its rivals have a secret agreement: they won’t hire each other’s staff. No job interviews. No salary negotiations. Just an invisible barrier keeping you and your wage exactly where you are.

Now, imagine this scenario playing out on a continental scale. That’s exactly what happened in the case of Delivery Hero and Glovo, two of Europe’s largest food delivery platforms. In June 2025, the European Commission (“Commission”) fined them EUR 329 million for operating a labour market cartel1 (“Delivery Hero/Glovo case”). This was the first time the EU had ever penalized such an agreement.

The case wasn’t just about two companies breaking the rules. It was about how modern businesses can manipulate labour markets through informal agreements that keep workers trapped and wages artificially low. And it marked the beginning of a new era in competition enforcement, where labour market restrictions are treated with the same severity as price-fixing cartels.

The Case That Redefined Labour Market Competition

At the core of the Delivery Hero/Glovo case was a no-poach agreement, a pact between the two companies not to hire each other’s employees. What began as a limited clause in a 2018 shareholders agreement soon expanded into a blanket ban on soliciting each other’s staff. The result? Suppressed wages, limited career opportunities, and a labour market that was anything but competitive.

The Commission classified this as a “restriction by object” under Article 101(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)2, meaning it was inherently illegal and no proof of actual harm was required. In this regard, Commission stated that: “No-poach agreements typically cause economic harm. In particular, they can have negative effects on wages because the parties can no longer proactively offer higher wages to induce employees to switch, and/or provide counteroffers to induce their own employees to stay. By doing so, no-poach agreements are capable of preventing the efficient allocation of productive employees to productive firms. Declining job reallocation rates have been linked to declining productivity and hence slower GDP growth3”. This decision placed no-poach agreements in the same category as price-fixing and market-sharing cartels, making them a top enforcement priority for regulators across European Union.

But the cartel didn’t stop at no-poach agreements. The companies also engaged in two other anti-competitive practices that reinforced their control over the market:

Exchanging Sensitive Information

Delivery Hero and Glovo didn’t just agree not to hire each other’s employees, they also shared commercially sensitive information, including:

• Pricing strategies (both current and future).

• Market expansion plans.

• Production capacities and cost data.

This information exchange allowed the companies to align their market behavior, reducing competition and harming consumers by limiting choice and innovation. The Commission’s Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements are clear that such exchanges can restrict competition by object, making them just as illegal as outright cartel agreements4.

Market Sharing

The companies also divided national markets, with Glovo focusing on Spain and Delivery Hero on Germany. In markets where both operated, they avoided direct competition, sometimes by selling business units to eliminate overlap. This market partitioning reduced incentives to compete, harming consumers and workers alike.

Together, these practices formed what the Commission determined to be a single and continuous infringement of EU competition law.

Why This Case Matters: A Fundamental Shift in Enforcement

The Delivery Hero/Glovo decision is more than just a fine, it represents a fundamental shift in how competition law treats labour market restrictions. Here’s why it’s a landmark case:

1.        No-Poach Agreements Are Now “By Object” Restrictions

The Commission’s decision to classify no-poach agreements as “by object” infringements means they are now presumed illegal without needing to prove actual harm. This places them on the same level as price-fixing and market-sharing cartels, making them a top enforcement priority for regulators.

This is a game-changer for workers and businesses alike. For employees, it means that anti-competitive agreements that once flew under the radar are now explicitly illegal, offering a path to fairer wages and better job opportunities. For companies, it means that informal agreements, even those not committed to paper, can lead to heavy fines and reputational damage.

2.        Labour Markets Are Now a Core Antitrust Issue

Traditionally, competition law focused on product and service markets. However, this case expands the scope to include labour markets, recognizing that restrictions on hiring can be just as anti-competitive as traditional cartels. The decision signals that workers’ rights are now a key part of competition enforcement, a shift that reflects the growing importance of labour market dynamics in today’s economy.

This is particularly significant in sectors with high worker mobility, such as tech, healthcare, and logistics, where talent competition is fierce. By treating labour market restrictions as a core antitrust issue, the Commission is sending a clear message: fair competition must extend to job opportunities and wages.

3.        A Warning to All Industries

While the Delivery Hero/Glovo case involved food delivery, the principles apply across all sectors. From tech to healthcare to franchises, companies must now ensure their hiring practices comply with competition law. The case serves as a warning: no-poach agreements are illegal, and companies that engage in them will face severe consequences.

This is not just about legal compliance. It’s about redefining how businesses compete for talent. Companies that once relied on informal agreements to limit hiring must now rethink their strategies, ensuring that their practices comply with competition law and promote fair competition.

Importantly, this applies not just to direct competitors, but to any companies that compete for the same talent pool. For example, a hospital and a tech firm could both be hiring IT specialists, or a bank and a consulting firm might compete for the same financial analysts. Even if these companies don’t compete in the same product market, agreements not to poach each other’s employees are still illegal under EU competition law.

The Broader Context: Slovakia’s First Labour Market Cartel Case

While the Delivery Hero/Glovo case established important precedents at the EU level, national competition authorities (e.g. Slovakia, Portugal, Netherlands) have begun applying these principles in their own jurisdictions. A notable example comes from Slovakia, where the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) issued its first no-poach decision in June 20255, demonstrating how EU-level enforcement priorities are being implemented at the member state level.

The case involved the Slovak Association of Fuel Industry and Trade (SAPPO), which was fined EUR 10,000 for including no-poach clauses in its “Ethical Code,”, which required member companies to refrain from soliciting or hiring employees from other member or Glovo companies6. Unlike the Delivery Hero/Glovo case which targeted direct competitors, this enforcement action focused on an industry association that had facilitated anti-competitive agreements among its members.

AMO further noted that such no-poach agreements can lead to negative consequences including inefficient allocation of human resources, reduced competition in the labour market and potentially lower wages or poorer working conditions for employees. Additionally, according to AMO these practices may ultimately affect consumers by reducing the quality of goods and services provided by employers bound by such agreements.

The low amount fine reflects the AMO’s approach to this first case in the labour market area, serving as a clear signal to businesses about the potential risks of engaging in similar practices. As this is the first decision of its kind, it establishes an important precedent for how labour market cartels will be treated under Slovak competition law, though it remains subject to further administrative procedures.

A New Era for Labour Markets and Competition Law

Delivery Hero/Glovo case represents a watershed moment in competition enforcement. For the first time, the Commission explicitly classified no-poach agreements as restrictions by object under Article 101(1) TFEU, placing them in the same category as the most serious forms of anti-competitive behavior such as price-fixing and market-sharing cartels. This legal qualification is particularly significant as it means that no-poach agreements are now considered inherently harmful to competition, without requiring proof of actual effects on the market.

This landmark decision has set in motion a broader shift in competition enforcement across Europe. The recent action by the AMO against the SAPPO further illustrates this trend. While the legal qualification in the Slovak case may differ, both decisions demonstrate that competition authorities at both EU and national levels are increasingly focusing on labour market collusion and its potential to distort competition, suppress wages, and limit worker mobility.

The emergence of these cases reflects a growing recognition among regulators that fair competition must extend beyond traditional product and service markets to include labour markets. The Delivery Hero/Glovo decision, with its explicit classification as a restriction by object, establishes a strong precedent that is likely to influence future enforcement actions. Meanwhile, the Slovak case shows how national authorities are applying competition law principles to address anti-competitive practices in labour markets, even when such practices are embedded in seemingly benign industry codes or ethical guidelines.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the position of any institution or authority. This analysis is intended for academic and professional discussion and does not constitute official guidance or policy.

Sources:

1.  Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 101.

2. Case AT.40795 – FOOD DELIVERY SERVICES, 2 June 2025, C(2025) 3304 final.

3. European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 259, 21 July 2023

4. Antimonopoly Office of Slovak Republic, KARTELY: PMÚ uložil prvú pokutu za kartelovú dohodu na trhu práce, available here: https://www.antimon.gov.sk/PMÚ-uložil-prvú-pokutu-za-kartelovú-dohodu-na-trhu-na-trhu-prace/?csrt=13150512423550640227

• 1Case AT.40795 – FOOD DELIVERY SERVICES, 2 June 2025, C(2025) 3304 final
• 2Ibid, para 71
• 3Ibid, para 72
• 4Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 259, 21 July 2023, pp. 1-125, para. 413-415
• 5Antimonopoly Office of Slovak Republic, KARTELY: PMÚ uložil prvú pokutu za kartelovú dohodu na trhu práce, available here: https://www.antimon.gov.sk/PMÚ-uložil-prvú-pokutu-za-kartelovú-dohodu-na-trhu-na-trhu-prace/?csrt=13150512423550640227
• 6Ibid