Google Shopping v. Idealo: The Largest Damages Award in Competition Law History by a German Court: Commentary on the Judgment of the Berlin II Regional Court dated November 13, 2025 — 16 O 195/19 Kart (2)

Introduction

Proceedings for abuse of a dominant position have steadily increased in recent years, suggesting that private enforcement will also gain prominence. However, unlike in the case of cartels—where case law is more developed—damages arising from abuses of dominant position in digital markets have been scarcely addressed in European civil courts. This ruling serves as a precedent for a line of litigation that is beginning to take shape in Europe.

In the Google Shopping case (Grand Chamber 2024 Appeal Judgment), the CJEU recognized self-preferencing as a new form of abuse of a dominant position. The legal proceedings initiated by Idealo are a significant example of the interplay between public and private enforcement and the complexity of these types of cases marked by singular procedural questions and material questions that depend from the economic analysis of the conduct and the harm.

Background

The origin of the dispute lies in Case AT.39740 — Google Search (Shopping). The Commission had been investigating for nearly 10 years whether Google's preference for its own price comparison service was illegal and adopted its penalty decision on June 27, 2017.

The Commission concluded that Google had held a dominant position in the general search markets of all countries in the European Economic Area since 2008, with market shares exceeding 90%. Based on this premise, the Commission ruled that the practice of displaying its own price comparison service in a privileged position, while reducing the visibility of rival comparison services, constituted an abuse prohibited by Article 102 of the TFEU.

Since 2000, Idealo has offered a free product and price comparison service to users. Its business model is to charge merchants for each user who, after comparing prices on Idealo, clicks and is redirected to the merchant's online store.

To fully understand the scope of the case and the controversial conduct later challenged by Idealo, it is important to clarify that Google’s service (Comparison Shopping Service, known as “CSS”) is not limited to the Google Shopping website or interface; rather, what is truly relevant are the so-called Shopping Units. These are the shopping result blocks that appear directly on the general search results page. The abuse not only affected the standalone website but also the entire integrated results display system.

The Commission imposed a record fine of €2,424,495,000 on Google and expressly stated that harmed competitors could seek damages in national courts.

Although Idealo was not a formal complainant during the administrative phase, the European Commission used it as a reference case. The Commission’s Decision describes Idealo in its Decision as Germany’s largest price comparison site, with 16 million users per month, in addition to using this company to define the market and demonstrate the exclusionary effect caused by Google’s conduct.

Idealo’s business model, and that of other comparison sites, is based on charging merchants for each user who arrives at their page from the comparison site. If Google diverts that traffic to its own service, the economic harm is direct and immediate. The Commission documented this effect, which gave Idealo a solid basis for its subsequent civil claim.

The Commission defined two distinct product markets in its Decision: the market for general internet search services and the market for comparison shopping services. The delimitation of both markets was based on a demand-side substitutability analysis. As regards comparison shopping services, the Commission found that they constituted a separate product market, since different specialized search services are not substitutable with one another, and neither general search advertising, direct retailers, nor online marketplaces could be considered adequate substitutes for dedicated comparison-shopping platforms.

In terms of geographic scope, both markets were found to be national in scope, reflecting linguistic segmentation across the EEA. On that basis, the Commission established that Google held a dominant position in the market for general internet search services in each national market from 2008 onwards, supported by market shares consistently exceeding 80% and significant barriers to entry.

The infringement was assessed across thirteen national EEA markets: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway, in all of which Google's self-preferencing conduct had the effect of diverting traffic away from rival comparison services towards its own service.

On April 12, 2019, Idealo filed a lawsuit seeking approximately 500 million euros against Google, taking into account the period of infringement recognized by the European Commission and arguing that the abuse continued because the measures adopted in 2017 did not guarantee genuine equal treatment.

The defendants in the damages action are two companies within the Google/Alphabet group. Until January 2019, Google LLC was responsible for the search engine in Europe; since then, Google Ireland Ltd. has been responsible. According to the LG Berlin II, both are jointly and severally liable. Idealo sought monetary compensation, a judicial declaration regarding the existence of the harm, and access to information regarding Google's traffic and revenue. Furthermore, it argued that the abuse did not end in 2017 but continued until 2023, thereby significantly extending the period during which damages could be claimed.

In November 2021, following Google’s appeal against the European Commission’s penalty decision, the General Court issued a judgment essentially upholding the Commission’s decision and maintaining the full fine (Case T-612/17, ECLI:EU:T:2021:763). In September 2024, the CJEU settled the matter: Google’s self-preferencing constituted a separate abuse, distinct from a denial of access, and Google was required to treat rival comparison services in the same manner as its own service.

In early 2025, following the CJEU’s September 2024 judgment confirming the Commission’s fine on appeal (Case C-48/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:726), Idealo expanded its claim. The updated claim took the Grand Chamber Judgment, now final, to file the claim as a follow-on action for the period January 2008- June 2017. Also, the stand-alone claim arguing that the abuse had persisted after the Commission Decision was extended to 2025, instead of the period initially claim individually (2017-2019).

As a result of the Grand Chamber confirming the abuse of dominance and the extension for six additional years, Idealo quantified again its damage suffered and increased the amount from €500 million to over €3.3 billion.

The contrast between the €3.3 billion claimed and the €465 million ultimately awarded reflects the difficulty of quantifying damages in these cases and the Court's caution in exercising its discretion. As a clarification, the amount actually awarded is €374,094,751.88; however, when adding the recognized interest of €91,126,641.82, the total amount comes to approximately €465 million: the largest antitrust damages award granted to date by a German court.

The Conduct: How Google’s Self-Preferencing Worked

Since 2002, Google has operated its own price comparison service, now called Google Shopping. Since 2013, the results of this service have been presented in so-called Shopping Units: visual blocks with images and prices that consistently appear at the top of the general search results page. The problem is that the privileged position of these Shopping Units did not reflect the criteria of relevance or quality for the user, but rather a unilateral decision by Google to place its own service above all others.

Rival comparison sites, on the other hand, were subject to general ranking algorithms—and even algorithmic penalties—that determined their position based on objective criteria. The result was an uneven playing field: Google’s comparison service always appeared first, and the others wherever the algorithm decided.

The result was a twofold blow: competitors like Idealo lost market share, and consumers found their ability to access the best available options curtailed. On top of this, Google exploited data from sellers and users who used its services to improve its own comparison tool. And the dampening effect on innovation was significant: if a platform consistently overshadows third-party offerings, those third parties stop investing in improving their products, which, in the long run, harms the market and consumers.

Following the Commission's Decision, Google voluntarily adopted a remedial measure to comply with the cease-and-desist order and allowed rival comparison sites to pay to appear in Shopping Units, in the same way as its own service. However, neither the Commission nor the European courts ever declared that this measure was sufficient to end the abuse. It was the Berlin Regional Court II that, in the context of this civil litigation, concluded in 2025 that the measure was insufficient: users continued to perceive the Shopping Units as Google’s own service, and by clicking on a product, they were taken directly to the merchant’s store, without going through any rival comparison site.

Thus, although products offered through price comparison sites like Idealo could appear in the same position as Shopping Units belonging to Google’s own comparison service, the comparison site was effectively deprived of all visibility, since users did not interact directly with its website.

In fact, only a small minority of users clicked on the links to rival comparison sites that appeared below the products; the rest went directly to the store, completely ignoring third-party comparison sites.

As an example, something similar continues to happen today on Google's search engine. If a user searches for any product, boxes (Shopping Units) containing those products will appear. Clicking the image or the product name opens a tab to the advertiser's website. However, at the bottom of the shopping unit, the price comparison site from which the product originates appears (From Producthero, From Klarna, From Idealo, etc.).

Unless the user specifically clicks the comparison site's name, they can view the product or purchase without visiting the comparison site's website or realizing it acted as an intermediary in their purchase. Unless the user is particularly attentive, in their eyes, the transaction was completed through Google's comparison service, not another competitor's.

In 2019, Google introduced new measures, known as Comparison Listing Ads. In the opinion of the Berlin Court, these measures also failed to resolve the restrictions on competition imposed by Google, thereby declaring that the infringement continued uninterrupted from 2008 until at least December 31, 2023.

An interesting point in the ruling is precisely the final cutoff date for the period eligible for damages. The LG Berlin II set that cutoff at the effective date of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) in early 2024, reasoning that from that point onward, the conduct would be governed by a different regulatory framework.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that even after the changes introduced in 2024, the Shopping Units remained under Google's own comparison service, especially after a new presentation layer, the Product Viewer, was added—also under its control. This product site is currently operational and serves as a preliminary filter before accessing Google Shopping, its own comparison service, where now, only its own compared products are displayed. In Idealo’s view, the structural conditions giving rise to the abuse had not changed substantially. Both Idealo and Google have appealed the ruling.

On the same day as the Idealo ruling, the Berlin Regional Court II handed down another judgment against Google in a virtually identical case: the lawsuit filed by Producto GmbH, which operates the recommendation portal Testberichte.de. The damage in this case amounted to approximately 107 million euros.

The factual and legal framework of both cases is the same. The difference in the amount is explained by Producto GmbH's smaller size and lower turnover.

In both cases, the appeals focus primarily on disagreements over the amount of damage to be redressed. However, the plaintiffs are confident that the appellate court will confirm that the abuse continues even after the changes introduced following the DMA and extends beyond the date set by LG Berlin II.

Beyond Idealo’s perspective and the significant loss of profits this may have entailed for a price comparison site competing in the same market, consumers have also been harmed, as their ability to access the best comparison sites has been reduced, leading to less variety. Over time, consumers have likely also paid higher prices due to the lack of incentives for innovation and the absence of visible competition among price comparison sites. However, this harm is diffuse and very difficult to quantify.

In practice, this harm is unlikely to be compensated due to procedural barriers to filing class-action lawsuits, leaving consumers' harm unredressed.

Google’s Liability

Article 16(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides that, once the European Commission has found a competition law infringement in a final decision, civil courts are bound by that finding and cannot re-examine whether or not an abuse occurred.

This binding effect is complemented at the level of national proceedings by Article 9(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU, which requires Member States to ensure that an infringement of competition law established by a final decision of a competent review court is deemed to be irrefutably established for the purposes of an action for damages brought before their national courts.

In Germany, these provisions are transposed through § 33b of the GWB (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), which establishes that civil courts are bound by a final infringement decision of the European Commission as well as by any corresponding findings contained in final judicial decisions issued following a challenge to those decisions.

What falls outside the scope of this binding effect, and what the LG Berlin II therefore had to determine on its own was whether that infringement caused specific harm to the claimant, the value of that harm, and whether a causal link existed between the two.

For the period after 2017, the court conducted its own analysis, concluding that Google remained dominant in the German search market and that its conduct remained abusive.

Regarding the legal characterization of the abuse, it should be emphasized that self-preferencing does not amount to a denial of access. Rival product and price comparison services had already obtained access to Google's search engine, so the relevant conduct could not be considered a denial of access. What Google was doing was treating them discriminatorily concerning that access.

This is a highly relevant point, since competition law imposes a particularly stringent standard for cases in which a dominant firm refuses to grant access to infrastructure or to provide a service to its competitors—known as the Bronner doctrine, derived from the CJEU judgment of November 26, 1998 (Case C-7/97, EU:C:1998:569).

One of Google's key defence strategies from the outset of the investigation was to frame its conduct as a denial of access to its general search results page, thereby triggering the strict evidentiary standard associated with the Bronner doctrine. Under that doctrine, a refusal to supply or grant access constitutes an abuse only where three cumulative conditions are met: the input in question must be indispensable and without any real or potential substitute, the refusal must be liable to eliminate all competition, and there must be no objective justification. Google argued that its Shopping Units did not constitute such an indispensable input and that, accordingly, the Commission had failed to establish the conditions required for an abusive refusal of access.

The CJEU rejected this argument and drew a crucial distinction. Rival comparison services had never been excluded from Google's general search results page. The problem was not that Google denied them access, but that, once present on that page, they were subjected to unreasonable and discriminatory conditions of access. Google applied demotion algorithms, most notably the Panda algorithm, to rival comparison services, systematically relegating their results to positions so low as to render them effectively invisible to users, while at the same time presenting its own Shopping Units in prominent and visually enriched formats that were not subject to those same algorithms.

The abuse therefore consisted not of a passive refusal within the meaning of the Bronner doctrine, but of an active combination of self-preferencing and algorithmic downgrading, a complex practice that went beyond mere preferential treatment. Since the conduct took the form of discriminatory treatment rather than a refusal of access as such, the Bronner criteria were inapplicable. To bring the infringement to an end, it sufficed for Google to apply to rival comparison services the same positioning and presentation procedures and methods that it applied to its own service, without any need to establish indispensability in the strict Bronner sense

Furthermore, the CJEU emphasized that Google's conduct was more complex than simple self-preferencing. The abuse consisted of two coordinated and mutually reinforcing practices. On the one hand, Google granted its own comparison-shopping service prominent and visually enriched presentation at the top of the general search results page, in the form of Shopping Units displayed with images, prices and merchant names, while exempting that service from the adjustment algorithms applied to generic search results.

On the other hand, rival comparison services were confined to appearing exclusively as generic results in the form of blue links and were simultaneously subjected to those same adjustment algorithms, most notably the Panda algorithm, which systematically downgraded their ranking to positions so low as to render them effectively invisible to users. It is worth noting, however, that the Panda algorithm was never applied to idealo.de, which explains why Idealo's traffic data in Germany diverged from the general downward trend observed among other comparison services during the relevant period.

This distinction is significant for the purposes of the Idealo damages claim. The harm suffered by Idealo did not derive primarily from algorithmic downgrading through Panda, but rather from the diversion of user traffic towards Google's own Shopping Unit through its preferential positioning and enriched format.

According to CJEU case law, now confirmed by the German court, a company cannot claim that it did not know it was acting unlawfully when the error was not inevitable. In this case, since the Commission's 2017 Decision, Google knew with certainty that its conduct favored its comparison service to the detriment of its competitors, thereby eliminating any possible good-faith argument for the subsequent period.

The harm suffered: an evidentiary hurdle for Idealo

Unlike in cartel cases, where Article 17(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU, transposed into German law via § 33a(2) of the GWB, establishes a legal presumption that the cartel caused economic harm, such a presumption does not exist in cases of abuse of a dominant position.

The court had to analyze for itself whether Idealo had suffered any harm, without being able to rely on any legal presumption. This asymmetry is one of the most criticized aspects of the current competition law damages regime, as the evidentiary standard required of the injured party in cases of abuse of a dominant position is more stringent than that applied in proceedings arising from a cartel, even though the potential for harm from both infringements is comparable.

Legal doctrine and case law suggest, however, that at least a factual presumption of harm should apply in cases of abuse of dominance. The German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has progressively expanded this logic in various contexts: it applied it in the truck cartel to price agreements, extended it in the Schlecker case to the exchange of price-related information, and applied it in the LKW-Kartell case to the general principle that prices set within the framework of a cartel are, on average, higher than those that would have been formed without the agreement restricting competition. In all these cases, the BGH has further emphasized that the judge applying § 287 ZPO has discretion in forming its conviction, and that refraining from awarding even minimal damages is justified only in exceptional cases. Applying that same logic to abuses of a dominant position would be consistent with this trend in case law and with the principle of effectiveness of European Union law.

An additional argument stems from European case law itself. The General Court, in its judgment of November 10, 2021 (Case T-612/17), stated in paragraph 678 that exclusionary practices by dominant undertakings may, in certain circumstances, be as serious as price-fixing or market-sharing agreements—so-called “hardcore” agreements. If EU courts equate the gravity of both categories of conduct, this reinforces the position that Idealo should not be subject to a more rigorous standard of proof than that applied in cartel proceedings.

Comparative case law also supports this line of reasoning. In the Twenga case in France (Economic Activities Court of Paris, November 24, 2025, Case No. RG 2020004977, Chamber 1-13, Kwerian SAS and SA Twenga v. Google Inc., Google France SARL, Alphabet Inc., and Google Ireland Limited.), the Paris Commercial Court ordered Google to pay €51.5 million in damages to the French price comparison site Twenga for abusing its dominant position. The abuse continued beyond the period sanctioned by the European Commission, and the court considered the “persistence of negative effects” to be “plausible” through 2022, despite the corrective measures adopted by Google. Twenga sued Google seeking compensation for the harm suffered in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands—markets that accounted for 92% of its revenue.

Quantification of Damages

With regard to quantifying damages, Idealo is claiming lost profits, that is, the revenue it would have earned had Google not engaged in abusive conduct. Quantifying harm in competition law cases requires constructing a counterfactual scenario, comparing the claimant's actual situation with the situation that would probably have existed in the absence of the infringement. Since that counterfactual cannot be directly observed and depends on assumptions and data limitations, the exercise can only yield best estimates rather than a single true value.

The Commission's Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages (SWD(2013) 205), and the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Practical Guide (C(2013) 3440) identify three principal methodological approaches for constructing that counterfactual. The temporal comparator method looks at the affected market before, during and after the infringement period, and is generally advantageous given the greater comparability of market characteristics. The geographic comparator method uses an unaffected market as a reference, provided it is sufficiently similar in terms of product, competitive conditions and market structure. Lastly, econometric methods, including regression analysis, allow the effect of the infringement to be isolated from other factors affecting the market, either by forecasting the counterfactual using data from an unaffected period or by incorporating an infringement indicator into a broader statistical model.

In exclusionary abuse cases under Article 102 TFEU, harm to competitors is typically expressed as lost profits, comparing actual profits with those that would probably have been earned in the absence of the infringement.

Idealo advocated a calculation based on the traffic it would have received in the absence of the infringement and its economic value per click. The court, however, rejected both Idealo's and Google's models. Where the infringement is of long duration, the temporal comparability of reference periods degrades considerably due to structural changes and market trends, making the selection of the reference period and the need for adjustments particularly important.

The standard comparator method was not applicable in this case because the market had been distorted for fifteen years, leaving no reliable reference period or unaffected geographic market against which to benchmark performance. Even so, the court correctly held that this circumstance could not serve as grounds for denying any compensation.

The Practical Guide itself acknowledges that absolute precision in quantification is unattainable and that the legal framework must not demand a degree of certainty that renders the action for damages practically unviable. Article 17(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU reinforces this principle by requiring that neither the burden nor the standard of proof for the quantification of harm renders the exercise of the right to damages practically impossible or excessively difficult, and by empowering national courts to estimate the amount of harm where precise quantification is practically impossible or excessively difficult on the basis of the evidence available. The risk of uncertainty in quantification is accordingly borne by the party that caused the harm, not by the injured party.

Notwithstanding this, the court opted for its own methodology. It used Idealo's actual traffic in the year prior to the start of the abuse. Then, the Court projected this data into the future by applying e-commerce growth rates in the German market during the period of infringement. The underlying logic is that if the market grew at that rate, Idealo would have grown similarly in the absence of the abuse. The hypothetical traffic calculated for the entire period amounted to 2.748 billion clicks or visits, starting from an initial traffic of 38.3 million annual visits to the comparison site’s website, with an annual growth rate of 9.19% applied. Additionally, the first year was discounted because the abuse did not fully take effect from the outset.

The result of this calculation is a loss of profits quantified at 374,094,751.88 euros for the 2008–2023 period, after deducting additional costs. Including interest, the total amounts to approximately 465 million euros. This figure represents only 14% of the damages that Idealo itself had calculated in its model. The divergence between the Court's methodology and that advocated by the parties is one of the main reasons why Idealo has appealed the judgment.

The future ruling by the Kammergericht Berlin (KG Berlin) deciding on the appeal will have to address this methodology and determine whether the general growth of e-commerce is truly comparable to the traffic trends of a price comparison site. However, the KG may only intervene if clear legal errors were committed regarding the existence of the damage (in this case, only for the period not sanctioned by the European Commission) or its quantification; it cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the court.

Article 17(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU requires that neither the burden of proof nor the standard of proof required for quantifying the damage render the exercise of the right to compensation practically impossible or excessively difficult, and expressly empowers national courts to estimate the amount of the damage when its precise quantification proves practically impossible or excessively difficult based on the available evidence.

This mandate is implemented in German law through § 33a(3) of the GWB, which expressly refers to § 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) for the determination of damages and allows for consideration of the proportional benefit obtained by the infringing party through the breach. § 287(1) of the ZPO grants the court the authority to decide on the existence and extent of damages by weighing all circumstances and forming its own conviction, without being bound by the parties' offers of evidence.

The Bundesgerichtshof has confirmed that, for the question of whether damage has resulted from a competition law violation, the applicable standard of proof is that of § 287(1) of the ZPO. Thus, it is sufficient that there is a clearly predominant probability, based on a solid foundation, that the damage has occurred.

Conclusions

The ruling confirms that corrective measures voluntarily adopted by an infringer do not automatically extinguish its civil liability if the harm persists. Google introduced changes in 2017, but the court found them to be insufficient. The infringement continued, and with it the obligation to pay damages.

The quantification methodology used by the Berlin court, based on extrapolation from e-commerce growth, reflects that the difficulty of calculating the damage cannot serve as an escape route for the party that caused it.

The existence of the parallel case of Producto GmbH, with a €107 million damages award handed down on the same day by the same court, as well as other similar cases reflected in the case law of other European Union Member States, confirms that this is only the beginning of a new series of lawsuits against Google.

From the perspective of the Digital Markets Act, this judgment is also of great strategic value. Article 6(5) DMA explicitly prohibits gatekeepers from treating more favorably, in ranking and related indexing or crawling, their own services and products compared to those of third parties, codifying in binding regulatory terms the very conduct that the Commission had already found unlawful under Article 102 TFEU.

The Idealo judgment confirms that national civil courts are fully equipped to adjudicate and quantify the resulting harm and opens the door to future damages claims based directly on the DMA, which may carry an even lighter evidential burden.

In addition, Article § 33b of the GWB provides that civil courts are bound by the European Commission's findings of infringement of Article 5, 6 DMA established in a final decision of a competition authority or confirmed by a competent review court.

Furthermore, a plaintiff claiming for damages on a violation of the DMA will need only prove the existence of the harm and the causal link, without having to demonstrate a dominant position or anticompetitive effects, which significantly simplifies the burden of proof compared to an action based exclusively on Article 102 of the TFEU.

References

Case Law

CJEU, Judgment of November 26, 1998, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG and others, C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569.

CJEU, Judgment of June 18, 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde and Bundeskartellanwalt v. Schenker & Co. AG and others, C-681/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:404.

CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of January 11, 2024, Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. v. European Commission, C-48/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:14.

CJEU, Grand Chamber, Judgment of September 10, 2024, Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. v. European Commission, C-48/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:726.

General Court, Judgment of November 10, 2021, Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. v. European Commission, T-612/17, ECLI:EU:T:2021:763.

Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Judgment of September 23, 2020, KZR 35/19 – Truck Cartel, ECLI:DE:BGH:2020:230920UKZR35.19.0.

Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Judgment of April 13, 2021, KZR 19/20 – Truck Cartel II, ECLI:DE:BGH:2021:130421UKZR19.20.0.

Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Judgment of November 29, 2022, KZR 42/20 – Schlecker, ECLI:DE:BGH:2022:291122UKZR42.20.0.

Berlin Regional Court II, Judgment of November 13, 2025, Idealo Internet GmbH v. Google LLC and Google Ireland Ltd., 16 O 195/19 Kart (2).

Berlin Regional Court II, Judgment of November 13, 2025, Producto GmbH (Testberichte.de) v. Google, 16 O 275/24.

Commercial Court / Economic Activities Court of Paris, November 24, 2025, Case No. RG 2020004977, Chamber 1-13, Kwerian SAS and SA Twenga v. Google Inc., Google France SARL, Alphabet Inc., and Google Ireland Limited.

Amsterdam District Court, November 5, 2025, Wolfson Capital Limited v. Google Netherlands B.V., Google LLC, and Alphabet Inc., C/13/722072 / HA ZA 22-674, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:8356.

Administrative Decisions

European Commission, Decision AT.39740, June 27, 2017 — Google Search (Shopping), fine of €2,424,495,000.

European Commission, Decision AT.40099, July 18, 2018 — Google Android, fine of €4,342,865,000.

European Commission, Proceeding DMA.100193 — Google Search, Art. 6(5) DMA, opened on March 25, 2024.

European Commission, proceedings opened in November 2025 — violations of Articles. 6(5) and 6(12) DMA in Google Search.