Johannesburg Arbitration Week 2026: Can Institutional Cooperation Deliver the Next Phase of African Arbitration?

Johannesburg Arbitration Week (JAW) 2026, held from 5–7 May, brought together leading practitioners and institutions to reflect on the evolving arbitration landscape across the continent. The discussions highlighted a key moment in the development of African arbitration, marked by growing integration between African and global arbitration communities. They also focused on a central question: should African arbitration advance through increased institutional competition, or is structured cooperation needed to ensure credibility and long-term effectiveness?

This question will be explored in the AFSA institutional panel on “Collaborating for Credibility: Institutional Cooperation and the Future of Arbitration in Africa.” The discussion will focus on how institutions position themselves within a rapidly expanding market. While arbitration capacity has grown substantially across Africa, institutional coordination continues to lag behind rising demand (ICCA Kigali 2025: International Arbitration in Africa—Growth Beyond Numbers, 2025).

Why this matters now

The timing of this debate is deliberate. Arbitration in Africa is no longer emerging; it is a functioning, increasingly relied-on mechanism for dispute resolution in sectors such as mining, infrastructure, energy, and finance, as analysed in Ojok (2023). The AfCFTA framework is expected to generate more intra-African disputes, while geopolitical changes continue to affect cross-border transactions involving African parties, a point reflected in recent commentary on cross-border disputes under the AfCFTA.

In this environment, users in cross-border transactions prioritise institutional legitimacy, procedural predictability, and confidence in enforcement frameworks. A British court ruling that overturned an $11 billion compensation award against Nigeria, citing fraud in the procurement of the contract, underscores the critical need for trust in arbitration systems that handle major public and commercial interests. However, users now prioritise costs, efficiency, and arbitrator selection. This places pressure on African institutions to meet growing demand while adapting to evolving user expectations.

In this environment, cooperation among institutions is not just aspirational—it is essential for advancing African arbitration.

Cooperation beyond the symbolic Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

Institutional collaboration is now well established, with MOUs between arbitral institutions serving as clear markers of goodwill and an intention to cooperate. However, the upcoming AFSA institutional panel at JAW 2026 is expected to question whether these instruments alone are sufficient.

The central issue is whether such arrangements move beyond formality to enable meaningful, operational cooperation.

Effective cooperation requires concrete, structured measures. These include joint training initiatives, knowledge-sharing, and improving the visibility of arbitrator pools across institutions. It also involves exchanging best practices in appointments and aligning procedures where appropriate. In technical areas, cooperation may extend to sharing experience in case management, emergency procedures, and practical matters such as access to hearing facilities.

The exchange of institutional knowledge is particularly important, given that many African centres face similar challenges, including resource constraints and concerns about costs, efficiency, and enforceability, as reflected in the SOAS 2024 Arbitration in Africa Survey Report. In this context, structured engagement between institutions can play a critical role in sharing solutions and reducing duplication of effort. Initiatives such as the African-German Arbitration Cooperation (AfGAC) exemplify this approach by bringing institutions together to collaborate, build capacity, and promote harmonised practices. At the regional level, the AFSA–SADC Alliance, established under the 2024 Charter, pursues similar objectives, including strengthening cooperation, enhancing capacity, and increasing the visibility of arbitration in Southern Africa. Taken together, these efforts support the development of arbitration ecosystems across the continent while preserving institutional independence.

The panel is also expected to highlight the professionalisation of arbitral secretariats as a key area for cooperation. Institutional credibility depends not only on the quality of rules or arbitrator pools but also on the consistency, neutrality, and responsiveness of administrative support. More broadly, the legitimacy of arbitration systems rests on confidence in their neutrality and integrity.1 Targeted training and capacity-building in this area can significantly strengthen user confidence.

Overall, the discussion is likely to emphasise that only substantive, operational cooperation — rather than symbolic alignment — can reinforce the legitimacy of African arbitral institutions and drive the next phase of growth.

Domestic and international users: a persistent divergence

A continuing challenge for African arbitral institutions is the divide between domestic and international markets. International disputes favour institutional arbitration because of the need for standardised processes, administrative support, and enforceability across borders. In contrast, domestic disputes, especially in South Africa, rely on ad hoc proceedings that local users view as more flexible and cost-effective, although these ad hoc proceedings often resemble private litigation rather than structured institutional arbitration.

The reasons for this preference are well known: domestic users often see ad hoc arbitration as more familiar, while institutional arbitration is sometimes seen as more formal, costly, or less suited to local needs—though this is not always the case.2

This difference creates a practical tension for institutions. Parties to cross-border disputes tend to seek established procedures, transparency, and reliable safeguards. By contrast, users operating in domestic contexts are often more focused on cost, flexibility, and procedures that align with familiar local practice. African institutions, therefore, face the challenge of accommodating both sets of expectations — maintaining standards that meet international scrutiny while remaining accessible and efficient for domestic users, as reflected in recent commentary on arbitration trends in Africa (Kluwer Arbitration Blog analysis of 2024 trends in Africa).

Addressing this tension requires targeted adaptation within institutional frameworks rather than a simple shift in approach. Measures such as expedited procedures, more transparent fee structures, and digital case management can help bridge the divide by combining procedural rigour with efficiency and cost control. In this way, institutions can respond to the expectations of both international and domestic users, aligning with broader trends reflected in recent survey data, including the 2025 QMUL International Arbitration Survey.

At the same time, these internal adjustments must be complemented by external engagement. Institutions may also need to proactively engage with domestic users to address common perceptions of institutional arbitration. Bridging domestic and international practice is therefore essential if arbitration is to develop as a coherent ecosystem rather than a fragmented set of approaches.

The selection of neutral arbitrators as the cornerstone of institutional arbitration’s credibility

The perception of a lack of neutrality in international arbitration has been of particular concern in Africa-related arbitration. The judgment of the English High Court setting aside the ad hoc majority award in P&ID v Nigeria recently brought this issue to the limelight when it questioned the Tribunal’s failure to investigate obvious red flags.

As a renowned Professor of arbitration law has publicly commented, one could potentially conclude from reading the (Western) majority award that, since it was the African party that would be ordered to pay an enormous amount to a Western party, the Tribunal did not bother to make the effort needed to prevent an injustice.3 The Nigerian co-arbitrator, by contrast, gave a dissenting opinion.

Irrespective of any actual or provable bias, a perception of a lack of neutrality is essentially one that relates to the image or reputation of arbitration and, therefore, to its credibility. It is not merely a substantial hurdle, likely to hinder the progress of international arbitration. It is one that goes to the very essence of arbitration. Neutrality, or at least the perception of neutrality, is the very foundation upon which private justice can be relied upon and be trusted.

An important function of institutions and appointing authorities is to seek to achieve this perception of neutrality. It has been proposed, in relation to disputes between parties of different backgrounds and origins, that sole arbitrators or presiding arbitrators should not merely be of a different nationality to those of the parties, but that they should be seen as being sufficiently detached from both parties so that they would not be rightly or wrongly presumed to share a common identity or mindset with either of them.4

Some institutions, notably from Africa, have been striving to directly apply this standard for several years, while other institutions have sought to use other mechanisms and considerations, often with the unstated aim of avoiding the risk of a perceived lack of neutrality. More diverse institutional courts constitute a step forward in institutions’ ability to appoint diverse and neutral tribunals.

A remarkable example of institutional cooperation in achieving perceived neutrality is a very recent MOU signed between the African Society of International Law and the Shanghai Arbitration Commission. The MOU states that in order to promote the neutrality, independence and diversity of arbitral tribunals, the African Society will recommend distinguished legal experts and practitioners from its network for consideration as arbitrators, specifically in cases involving non-African parties.

The impact of such an MOU is two-fold with respect to neutrality. Firstly, in relation to disputes between non-African parties who themselves are of different backgrounds, it acknowledges that African arbitrators would be perceived as ideal neutrals. Secondly, in proposing to make appointments from Africa’s “pool of highly qualified and neutral arbitrators” in order to promote neutrality in such disputes, it paves the way to correct the inexcusable under-representation of African arbitrators in international disputes which are not Africa-related.

Typical reasons often advanced to explain the stark lack of diversity in appointments, such as the perception of a limited pool of suitably experienced candidates and repeat appointments concentrated within a small group, also apply to another specific type of diversity: gender diversity. The SOAS 2024 Survey suggests that while many users are now willing to nominate women arbitrators, that does not always translate into actual appointments, including for those very same reasons. The panel discussed and explored means to further increase gender diversity through concrete measures and various mechanisms of institutional cooperation.

A forward-looking perspective

The JAW 2026 AFSA institutional panel is not expected to call for consolidation or the emergence of a single dominant arbitral institution in Africa. Rather, it is likely to point towards a network of institutions that keep their individual identities while cooperating to strengthen overall credibility and effectiveness.

In this context, cooperation among arbitral institutions in Africa and beyond is not merely formal but a strategic response to shared challenges. As arbitration expands, the defining question is whether African institutions can work together effectively to build lasting credibility and consolidate growth across the continent.

• 1Brekoulakis, S. (2013). Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making. Journal of International Dispute Settlement 4(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idt016.
• 2(2025). Guide: Institutional vs. Ad Hoc Arbitration. SCC Arbitration Institute. https://sccarbitrationinstitute.se/en/news/scc-guide-to-dispute-resolution-institutional-arbitration-vs-ad-hoc-arbitration/.
• 3Professor Emilia Onyema at a COMBAR Africa talk in 2024 titled: “Making arbitration fit for purpose in Africa-related disputes: ensuring that neutrality is actually perceived”.
• 4For instance, at the African Bar Association Annual Conference of 2025 in Accra, Ghana. See also Peeroo J (2024). Achieving neutrality through diversity: inadequacies of the nationality criterion. UCT Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Collected Papers 2024/01.