Can Pakistan Build an International Commercial Court on an Arbitration Act From 1940?

The Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan proposed a constitutional modification on July 20, 2026, at its 49th meeting, adding a new Article 212-A to create the International Commercial Court of Pakistan as a separate federal superior court. A draft Arbitration Bill based on the UNCITRAL Model Law was presented by a group under the same Commission two years prior, with the goal of replacing the Arbitration Act of 1940. The bill has not been passed into law. Although the Commission's proposal is not a bill before Parliament, it is a recommendation to the federal government. If it is approved, Pakistan will obtain a specialized international commercial court, and arbitration conducted in Pakistan will continue to be governed by legislation that predates the State.

The objection is not that reform is untidy. A court of this kind supervises arbitration, competes with it for the same disputes, or as the successful models show, does both. On any of those footings, the arbitration statute behind the court determines what the court is worth. Pakistan proposes to settle the institution before settling the statute, and the proposal, as published, does not mention the relationship at all.

What Has Not Been Proposed

Only the constitutional vehicle was revealed in the announcement. In a single day, Justice Mansoor Ali Shah found the deficiencies in jurisdiction, composition, appellate structure, procedural rules, international judges, and the court's connection to arbitration. He also made a point that merits more consideration: courts of this type derive their legitimacy from the surrounding legal landscape rather than from the document that established them. Some practitioners were even more direct. There are supporters of the initiative as well, and they have a strong argument: Pakistan's civil backlog and contract enforcement record are real, and specialized commercial benches have helped both elsewhere.

Where the court would sit in the Constitution deserves closer attention than it has had. The ICCP would sit next to Article 212, which grants administrative courts and tribunals exclusive jurisdiction. Article 212's clause (2) is an ouster, meaning that in the presence of such a venue, no other court may consider proceedings within its jurisdiction, and pending processes would cease. The architecture of the nearby provision that it would inherit is much more significant than the number itself. Article 212-A has already been used: it was removed in 1985 by President's Order No. 14 of 1985.

The Institutional Geography the Bill Assumes

The Bill directs arbitration's supervisory powers through the High Courts: stay (section 9), interim measures (section 10), appointment (section 13), and setting aside (section 39), as two members of the drafting committee described on this blog. The Model Regulations of Schedule 2 go one step further by establishing an Arbitration Council for every High Court, which is in charge of appointments and default procedural procedures. The Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2011, which grants the High Court’s sole authority to enforce international awards, is unaffected by the Bill.

Therefore, the foundation of Pakistan's arbitration reform is a pluralistic and provincial judicial geography. The ICCP is a single, federal organization. The two instruments do not acknowledge one another. Which court oversees a Lahore-based international arbitration? Does the 2011 Act's enforcement move or remain in its current location? The Federal Constitutional Court, established by the 27th Amendment, sits above both. As another author pointed out in February on this blog, it may raise constitutional certification issues pertaining to arbitration-related public policy challenges. A change that is marketed as lowering court intervention runs the danger of producing more forums than it started with.

The Comparators Built the Statute First

The comparative that is most frequently used and least beneficial to the idea is Singapore. The Model Law was put into effect in 1994 by the International Arbitration Act. Twenty years later, on January 5, 2015, the Singapore International Commercial Court opened as a division of the Singapore High Court rather than a distinct superior court. It necessitated three legislative amendments, including one to the Constitution. After that, Singapore spent ten more years defining the interface. The Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 2018 made it clear that the SICC could hear arbitration-related proceedings, and in January 2023 it published a model jurisdiction clause that was approved by SIAC and allowed parties to designate it as the supervisory court for arbitrations with a Singaporean seat, with the General Division serving as the default. It is a predetermined connection with statutory power for both opt-in and default.

The Gulf models come in a different way. In 2004, Dubai established the DIFC Courts and a DIFC arbitration legislation, which was replaced in 2008 by the Model legislation-based DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008. In 2015, Abu Dhabi Global Market introduced both its courts and its Model Law-based Arbitration Regulations. Since both are free-zone courts rather than federal superior courts, there are not many similarities. The order in which Dubai and Abu Dhabi enacted laws pertaining to arbitration coincided with the establishment of their own legal systems.The idea that a contemporary statute is a formal prerequisite is not the lesson. The reason for this is that none of these jurisdictions requested a new court to oversee arbitration under outdated legislation because none were left to do so.

The Chinese Counterargument

The other method is cut by one comparator. The China International Commercial Court was founded in 2018, but the country's 1994 Arbitration Law was still in effect. It did not recognize the court's seat, adopt competence-competence, or allow foreign organizations to conduct arbitrations onshore. The argument is that a new court is a coercive tool because it increases the cost of legislative delay.

The analogy is blunted by two features. First, the CICC outlined its arbitration interface from the beginning. In the first year of the court's existence, the Supreme People's Court issued a notice admitting CIETAC, SHIAC, SCIA, the Beijing Arbitration Commission, and CMAC to the "one-stop" platform, with the CICC providing preservation, set-aside, and enforcement support. Beyond a purported goal of bolstering the enforcement of arbitral rulings, Pakistan’s plan is harshly criticized, and lacks a corresponding clause outlining the court’s arbitration interface. Second, China has never viewed the court as a stand-in for law change; the updated Arbitration Law, which went into effect on March 1, 2026, codifies the seat, permits limited ad hoc arbitration, and opens the market to international organizations. The framework took seven post-CICC years to complete, starting with a foundation that already incorporated CIETAC.

Therefore, in cases where a statute is just outdated, the forcing-device argument is applicable. Pakistan has a different stance. It arbitrates under the 1940 Arbitration Act, which predates both the state and the New York Convention that the court was intended to uphold.

Awards Travel; Judgments Do Not

Its supporters should be troubled by a further asymmetry. More than 170 states are bound by the New York Convention, to which Pakistan is a party. It is not a party to either the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention, which has thirty-three contracting parties, or the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention, which has thirty-nine. Only domestic reciprocity laws would allow an ICCP ruling to travel overseas. A convention governs the circulation of awards made in Pakistan.

Singapore dealt with this right away. Prior to the SICC’s opening on January 5,2015, parties may agree in writing to restrict or forego the right of appeal; however, this agreement only applies to the Singaporean system. Since a SICC ruling still travels outside as a judgment, it is dependent on reciprocity or the Hague instruments rather than the New York Convention.

Will, Not Arithmetic

One could argue that since the two instruments rely on distinct coalitions, they are not in competition. That is true, and it exacerbates the situation. A two-thirds majority in both Houses is required for the ICCP; Pakistan convened one twice in thirteen months, for the 26th Amendment in October 2024 and the 27th in November 2025. An ordinary majority is required for the Arbitration Bill. Twenty-six months after it was delivered to the Federal Minister for Law and Justice on May 2, 2024, with the Federal Cabinet's consent in principle, it is still not a law.

The true challenge is not so much numerical as it is federal. The Bill mandates provincial resolutions granting that authority under Articles 144 and 147, since domestic arbitration is a provincial matter. There is a similar proviso in Article 212. The ICCP reproduces this coordination issue at the constitutional level rather than avoiding it. Institutional continuity has not been helpful either. The drafting committee's chairman, Justice Shah, is no longer on the Bench, and another member, Makhdoom Ali Khan, has subsequently quit the Commission. The body that created the Bill is not the same as the one that recommended the ICCP in July 2026.

What Coherence Would Require

This is not an argument against the establishment of an international commercial court in Pakistan; it is an argument against making one on its own. The proposal would be defensible in three ways: first, the Arbitration Bill should be passed, or both instruments should be moved together; second, the interface should be defined in the enabling framework using the Singapore model of designation with the High Courts as default; and third, the enforcement should be transparent, either by acceding to the Hague instruments or by recognizing that the courts' value is primarily domestic.

Such courts do not foster commercial trust. They take it from the legal system that surrounds them. There is very little to borrow for a supervisory court based on a statute that was passed seven years prior to Pakistan’s founding. According to the current proposals, the ICCP would be that.