The UPC’s first CJEU referral – a case of constitutional significance or a jurisdictional nightmare?

On 6 March 2026, the UPC Court of Appeal in Dyson v Dreame & Eurep referred four questions concerning the extent of the UPC’s long-arm jurisdiction to the Court of Justice of the European Union – making it the UPC’s first ever referral to the CJEU. 

Put briefly, the background to the referral questions arises from an appeal in an action for provisional measures brought by Dyson on 2 May 2025 against four entities: Dreame International (Hong Kong) Limited (responsible for manufacture, and sale via websites in Germany and Spain), Eurep (its Authorised Representative under the EU product safety regulations, based in Germany⁾, Teqphone (German distributor) and Dreame Technology AB (Swedish distributor).  The claimed infringements were alleged to have taken place in all UPC member states and the non-UPC member state, Spain.

Of note, Eurep did not sell or offer to sell Dreame’s hairdryers. Eurep was listed as the Authorised Representative on the packaging of Dreame's products in compliance with EU product safety regulations – a requirement that non-EU manufacturers such as Dreame must comply with in order to sell products in the EU. Eurep therefore acted as the formal contact point for consumers and authorities in the EU and performed other administrative tasks under those regulations, including storing technical documentation.

In its recent decision, the UPC Court of Appeal decided most of the case, but stayed the appeal proceedings in respect of: (i) the action against Dreame International (Hong Kong) Limited to the extent that it related to the territory of Spain, and (ii) the action against Eurep, on the basis that both raised unresolved questions of EU law which required a ruling from the CJEU. The Court of Appeal then referred four questions concerning the interpretation of Regulation 1215/2012 and Directive 2004/48 that it held had not previously been clarified in CJEU case law, and in respect of which the correct interpretation was not so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable doubt (UPC_CoA_789/2025 & UPC_CoA_813/2025).

The four questions are as follows:

1. Must Article 8(1) in conjunction with Article 71b(2) of Regulation 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that a situation where, in proceedings before a common court within the meaning of Article 71a(2) of Regulation 1215/2012, a first company that is established in a third State is alleged to have committed an infringement of a national part of a European patent which is in force in an EU Member State that is not party to the instrument establishing the common court, and a second company that is established in an EU Member State that is party to the instrument establishing the common court is alleged to be an intermediary whose services are used by the first company to infringe in the EU Member State that is not party to the instrument establishing the common court, is capable of leading to “irreconcilable judgments” resulting from separate proceedings as referred to in Article 8(1) Regulation 1215/2012?
2. Must Article 71b(2), second sentence, of Regulation 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that a common court has jurisdiction in relation to an action for provisional measures against a company established in a third State that is alleged to have infringed a European patent in force in an EU Member State that is not party to the instrument establishing the common court, and in some or all EU Member States that are party to the instrument establishing the common court by offering the same products in all those EU Member States through websites that are identical apart from the language?
3. Is the fact that the company uses the services of a company that is established in an EU Member State that is party to the instrument establishing the common court in order to infringe a relevant circumstance in answering this second question?
4. Does Article 9(1)(a) of Directive 2004/48 or any other provision of Union law preclude case-law of a national or common court under which an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing or prohibiting infringement of a patent by a third party by placing products on the market to which Regulation 2023/988 and 2019/1020 apply may be granted against an authorised representative that performs the tasks laid down in these Regulations on behalf of the third party?

In other words: can an UPC member state-based company acting as authorised representative/ intermediary act as an anchor defendant (or hook) to join a non-UPC member state-based company to UPC proceedings? Can the UPC could derive jurisdiction over a non-UPC member state-based company in respect of the sales via a non-UPC member state website given that sales were also made via an identical (save for language) website in a UPC member state – and is it of relevance that there is an EU-based intermediary? And can an Authorised Representative be treated as an "intermediary" against whom a preliminary injunction could be granted under the IP Enforcement Directive?

Commentary

Since the CJEU’s decision in BSH v Electrolux, there have been a number of cases in the UPC concerning long-arm jurisdiction – many testing the boundaries of that so-called BSH jurisdiction. These questions seek clarity on some aspects that the UPC has been grappling with, and practitioners and court users alike hope that the answers will at least somewhat clarify whether the UPC truly is a location for pan-European (rather than pan-UPC) injunctions. The answers will also provide needed clarity on whether intermediaries like authorised representatives of non-EU manufacturers can be used as a jurisdictional hook to invoke the UPC’s long-arm jurisdiction. Non-EU companies considering how best to structure their EU representation and organise their businesses will be wise to watch this space.