Paying for Proof in Trade Secrets: How the UPC Sets the Exchange Rate
November 17, 2026
The price of proof
A confidentiality club is often discussed as though it were an access list. It is a judicial allocation of commercial risk. Most parties still treat it as the last item to settle, once the evidence has been seized and the report is about to be released. By then, much of the allocation has already been made.
The point is sharpest when the secret is the proof itself. A patent dispute over a process, a chip or a piece of software can turn on reactor dimensions, process parameter tables, die layouts or source code. The claimant needs that material to prove infringement. The defendant may have to disclose its own to show that it does not infringe, or that it used the invention first. Each side pays for proof in the currency of its secrets, and the Court sets the exchange rate when it decides who may read what, for which purpose and for how long.
In October these columns examined how the Court of Appeal has organized access to comparable licences in FRAND disputes, and what the readers of those licences give up in return.1 Technical evidence raises a different problem. A licence is read to test a rate. A process recipe or a code repository is read to understand how something works, often by people whose next assignment is to build something similar. The orders of the past year, many of them from the Düsseldorf Local Division, have begun to show how the UPC prices that risk.
Two rules and a floor
The framework starts with Article 58 UPCA, which allows restrictions on collecting or using evidence and on access to it to protect a party’s or third party’s trade secrets, personal data and other confidential information, or to prevent abuse of evidence. R. 262A supplies the procedure. Under R. 262A.5, the Court may allow an application considering, in particular, whether the grounds for restriction significantly outweigh the opposing interest in full access.2 This is a balancing exercise: a confidentiality label does not, by itself, trigger the restriction. Protection extends beyond trade secrets in the strict sense.3
The floor is in R. 262A.6. The number of persons given access must be no greater than necessary to secure an effective remedy and a fair trial, and must include “at least, one natural person from each party” together with its lawyers or representatives. The wording follows Article 9(2) of the Trade Secrets Directive almost word for word.4 Paris had reached a comparable position by decree in December 2018, years before the UPC opened. Where a document is needed in full, the Paris judge names its readers and, for a company, designates its natural persons only after hearing it.5
The divisions have drawn the consequence for technical evidence. Yangtze Memory v. Micron concerned the technical detail of a memory die filed in support of a prior use defence. The Düsseldorf Local Division held that an attorneys’ eyes only regime was out of the question once the other party objected, that only the party whose access is restricted can waive the floor, and that a waiver the claimant had given for its own evidence did not extend to evidence the defendant later chose to introduce.6 Being competitors could not justify exclusion either, or R. 262A.6 “would be rendered meaningless”.7 In Topsoe v. SYPOX, the same division applied the principle to inspection and preservation proceedings and held that excluding every natural person of a party requires that party’s consent.8
The floor therefore yields only to the consent of the party it protects. “External eyes only” is a less reliable shorthand. The Court of Appeal accepted in Daedalus Prime v. Xiaomi that the natural person need not be an employee and can be an external adviser. The line that matters runs between the party’s designated natural person and its litigation representatives. Whether a reader is internal or external does not, by itself, place that reader on either side.9
The inspection report as first exchange
The first exchange of secrets often takes place before any action on the merits. Under Article 60 UPCA, the Court may order the preservation of evidence, including a detailed description of the accused process or product, and R. 199 allows inspection in situ. No employee or director of the applicant may be present when the measures are carried out.10 The difficult moment comes later, when the report is released.
In Progress Maschinen v. AWM, the Court of Appeal held that an application to preserve evidence implies a request for access to the resulting report, because the evidence is intended for merits proceedings. Disclosure nevertheless requires a separate decision. If confidential information may be involved, the respondent must be heard on whether and to what extent access should be granted. Failure to seek review of the preservation order is not tacit consent to disclosure. The period for commencing merits proceedings runs from disclosure enabling the applicant to use the report for that purpose.11 The respondent should therefore identify its objections precisely, while the Court must still respect its right to be heard.
The Düsseldorf Local Division has since given the exercise a structure. In Bekaert v. Siltronic, concerning saw wire inspected in a warehouse, it set out three steps. The Court first asks whether the material contains trade secrets, personal data of third parties or other confidential information. Confidential material irrelevant to infringement is then redacted. Relevant confidential material is dealt with case by case, either disclosed to the applicant under a duty of secrecy or restricted to a defined group.12 The reasons treated prices, quantities and bank details as information to be redacted. The brass coating and the winding pitch were not, because anyone could see them on the packaging and the products.13 The report went to the applicant itself, for use in the merits proceedings only.14
Paris has run the same triage since December 2018, on a procedure written into the Commercial Code. Documents taken in a saisie-contrefaçon can be placed under provisional sequestration. The party invoking secrecy must then file, on pain of inadmissibility, the full confidential version, a non-confidential version or summary, and a memorandum giving reasons for each passage. The judge refuses what is not necessary to resolve the dispute and orders production in full of what is.15 In Bio Ex v. Angus, the technical documents on a fluorine-free fire-fighting foam went to the patentee because they were needed to prove infringement. So did the sales figures, as proof of the extent of infringement. Only the customers’ names and addresses were struck out.16 Where Bekaert redacted prices and quantities, Paris treated them as part of the proof.
Topsoe v. SYPOX concerned a plant producing hydrogen by electrically heated steam methane reforming. For disclosure of the inspection material, the division presumed relevant the information actually used by the court-appointed expert, and the respondent had to rebut that relevance. Saying that infringement could have been assessed from other information was insufficient. For material the expert had not used, the applicant had to establish relevance, including where necessary to understand the report as a whole.17 The 21 August order redacted specified plant data and withheld several annexes, made disclosure to the applicant’s natural persons conditional on their identification, and limited use to merits proceedings against the respondents.18
The presumption concerns relevance. Confidentiality survives it. A party should explain both why particular material is irrelevant and, if it is relevant, which access and use restrictions remain necessary. On 12 October 2026, the Düsseldorf panel upheld the 21 August order as regards the Pilot 1 material. It rejected newly advanced third-party confidentiality allegations as late and, in any event, insufficiently specific, while the detailed protection arrangements were reserved for separate treatment.19 A confidentiality objection first raised on review may already be late. Paris makes the deadline explicit: a provisional sequestration ordered for a saisie-contrefaçon is lifted, and the documents go to the applicant, unless the judge is asked within one month of service to modify or retract the order.20 Relevant information does not become unrestricted information, but the time to say why is short.
Access is a functional question
The proper composition of a club depends on what each person must do. External lawyers need full access to advise and plead. Patent attorneys and technical experts may need to read source code or laboratory records. An in-house engineer may be the only person able to tell counsel whether a parameter matters. A research manager may create a risk of reuse even when acting in good faith.
The analysis turns on role rather than title. The divisions apply to technical material the test the Court of Appeal developed for confidential information generally, which looks at the person’s role, the relevance of the information to that role and the person’s trustworthiness.21 In 3V Sigma v. ACEF, after an ex parte preservation order, the Milan Local Division had to deal with technical documents of a third-party manufacturer held under contractual confidentiality. It refused to exclude the applicant’s representatives. It admitted one external adviser, to be named by the applicant and belonging to a professional body, while refusing an open number of advisers, and it admitted one natural person from the applicant because R. 262A.6 requires one.22 In Yangtze v. Micron, employment by a party was no reason to refuse access, and neither was the prospect that a designated person might later move to research and development.23
The technical setting changes what the reader gives up. In licence disputes, the Court of Appeal has accepted narrowly framed restrictions on future negotiations with counterparties to disclosed agreements. In Yangtze v. Micron, Düsseldorf rejected a five-year restriction on SDRAM research and development as a disproportionate interference with professional activity, distinguishing the much narrower negotiation restriction in Ericsson v. ASUSTeK.24 That holding does not establish that a shorter research bar would be valid. A party fearing reuse should first propose justified restrictions on use, secure access and appropriate readers, and any further restriction requires its own necessity and proportionality analysis.
Two limits: privilege and plausibility
Confidentiality and privilege answer different questions. Under R. 287 and R. 288, qualifying professional communications and litigation material can be protected from disclosure. Confidentiality determines access to, and permitted uses of, information that may properly be before the Court.25
Neither concept should fill a gap in the other. A process specification may have to be produced if it is relevant and the conditions are met, whatever its commercial sensitivity. A privileged legal memorandum should not be disclosed merely because a club exists. The review protocol should classify privilege, trade secrets, personal data, third-party confidentiality and ordinary commercial sensitivity separately, because a single label cannot do five legal jobs.
Source code illustrates a distinct threshold. In Network System Technologies v. Qualcomm, the Munich Local Division had refused an R. 190 production request because the infringement case was not plausibly substantiated. The appeal against that refusal was late. The Court of Appeal also rejected a renewed request without new facts. Offering different access levels, or citing developments in confidentiality case law, did not supply them.26 The ruling turned on timing and on the absence of new facts. It is not an appellate endorsement of Munich’s infringement assessment.
R. 190 requires reasonably available and plausible supporting evidence and identification of evidence controlled by the opposing party or a third party. It does not require the applicant already to prove infringement on the merits. Access safeguards can be designed at the same time as production is decided. A request for code should explain the observable infringement case, identify the missing evidence and show why particular experts need particular modules. The response should address that threshold, relevance and proportionality, alongside a workable confidentiality proposal.
Use and publicity
Reuse by someone inside the circle can be a greater risk than disclosure outside it. An order should therefore limit the purpose for which the information may be used, as Topsoe and Bekaert did by confining it to the merits proceedings.27 The team should also settle how the material will be stored, whether local copies are permitted, which tools may process it, how expert copies are controlled and how access ends when a person leaves the matter. In Topsoe, the division declined, at that stage, to order the experts to delete their data.28 The end of the club’s life is best organized by the parties in advance.
Cross-border teams add a layer. A die analysis may be reviewed in several offices, by experts in different states and through vendors providing translation or hosting. Every additional person should have a defined function and an enforceable obligation. A confidentiality order that is precise in court and vague in the data room protects only the formal record.
Restricting access within the proceedings does not settle what the public may see. R. 262.1(b) and R. 262.2 govern public access to pleadings and evidence, and a party wishing to withhold information must identify it, give reasons and supply redacted copies.29 Redaction should preserve the reasoning. A public version stripped of every parameter becomes meaningless, and the better course explains each redaction and uses ranges or neutral descriptions where they protect the secret without erasing the argument. The same value repeated in an unredacted pleading or at a public hearing can undo the protection obtained for an exhibit.
Beyond the hearing
Technical disputes may move to the Patent Mediation and Arbitration Centre. Article 25.2 of the Mediation Rules restricts later use of documents prepared exclusively for mediation, settlement views, admissions, mediator proposals and indications of willingness to settle, subject to written agreement of the parties or requirements of applicable law. Article 25.4 permits a neutral confidentiality adviser or a restricted group, potentially including named employees. The Arbitration Rules provide comparable mechanisms in Article 47.4 and allow document access to be limited to named persons under Article 29.4.30
As discussed in October, evidence that exists independently of mediation is not made inadmissible merely by being used there. Mediation-specific material is subject to the applicable confidentiality and admissibility rules, including their exceptions.31 Nor can a private agreement simply override an earlier UPC restriction on using inspection material. R. 196.2 permits another use if the Court orders it. Before transferring material to a PMAC procedure, the parties should obtain any necessary judicial permission and specify readers, purposes and the conditions for later use in court.32
Confidentiality does not end when the hearing ends. The order should address appeals, parallel national proceedings, settlement, enforcement, the retention of expert material and the return or destruction of copies.
Information can lose its confidential character as facts become public, while a roadmap or manufacturing recipe may remain sensitive for years. Patent expiry, by itself, does not make undisclosed know-how public. The order should provide a means to review protection when circumstances change, rather than assume that every restriction ends with the patent or the hearing.
The architecture before the evidence
The authorities examined here do not resolve the merits application of Article 55(3) UPCA, which requires account to be taken of the defendant’s legitimate interest in protecting manufacturing and trade secrets where the burden of proof is reversed for process patents.33 The Düsseldorf disclosure method also remains a first-instance construction, now applied on panel review in Topsoe. Progress provides the appellate framework, but these decisions do not yet amount to a complete appellate code for every inspection report.
The method fits in a confidentiality schedule of six fields, through which every technical document a party may disclose or seek should pass. First the information, identified at the level of the document or data field, then the risk it carries, stated as a specific harm. The circle is built from functions and named persons, with the floor of R. 262A.6 in mind, and the permitted use is tied to identified proceedings. The public version is prepared at the same time. Duration closes the grid, with a review point and an end.
The same grid should be run across secrets already in circulation. Supplier documents held under a non-disclosure agreement, as in 3V Sigma, may require notice before they can be produced. Reports from earlier inspections may carry restrictions on use. The engineers most likely to be named as readers may be the very people the business plans to put on its next development project, and that conflict is cheaper to discover before nomination than after access.
A confidentiality club succeeds when nobody notices its administration and everyone can explain its legal necessity. That success is prepared in the confidentiality schedule, which belongs in the evidence plan before the first inspection is requested.
1 M. Dhenne, “Person, Bar, Perimeter: What Comparable Licences Cost Before the UPC”, Kluwer Patent Blog, 6 October 2026.
2 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), Article 58. Rules of Procedure of the Unified Patent Court (RoP), R. 262A.1 and R. 262A.5.
3 Düsseldorf Local Division, 21 August 2026, UPC_CFI_1696/2025, Topsoe v. SYPOX, para. 63, referring to Court of Appeal, 1 August 2025, UPC_CoA_70/2025, Strabag v. Swarco, para. 17.
4 RoP, R. 262A.6. Directive (EU) 2016/943, Article 9(2), third subparagraph.
5 Code de commerce, Article R. 153-6, inserted by Décret n° 2018-1126 of 11 December 2018.
6 Düsseldorf Local Division, 17 August 2026, UPC_CFI_1034/2025 and UPC_CFI_931/2026, Yangtze Memory v. Micron, paras 16 to 20.
7 Ibid., para. 21.
8 Topsoe v. SYPOX, n. 3, paras 252 and 253.
9 Court of Appeal, 12 February 2025, UPC_CoA_621/2024, Daedalus Prime v. Xiaomi, paras 12 and 13.
10 UPCA, Article 60(1) and (2). RoP, R. 196.5, R. 199.1 and R. 199.2.
11 Court of Appeal, 23 July 2024, UPC_CoA_177/2024, Progress Maschinen & Automation v. AWM, paras 10 to 12 and 17 to 20.
12 Düsseldorf Local Division, 19 November 2025, UPC_CFI_539/2024, Bekaert Binjiang Steel Cord v. Siltronic, paras 28 and 29.
13 Ibid., paras 30 to 35.
14 Ibid., para. 40 and operative part, points II, III and V. See RoP, R. 196.2 and R. 199.2.
15 Code de commerce, Articles R. 153-1 and R. 153-3 to R. 153-7, inserted by Décret n° 2018-1126 of 11 December 2018 and applicable to patent saisies through the Intellectual Property Code.
16 Tribunal judiciaire de Paris (référé-rétractation), 29 October 2020, RG No. 20/07070, Bio Ex v. Angus Holdings Safety Group.
17 Topsoe v. SYPOX, n. 3, paras 70 to 72.
18 Ibid., operative part, points 1 to 4.
19 Düsseldorf Local Division, 12 October 2026, UPC_CFI_1696/2025, Topsoe v. SYPOX, paras 43 and 61 to 67 and operative part. Review under R. 333 of the order of 21 August 2026.
20 Code de commerce, Article R. 153-1, second paragraph. On provisional sequestration as the only means of protecting trade secrets during a saisie-contrefaçon, Cour de cassation, Commercial Chamber, 1 February 2023, No. 21-22.225.
21 Daedalus Prime v. Xiaomi, n. 9, paras 12 to 18.
22 Milan Local Division, 23 September 2025, UPC_CFI_342/2025, 3V Sigma v. ACEF and AGA, reasons and operative part, pp. 6 and 7.
23 Yangtze Memory v. Micron, n. 6, paras 29 and 39.
24 Yangtze Memory v. Micron, n. 6, paras 40 and 41, distinguishing Court of Appeal, 26 January 2026, UPC_CoA_631/2025 and UPC_CoA_632/2025, Ericsson v. ASUSTeK.
25 RoP, R. 287 (attorney-client privilege) and R. 288 (litigation privilege).
26 Court of Appeal, 17 August 2026, UPC_CoA_69/2026, UPC_CoA_71/2026 and UPC_CoA_72/2026, Network System Technologies v. Qualcomm, paras 51, 55, 64 and 66. See RoP, R. 190.1.
27 Topsoe v. SYPOX, n. 3, operative part, point 4. Bekaert v. Siltronic, n. 12, para. 40. RoP, R. 196.2.
28 Topsoe v. SYPOX, n. 3, paras 250 and 251.
29 RoP, R. 262.1(b) and R. 262.2. On the Court of Appeal’s case law on access to the file, see Dhenne, n. 1.
30 PMAC Mediation Rules, D-AC/06/04112025 rev.2, Articles 25.2 to 25.4. PMAC Arbitration Rules, D-AC/07/04112025 rev.2, Articles 29.4, 47.3 and 47.4.
31 M. Dhenne, “The Afterlife of a FRAND Negotiation”, Kluwer Patent Blog, 22 October 2026.
32 RoP, R. 196.2, applied to inspection through R. 199.2. PMAC Mediation Rules, Article 25.2.
33 UPCA, Article 55(3).
Featured image: Rama, CC BY-SA 2.0 FR, via Wikimedia Commons (cropped).
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