Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – Switzerland

With the Swiss Parliament approving the revision of the Cartel Act as well as the new FDI regime in December, the Swiss legislator ends the year 2025 with a legislative "bang" for the Swiss competition community. However, already throughout the previous months, 2025 had proven to be an eventful one with various decisions from the Swiss Competition Commission ("ComCo"), as well as the Federal Administrative Court ("FAC") and Federal Supreme Court ("FSC") spanning across various industries and topics.

In the following, we provide a brief overview of the main developments on cartels, abuse of dominance, merger control and regulatory changes.

1  Unlawful Agreements / Cartel Cases

In 2025, ComCo imposed its first-ever sanction on a cartel in the pharmaceutical sector involving an active ingredient. The authority also set a precedent for the (im-)permissible elements of purchasing cooperatives, and reached an agreement with Visa on the maximum allowable interchange fees for card payments made with Swiss debit cards at physical points of sale in Switzerland, similar to the previous year's agreement with Mastercard. Finally, the authority launched several investigations into bid rigging cases in the construction sectors.

In April 2025, ComCo fined several pharmaceutical companies for anti-competitive agreements related to butylscopolamine bromide ("SNBB"), an important ingredient in the manufacture of antispasmodic medicines for abdominal pain, marking the first case involving an active pharmaceutical ingredient.1 For background, between 2005 and 2019, seven producers and distributors of SNBB colluded to fix the minimum sale price of the ingredient and allocate quotas. Additionally, the pharmaceutical companies also exchanged competitively sensitive information. The sanctions imposed through settlements totalled approximately CHF 600'000. As part of their participation in the leniency program, C2 Pharma was granted full immunity for revealing the cartel, while Transo-Pharm and Linnea received partial immunity.

In the summer of 2025, ComCo clarified the permissible and impermissible aspects of purchasing cooperatives in its decision concerning the cooperation of 16 retailers via Markant Handels- und Industriewaren-Vermittlungs AG ("Markant").2

The retailers in question procured everyday products from national and international suppliers. Markant offered both, retailers and their suppliers, various services, including payment processing and negotiated service conditions with the suppliers for these services, which it then partially paid out to retailers as refunds. It also negotiated discounts for retailers with suppliers.

While the discounts and their collective enforcement measures were considered permissible due to their ability to enable retailers to build up countervailing power and achieve lower purchase, and eventually also lower sales prices, ComCo found non-transparent rebates and collective enforcement measures to distort competition. In order to supply retailers, Markant's suppliers were required to purchase a service package. If suppliers did not accept the increased service conditions, retailers took collective measures, including delisting products. The payment of parts of the service conditions to the 16 retailers in the form of refunds were not disclosed to the suppliers. Hence, ComCo deemed these agreements to be inadmissible price agreements on the purchasing side. Retailers involved in the scheme were fined around CHF 28 million, while Markant faced no sanctions as it is not a competitor of the retailers.

Also in the summer of 2025, ComCo reached an agreement with and thus concluded its investigation against Visa Europe Ltd. ("Visa")3 on interchange fees for Swiss debit cards at physical points of sale, capping the average fee at 0.15%. Additionally, cross-border interchange fees for EEA-issued Visa cards were reduced from 1% to 0.2% for debit cards and from 1.15% to 0.44% for credit cards. This follows after ComCo had already reached a similar, albeit not identical, agreement with and closed its investigation against Mastercard Europe SA ("Mastercard") in 2024.4

For background, in 2022, the Secretariat of ComCo opened a preliminary investigation against both, Visa and Mastercard. ComCo found that the domestic multilateral interchange fees (“DMIF”) constituted an agreement on minimum and fixed prices, but that the fees could be justified based on efficiency criteria if kept within a capped amount.

Further, taking a closer look at developments in the building sector, in autumn 2025, ComCo concluded one bid-rigging investigation and initiated another in the French-speaking part of Switzerland.

ComCo's investigation had focused on public procurement contracts for road maintenance, where four companies in Jura, Neuchâtel, Bern, and Fribourg had coordinated bids and prices over several years.5In particular, they had coordinated to divide cantonal as well as municipal road repair work. All companies cooperated to settle the case amicably. Additionally, at the end of 2025, ComCo launched a new investigation into possible collusion in the building and civil engineering sectors in Jura and conducted searches at several companies.6At the end of the year, ComCo further launched a new investigation into possible collusion in the building and civil engineering sectors in the canton of Jura. It carried out searches at several companies.

Finally, in December 2025, ComCo concluded its long-running investigations into the financial market, involving twenty banks and concerning trading in interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange spots, and precious metals.7Between 2005 and 2013, traders exchanged sensitive information regarding their trading strategies. The investigations, which spanned over ten years, resulted in a total sanction of CHF 237.5 million across seven banks, with seven of the nine cases resolved through settlements, and two discontinued.

Turning to relevant new case law from the courts in relation to anti-competitive agreements and cartels, the FAC's car leasing judgement and the FSC's air cargo cases are particularly noteworthy.

In October 2025, the FAC upheld the sanction of approximately CHF 7.8 million imposed on Ford Credit Switzerland by ComCo.8The FAC found Ford Credit to have participated in an unlawful coordination of car leasing conditions, specifically for exchanging sensitive pricing information, such as interest rates and residual value tables. The FAC's decision has been appealed to the FSC.

Earlier in 2025, the FSC ruled on the so-called air cargo cases, involving twelve airlines and their subsidiaries, including Lufthansa, that were found to have been engaged in illegal price-fixing on freight rates and fuel surcharges between 2000 and 2005.9 Following proceedings that lasted over eight years, ComCo had imposed sanctions for the illegal coordination. The FSC, however, found the duration of the proceedings to be excessive and reduced the original fine by 25%. Lufthansa, which had voluntarily disclosed the collusion in 2006, including its Swiss subsidiary, was exempt from the sanction.

2 Abuse of Dominance

2025 has seen an increased activity of ComCo regarding relative market power. After having published that it had concluded its first ever abuse of relative market power investigation in late 2024, ComCo has now published its reasoned decision, closed one investigation after the parties entered into an amicable settlement, and finally opened one new investigation based on abuse of relative market power allegations.

In autumn 2022, the Swiss bookseller Payot filed a complaint with ComCo against the French publishing group Madrigall alleging an infringement of the provisions on relative market power.10 For background, already back in 2013, ComCo (and ultimately the courts) ruled in the “Marché du livre écrit en français” case that direct purchases and parallel imports from abroad must not be prohibited. The amendment to the law, which came into force on January 1, 2022, now also foresees purchases to be made at the conditions applicable abroad, which is exactly what Payot based its complaint on.

Specifically, Payot claimed that Madrigall prevented it from sourcing Madrigall books directly in France at the prices customary there. Applying its three-step test (dependency, absence of countervailing power and absence of gross negligence on part of dependent undertaking), ComCo concluded that the alternatives available to Payot – in particular sourcing via French or Swiss wholesalers, procuring books on the grey market or delisting Madrigall titles – would have entailed significant disadvantages, including substantial losses in turnover and attractiveness, and were therefore not reasonably available. Payot was, thus, deemed dependent on Madrigall, and no gross negligence on its part was identified. ComCo further held that Madrigall abused its position of relative market power by charging Payot significantly higher purchase prices than French booksellers, without being able to justify more than a minor part of the price difference by additional costs specific to Switzerland. Madrigall was therefore required to offer Payot, in principle, the same conditions as French booksellers, subject only to proven additional costs. In case of non-compliance, ComCo may initiate new proceedings and impose sanctions. ComCo's decision, which was published in March 2025, has been appealed to the FAC.

Regarding another case of abuse of relative market power allegations, ComCo had opened an investigation after a garage that operated as an authorised dealer of BMW and MINI for several decades had filed a complaint.11 Following indications from BMW that the commercial relationship would be expanded, the garage undertook substantial investments in the amount of several million Swiss francs. BMW subsequently terminated the relationship without providing for an adequate transitional arrangement. In the course of the proceedings, the parties reached an amicable settlement providing for a transitional solution by temporarily extending the cooperation, and the investigation was discontinued. It is nevertheless noteworthy, however, that in its assessment, ComCo states that BMW held relative market power vis-à-vis the garage and that, in the absence of its adjusted conduct as part of the amicable settlement, BMW's termination would presumably have constituted an abuse of its relative market power under the Cartel Act. The alternatives available to the garage – including switching to other manufacturers, focusing on used vehicles or exiting the sector – were considered not reasonably available, as they would have entailed significant losses and largely unrecoverable investments. Neither countervailing power nor gross negligence on the part of the garage was established.12 On the basis of this summary assessment, ComCo finally imposed the full costs of the proceedings on BMW.

Following ComCo's first decisions regarding the new relative market power provisions, the Secretariat of ComCo updated its corresponding guidelines as of February 2025. The revisions relate in particular to the criteria for assessing whether an undertaking is to be considered to have relative market power. In parallel, the Secretariat of ComCo has also amended its notification form for alleged abuses of relative market power.

Finally, during 2025, ComCo also opened one new investigation into a potential abuse of relative market power. This concerns Beiersdorf, headquartered in Germany and manufacturer and global distributor of products under the Nivea brand.13 Migros, one of the largest retail companies and supermarkets in Switzerland, sources Nivea products from Beiersdorf and resells them to consumers in its stores and online. In its investigation, ComCo is examining whether Beiersdorf holds a position of relative market power vis-à-vis Migros. Should such a position be established, ComCo will assess further, whether Beiersdorf has abused this position by charging Migros higher prices for identical Nivea products than those applied to comparable retailers abroad.

In regards to the established concept of an abuse of a dominant position, two ComCo cases from 2025 are noteworthy: One opening of a preliminary investigation and one closing of an investigation.

In December 2025, ComCo opened a preliminary investigation into Apple's practice to exclusively grant third parties access to the near field communication ("NFC") interface on iOS devices via its NFC & SE platform technology, subject to conditions defined by Apple.14 In particular, ComCo is examining whether alternative providers of mobile payment apps are able to compete effectively with Apple Pay for contactless payments on iOS devices at the point of sale.

Apple devices operate on the proprietary iOS operating system, within an ecosystem fully controlled by Apple, including access to the standard NFC technology enabling short-range wireless data exchange between smartphones and other NFC-enabled devices. Until 2024, Apple denied third-party providers access to the NFC interface on iOS devices, whereas such access was available on Android devices. For the EU and EEA, the European Commission accepted binding commitments from Apple in July 2024, under which Apple agreed to grant third parties free access to NFC technology on iOS devices. Since spring 2024, ComCo has been in discussions with Apple with a view to enabling similar access for Swiss app providers. As of the end of 2024, Apple has granted Swiss third-party app providers access to the NFC & SE platform on iOS devices. In its preliminary investigation, ComCo will assess whether the specific conditions of access in Switzerland, which differ from those applicable in the EEA, comply with Swiss competition law.

Earlier in 2025, ComCo closed its investigation against Swisscom concerning the interconnection of corporate sites via broadband networks in relation to various customers without further action.15 This comes after the FSC's landmark decision in spring 2024 that saw ComCo's first decision against Swisscom also concerning the interconnection of corporate sites via broadband networks, albeit in relation to only one particular customer, being annulled.

Turning to relevant decisions by the Swiss courts in 2025, two judgements by the FSC are of particular interest. First, in its Vifor decision,16 the FSC touched on various relevant legal aspects including, most notably, the effects-based approach and the need to establish an actual possibility of the relevant conduct to hinder competition, as opposed to a merely abstract risk of competitive harm. In its Sunrise decision of September 2025 regarding exclusive pay-tv broadcasting rights,17 the FSC subsequently confirmed its aforementioned ruling.

First, taking a closer look at the Vifor decision, in 2016, ComCo imposed a fine of CHF 4.5 million on Galenica AG (now Vifor Pharma Participations AG; “Vifor”) and its subsidiary HCI. ComCo found that, as of 1 January 2013, HCI held a dominant position in the relevant market for refined, machine-readable data relating to medicinal product information and had abused this position by including contractual clauses vis-à-vis software providers that prevented the use of competing databases and by offering pharmaceutical manufacturers the inclusion of their medicinal product information in its databases only in combination with additional services. The FAC confirmed the existence of an abuse of a dominant position but reduced the fine to approximately CHF 3.8 million.

Upon appeal, the FSC partially upheld the complaint and referred the case back for a new assessment of the sanction. While confirming HCI’s dominant position, the FSC held that the abuse was limited in scope. Of the four practices objected to by the lower instance, only one contractual clause prohibiting software providers from integrating third-party data structured essentially in the same way as HCI’s data was found to infringe competition law, as it also prohibited forms of imitation permissible under unfair competition law. By contrast, the exclusive purchasing obligation contained in one single contract was considered not capable of foreclosing competitors, and the alleged tying practices were not proven due to lack of separate products.

The FSC further clarified that corporate restructuring did not preclude the imposition of a sanction. The former parent company, Galenica AG, had continued to exist as Vifor Pharma AG until June 2023, before being merged into Vifor Pharma Participations AG. In line with its case law and EU competition law principles, it held that the latter entity became the new addressee of the sanction, irrespective of its current status as a holding company. Finally, referring to its previous SIX judgment and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the FSC confirmed that, under an effects-based approach, competition authorities are not required to demonstrate actual market foreclosure. However, they must establish, on the basis of all relevant circumstances, that the conduct is concretely capable of restricting competition; a merely hypothetical or abstract risk is insufficient.

Second, in its Sunrise decision, 18besides confirming its aforementioned ruling that there must be an actual possibility to hinder competition, the FSC upheld the sanction against Sunrise (formerly UPC) for denying access to Swiss ice hockey broadcasts on pay-tv, thereby mostly confirming its case law on the exploitation of exclusive rights and following its precedent "sport on pay-tv19".

For background, Swisscom filed a complaint with ComCo in 2017, after Sunrise (UPC at the time) refused to provide a distribution offer for the broadcasting of Swiss ice hockey that Sunrise (UPC at the time) had secured starting from the 2017/2018 season. Finally, from the 2020/2021 season onwards, Sunrise (UPC at the time) adapted its conduct and opened the distribution channel. In any event, in 2020, ComCo found an abuse of a dominant position concerning the time from 2017 to 2020, imposing a sanction of CHF 29 million, which was mostly upheld by the FAC, and now the FSC.

On substance, the FSC held that Sunrise's refused access to exclusive Swiss ice hockey broadcasting rights from 2017 to 2020 constituted an unlawful refusal to deal within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) Cartel Act. It stated that a basic offer of Swiss ice hockey broadcasts was objectively necessary during the investigated period to be able to compete effectively in the TV platform market. Justifications put forward by Sunrise, including the alleged protection of investments, were not accepted as legitimate business reasons. Hence, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

3 Merger Control

In 2025, ComCo approved two noteworthy mergers: one in the tour operations sector and another between two prominent insurance companies.

In August 2025, ComCo authorized the acquisition of Hotelplan by DERTOUR, despite both being among the largest tour operators in Switzerland. The merger would create the largest tour operator in the country. Rather exceptionally, ComCo conducted an in-depth (Phase II) review of the merger. The review revealed that, while the merger would increase market concentration, travellers still had numerous booking options available and actively used various channels to compare prices and offers. ComCo ultimately concluded that the merger would not eliminate effective competition in the relevant markets, allowing the two operators to proceed with the transaction.20

In September 2025, ComCo also approved the "merger of equals" between Baloise Holding AG and Helvetia Holding AG. This approval followed a similar clearance from the European Commission in early August. With a business volume of approximately CHF 20 billion across eight countries and a global specialty business, the combined entity will become the second-largest Swiss insurance group and a leading European insurer.

4 Regulatory Changes

In December 2025, the Swiss Parliament adopted a comprehensive revision of the Swiss Cartel Act, marking the most significant reform of Swiss competition law in over a decade. The reform package includes a modernization of merger control, a strengthening of civil antitrust enforcement, a more targeted definition of hardcore price cartels and, notably, the (re)introduction of an effects-based assessment for hardcore agreements as well as for abuses of a dominant position or of relative market power.

Under the revised Cartel Act, Swiss merger control will shift from the current “dominance plus” test to the Significant Impediment to Effective Competition (“SIEC”) test, thereby aligning Swiss law with EU standards. This change lowers the intervention threshold and is likely to result in an increased number of in-depth investigations by ComCo. In addition, standing to bring civil damages claims will be extended to all persons whose economic interests are affected by unlawful restrictions of competition, including consumers and public authorities.

The revision also narrows the definition of hardcore price cartels. Whereas the current regime qualifies a broad range of price coordination practices as hardcore violations, the amended Cartel Act limits this category to minimum and fixed resale price agreements and to maximum price agreements on the demand side. At the same time, the reform reinstates a fully effects-based approach. ComCo will be required to demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis and on the basis of qualitative and quantitative analysis, that an agreement produces actual or likely anti-competitive effects. The same standard will apply to the assessment of alleged abuses of a dominant position or of relative market power, which must be evaluated in light of the specific market circumstances and empirical evidence. The revised Cartel Act is expected to enter into force in 2027.

Moreover, in December 2025, the Swiss Parliament also adopted a new foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening regime aimed at safeguarding public order and security. The regime will introduce a mandatory notification requirement for acquisitions of control over Swiss targets by foreign state-controlled investors. It applies where a foreign state body, or an undertaking or individual directly or indirectly controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign state body, acquires control over a company registered in the Swiss Commercial Register and where defined sector-specific and financial thresholds are met.

More concretely, the regime focuses on critical sectors such as electricity, water, natural gas, war materials and security-relevant IT services. A filing obligation is triggered if the Swiss target meets a de minimis threshold of at least 50 full-time employees worldwide or annual worldwide turnover of at least CHF 10 million in the preceding two financial years. In additional sectors, including major hospitals, pharmaceutical and medtech companies, key transport infrastructure, telecommunications networks and systemically important financial institutions, notification is required if the Swiss target reaches a turnover (or, for banks, gross income) threshold of at least CHF 100 million. The tiered system seeks to balance security concerns with Switzerland’s traditionally liberal investment policy.

The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (“SECO”) will act as the competent authority. The procedure is two-staged, consisting of a one-month Phase I review and, where necessary, a three-month Phase II investigation. Notifiable transactions are subject to a standstill obligation; infringements may be sanctioned with fines of up to 10% of the Swiss target’s global annual turnover. In cases of opposition by SECO or where significant political considerations arise, the Federal Council becomes the decision-making authority and is exclusively competent to prohibit a transaction.

Substantively, approval depends on whether the acquisition gives reason to assume that public order or security is endangered or threatened. The law sets out non-exhaustive criteria, including the substitutability of the target’s products or infrastructure and the foreign investor’s past involvement in activities such as espionage. The new regime is expected to enter into force in 2027 following the adoption of implementing ordinances.

5 Outlook

During 2026, various preparatory developments around the coming into force of the revised Cartel Act in 2027 are to be expected with ComCo gearing up to meet associated challenges. This will likely include, inter alia, relevant amendments to their guidelines, handouts and merger filing forms. Moreover, a handful of major cases remain pending at the FAC and FSC, promising potential for an equally

• 1ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/en/nsb?id=105610.
• 2ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/80qECKyzDZxK8gAq-0GcC.
• 3ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/en/newnsb/TN62E0Z5SBWkDtlngfknQ.
• 4See RPW 2024/4, 1285 ff.
• 5ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/18zSBA7x6UsB0f7jkVnO_.
• 6ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/FQe4lnmfryo3Hs3OdIs33.
• 7ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/en/newnsb/GmkisOCZfpqxWbOawM4wL.
• 8Decision of the FAC, 6 October 2025, available at: https://bvger.weblaw.ch/pdf/B-4024-2021_2025-10-06_050b1757-3883-4df6-b6e1-a78b5d3e7d8d.pdf.
• 9See FSC decisions 2C_75/2023, 2C_65/2023, 2C_68/2023 and 2C_81/2023 of 19 February 2025.
• 10RPW 2025/3, 733.
• 11RPW 2025/3, 812.
• 12ComCo press release available at: https://www.ebg.admin.ch/de/newnsb/P3RCdJp-qruFej540d2Co.
• 13ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/nkbsnE2Pox0Kyqzenm7VB.
• 14ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/egoLzxP2rT6G265nJvqnA.
• 15ComCo press release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/i4xDMF86X7FGU2byNcl93.
• 16Judgement of the FSC of 23 January 2025, BGer 2C_244/2022.
• 17Judgement of the FSC of 24 September 2025, BGer 2C_683/2023.
• 18Judgement of the FSC of 24 September 2025, BGer 2C_683/2023.
• 19Judgement of the FSC of 23 April 2025, BGer 2C_561/2022.
• 20See ComCo Press Release available at: https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/jfM2aR9nXRvqvR-5gC0b7.