Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – Mozambique

Competition enforcement in Mozambique is transitioning from institution‑building to a more mature, decision‑driven regime. The year of 2025 was marked by (i) a step change in public enforcement through landmark infringement decisions in the aviation and the sugar sectors, (ii) the adoption of a leniency regulation; (iii) a steady flow of merger control notifications and decisions; and (iv) a visible tightening of procedural discipline, notably through a time‑limited gun‑jumping regularization window and fines for non‑cooperation.

Institutional and Legal Background

The Mozambican competition framework has a staged genesis: a competition policy instrument  was first adopted in 2007, but it was only in 2013 that a dedicated Competition statute (Law No. 10/2013 of 11 April) was enacted, followed in 2014 by the approval of the Bylaws of the Competition Regulatory Authority (“CRA”). Even with this formal legal architecture in place, the CRA did not become fully operational until 2020 with the appointment of its first Chairman.

Between 2021 and 2025a number of key regulatory instruments were adopted or revised. These included the Regulation on Notification Forms for Concentrations (April 2021), amendments to the Schedule of Fees applicable to proceedings before the CRA (originally approved in June 2015), the revision of the CRA’s Bylaws and the revision of the Regulation implementing the Competition Act (December 2021).

Public enforcement activity effectively commenced in August 2021, when the CRA reviewed its first merger filing, relating to a transaction involving BP and Total. In 2022, the CRA  intervened on the antitrust front, notably issuing a warning to the Association of Mozambique Driving Schools concerning the setting of entry-level prices for driving lessons by its members. Since then, enforcement activity has developed incrementally across merger control and antitrust domains.

In parallel with the consolidation of its enforcement activity, the CRA has also strengthened its advocacy and institutional outreach functions. In 2025, the Authority issued several formal opinions on proposed regulatory and legislative initiatives across strategic sectors – including transport, agriculture, maritime activities and aviation. This was complemented by economic studies and sector-specific analyses in areas such as sugar, cement and transport.

While public enforcement has clearly accelerated, private enforcement mechanisms remain undeveloped, and judicial follow-on practice is still incipient. The institutional framework is therefore consolidating primarily through administrative action, complemented by advocacy and advisory interventions, rather than through court-driven litigation.

Antitrust Enforcement: First Steps but Giant Leaps

Abuse of Dominance in the Aviation Sector: the LAM Case

The first significant case resulting in the imposition of sanctions by the CRA was the LAM case concerning Linhas Aéreas de Moçambique, S.A. (Mozambican Airlines). The infringement decision was issued in 2025 for alleged abuse of a dominant position in the domestic scheduled passenger air transport market. LAM was sanctioned with a fine amounting at 11 million Meticais (approximately EUR 146,000).

According to the CRA, LAM was charging a surcharge associated with variable costs not incorporated in the ticket’s price. This surcharge represented approximately 60% of the final price paid by consumers. Although presented as a fuel-related charge, the CRA found that this surcharge effectively covered general operating costs that should have been incorporated in the base fare. In the Authority’s assessment, the surcharge distorted the real price of tickets and resulted in unjustified excessive pricing, directly harming consumers. LAM was deemed to hold a dominant position in the relevant domestic market and was therefore subject to a particular responsibility not to exploit its market power.

A central element of the decision was the absence of a clear legal and accounting basis for the surcharge. The CRA concluded that LAM failed to demonstrate objective, transparent and verifiable criteria governing the calculation or adjustment of the surcharge. Variations were described internally as part of a commercial strategy, and references to exchange rate fluctuations and operational costs were not supported by sufficiently detailed financial justification. The CRA also scrutinised LAM’s internal pricing structure, noting that the various departments involved in revenue management and surcharge regulation lacked a defined and coherent methodology for price formation. This absence of an objective and verifiable pricing methodology was decisive in qualifying the conduct as an exploitative abuse in the form of excessive pricing.

The final decision combined behavioural and pecuniary sanctions. LAM was ordered to eliminate the surcharge within two months and was fined 8,332,303.54 Meticais (0.18 % of LAM’s turnover for the previous year) for the abuse of dominance proper.

In addition, the CRA imposed two fines on LAM for procedural infringements, amounting in total to 2,777,434.51 Meticais (0.06% of the undertaking’s turnover in the previous year), for lack of cooperation and for the provision of incomplete information during the investigation. Each infringement is independently punishable by a fine of up to 1% of the undertaking’s turnover in the preceding financial year.

Further developments in this case are expected in the coming months, as LAM has publicly stated its intention to appeal the decision, expressing disagreement with its underlying reasoning.

Sugar Industry

Another landmark enforcement development in 2025 was the CRA’s final decision addressing an alleged horizontal agreement in the national sugar distribution market involving Distribuidora Nacional de Açúcar, Limitada (“DNA”) and its four shareholder producers, each holding 25% of its share capital.

The origins of the arrangement date back to 2002, prior to the entry into force of Mozambique’s Competition Act. At the time, the Government had adopted a series of policy measures aimed at developing and expanding the national sugar industry. Within that broader industrial policy framework, and in response to the structural challenges affecting the sector, the four producers established DNA as a joint distribution vehicle. Following its creation, DNA was designated by the Government as a “single sales desk” for domestically produced sugar in Mozambique.

As part of this structure, the producers entered into a shareholders’ agreement containing a series of clauses governing the commercialization of sugar through DNA. In particular, the agreement required the producers to sell all sugar produced in Mozambique exclusively through DNA, unless authorised otherwise by DNA itself. It further empowered DNA’s Board of Directors to determine pricing policies, establish uniform weighted average prices to be paid to all producers, and regulate production and export volumes.

According to the CRA, the exclusivity obligation eliminated independent sales channels, the pricing clauses constituted direct or indirect price fixing, and the output and export allocation mechanisms restricted production and divided market opportunities among the producers. Taken together, these provisions centralised price and output decisions within a jointly controlled vehicle, thereby eliminating competitive autonomy among horizontally related producers. The CRA therefore characterized the conduct as a horizontal cartel.

In September 2025, the investigated undertakings entered into settlement agreements with the CRA in which they acknowledged the infringement and accepted the imposition of fines totalling 69,529,814.94 Meticais (approximately EUR 925.583,27) in exchange for a reduction in penalties. They also agreed to structural and behavioural commitments, most notably the dissolution and liquidation of DNA after a transitional period which, according to the CRA, would restore competitive dynamics in the sugar market by allowing producers to determine prices, quantities and commercial strategies independently.

This case marks the first fully operationalized settlement in Mozambican competition enforcement practice and shows both the willingness of the CRA to fully apply its enforcement powers where appropriate and its availability to consider a negotiated outcome for antitrust proceedings.

Adoption of a Leniency Regulation

In 2025, the CRA formally adopted a  Leniency Regulation designed to incentivise cooperation in antitrust proceedings through structured fine reductions for voluntary self-reporting and submission of evidence. The regime was approved by Resolution No. 1/2025 on 31 March 2025, following a public consultation launched in April 2024, and represents a significant institutional step in strengthening investigative tools under Mozambique’s Competition law.

The Leniency Regulation applies broadly to collective restrictive practices prohibited under Articles 17 and 18 of the Competition Act, including agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices, whether horizontal or vertical, where the conduct has as its object or effect the restriction of competition in the national market. While cartels are expected to be the primary focus, the regime is not formally limited to them.

Eligibility to benefit from this instrument is based on the concept of significant added value: applicants must provide evidence that materially enhances the CRA’s ability to prove the infringement, either by its nature (for example, contemporaneous documentary evidence) or by the level of detail provided. Fine reductions are granted according to the order of application – 50-70% for the first applicant, 30-50% for the second, and 10-30% for the third – subject to cumulative conditions, including immediate cessation of the infringement (unless authorised otherwise), evidentiary insufficiency at the Authority’s level at the time of application, and a formal confession combined with full and continuous cooperation at the applicant’s expense.

Procedurally, applications must be submitted in writing (in person, by registered mail or via the Authority’s website), although oral statements may be provided at the Authority’s headquarters. A marker system allows applicants to secure priority while completing their submission within 15 working days, and leniency materials are classified as confidential except where disclosure is legally required.

From a comparative perspective, while the regime’s scope is broad, the absence of full immunity for the first applicant and the requirement of a formal confession may influence strategic incentives when compared to more established leniency frameworks in other jurisdictions. The practical effectiveness of the mechanism will ultimately depend on consistent and predictable application by the CRA, particularly in its early cases.

Notwithstanding, the introduction of a structured marker system and clearly tiered reductions enhances legal certainty and positions the CRA to rely more systematically on cooperation-based detection tools in cartel enforcement.

Merger Control: Notifications, Decisions and Compliance Trends

Notifications

In 2025, a total of 10 transactions were notified to the CRA, of which only two remained under review at the time of writing. The transactions spanned several sectors of the Mozambican economy. The most prominent sectors, by number of notifications, were manufacturing, energy, agriculture, forestry and fisheries.

This sectoral distribution confirms a pattern already visible in previous years: merger activity remains concentrated in primary industries and infrastructure-related sectors, reflecting both the structural importance of energy, agribusiness and manufacturing in Mozambique’s economic landscape and continued domestic and foreign investment in these areas.

Decisions and Remedies

During the year under review, the CRA adopted eight clearance decisions, two decisions of non-applicability and one conditional clearance decision.

The only conditional clearance decision concerned the acquisition by Grindrod Mauritius of the port terminal Matola Limitada (May 2025). The CRA identified potential competition risks linked to discriminatory access to what it considered an essential export facility, including foreclosure of independent operators, preferential treatment of companies within the acquiring group, and increased dependence of exporters in a context of limited logistical alternatives. To address these concerns, the Authority accepted a package of commitments that included: (i) reserving a specifically quantified “special allocation” capacity of 400,000 tonnes per year for new and smaller operators, with priority for independent logistics competitors; (ii) applying objective, transparent and non-discriminatory allocation and pricing criteria; (iii) prohibiting exclusivity or tying arrangements favouring group companies; (iv) publishing semi-annual reports detailing capacity, utilisation and standardised tariffs; and (v) establishing a structured compliance-monitoring framework supported by periodic reporting and the possibility of independent audits.

Procedural Compliance and Gun Jumping

An official notice granting a time-limited opportunity to regularise concentrations implemented without prior notification was published. The measure provided a six-month window – counted from early January 2025 – during which undertakings could notify past transactions without incurring the penalties ordinarily associated with gun jumping. The notice made clear, however, that once the window expired, unnotified transactions subject to mandatory notification would be subjected to sanctions under Competition Law.

Importantly, the CRA reiterated that it may initiate ex officio merger control proceedings for transactions implemented within the previous five years and of which it becomes aware.

Cooperation Duties in Merger Proceedings

2025 also reflects a more assertive approach to procedural cooperation in merger-related investigations. In a decision concerning Studio 88 Moçambique, Limitada, the CRA imposed two separate fines – one for lack of cooperation (0.6% of the relevant turnover base) and another for failure to provide information (0.4%) – in connection with repeated non-collaboration in supervisory requests relating to a possible concentration involving Mr Price. The case confirms that failures to comply with information and cooperation obligations may be sanctioned independently of the merger’s substantive assessment.

Conclusions

Taken together, the developments of 2025 signal a qualitative shift in Mozambican competition enforcement. The CRA has moved beyond foundational rulemaking towards structured decisional practice, including substantive infringement findings, the operationalization of settlement mechanisms, stricter enforcement of procedural and cooperation obligations and the adoption of a formal leniency regime.

At the same time, the CRA’s use of opinions and advocacy initiatives indicates a gradual integration of competition principles into broader regulatory and policy frameworks. This parallel development – combining enforcement activity with advisory and preventive functions – points to an increasingly coherent competition governance structure.

If applied consistently, the instruments deployed in 2025 may contribute to the continued institutional consolidation of Mozambique’s competition law framework.