Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – Italy

Introduction

2025 was a year in which the enforcement activity of the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) was marked more by continuity than by rupture.

Attention to “classic” infringements remained central, but increasing weight was attached to “new” competitive concerns arising in markets that have become technically and structurally more complex. In these contexts, while remaining within established legal parameters and analytical categories, the AGCM progressively shifted its focus from the static outcome of conduct to the way markets are designed, regulated, and governed.

The recurring questions are no longer limited to prices and market shares, but concern who sets access rules, who designs the system’s technical architecture, how realistically a competitor can enter and compete without being trapped by operational bottlenecks, and where the market is heading irom a forward-looking perspective. This is where competition primarily unfolded during the year, rather than in static snapshots of market structures.

Restrictive agreements

With regard to horizontal agreements, 2025 displays two parallel enforcement strands that coexist without friction.

There has been a return of the “classic” cartel, characterised by long-lasting price agreements involving a plurality of firms and typically featuring systematic information exchanges and the active role of trade associations. The recent Fonderie case (case I866, decision of 22 December 2025) is a textbook example in this respect. A single and continuous infringement lasting more than twenty years, in which the Assofond association allegedly acted not as a neutral forum but as a true facilitator of coordination. In particular, the “indicators” made available by the Association, formally presented as technical benchmarks, were treated by the Authority as focal points capable of reducing uncertainty about competitors’ strategies and sustaining price increases without the need for explicit discussions. The Authority thus held that apparently neutral tools, in concentrated or highly cohesive markets, may perform the same function as an explicit anti-competitive agreement.

Among the classic cartel cases that characterised 2025, particular relevance attaches to the finding of a cartel among several major Italian oil companies (case I864, decision of 23 September 2025). The proceedings, triggered by a whistleblower, led the Authority to impose an overall fine of almost EUR 1 billion for coordination in the determination of the bio-component included in fuel prices, introduced to comply with regulatory obligations. The infringement consisted in the implementation of simultaneous and largely coinciding price increases, determined through direct and indirect exchanges of information, also facilitated by the publication of such prices in articles appearing in a well-known sectoral newspaper.

Alongside these cases - and this is where 2025 marks a further step forward - the AGCM increasingly relied on Article 101 to capture forms of coordination that do not pass through a traditional agreement but are embedded in firms’ ongoing relationships. This is illustrated by the SAS/Moby/GNV proceedings in the ferry transport sector (cases I872–I872B, decision of 22 October 2025), where no cartel in the strict sense was identified, but a combination of significant minority shareholdings and inter-company financing among competitors (Moby/SAS–GNV) was considered allegedly capable of facilitating both direct and indirect contacts. The Authority considered that these structural links made it possible to coordinate the parties’ commercial policies on the relevant routes, as, in concentrated markets with high barriers to entry, such links may align incentives and weaken rivalry even in the absence of information exchanges or price agreements. The proceedings were ultimately closed through the acceptance of commitments, despite the Authority’s qualification of the case as a “cartel” (see AGCM press release of 31 December 2025).

A similar logic emerges in cases of joint selling and consortium governance. In the Federconsorzio Dolomiti SuperSki proceedings (case I877, opened by decision of 1 July 2025), the issue is not a traditional agreement per se, but the point at which integration aimed at generating genuine efficiencies turns into anti-competitive homogenisation. In short, the proceedings were opened to assess whether the by-laws adopted by a federation, bringing together twelve management consortia of ski areas, result in restrictions of competition on the prices of ski passes sold by the member consortia, as well as in anticompetitive limits on their sale through third parties. According to the opening decision, the centralisation of prices and sales channels may transform a federation, formally justified on efficiency grounds, into a disciplining tool for its members, thereby limiting both mutual competition in the market and competition in the distribution of ski-pass products (for example by online platforms, whose complaint triggered the proceedings). The proceedings are still pending, and their outcome will be of particular interest.

On the vertical side, 2025 shows a change of pace, with the AGCM launching numerous proceedings and marking a revival of enforcement in a category of agreements that has historically played only a marginal role in the Authority’s practice. Indeed, the recent opening of proceedings concerning DJI/Nital (case I878, decision of 14 October 2025), Citizen and Swatch (cases I879–I880, decisions of 25 November 2025) and Morellato (case I876, decision of 26 March 2025) reveals a clear enforcement line, bringing vertical agreements back to the centre of the Authority’s priorities.

These cases reflect AGCM’s intention to target not only explicit vertical restraint clauses, but also more sophisticated and informal methods of controlling prices and distribution channels. Particular weight is attached to systematic monitoring of online channels and to the exercise of commercial pressure as practices that may, in themselves, restrict competition.

A prime example is provided by the DJI/Nital proceedings, in which the Authority alleges that the firms used the prices published on the main distributor’s website as benchmarks, systematically monitored retailers’ deviations and intervened, through trademark-related warnings and threats to interrupt supplies, in order to neutralise any form of price competition. A substantially similar strategy is alleged in the Citizen and Swatch proceedings, where online prices are said to have been fixed through constant monitoring of authorised distributors’ digital channels and the adoption of retaliatory measures against those promoting discounts or divergent commercial conditions. In the Morellato case, by contrast, the focus shifts to restrictions on the use of marketplaces which, according to the opening decision, would reserve privileged access to digital platforms for the manufacturer and constrain retailers’ commercial autonomy.

In short, the 2025 proceedings signal a more substantive approach by the Authority to vertical agreements, consolidating the view that a written obligation is not required in order to establish a restriction of competition. Where (digital) monitoring makes deviations immediately visible and retaliation is rapid and credible, the competitive constraint is already embedded in the structure of the distribution relationship.

Read together, the 2025 horizontal and vertical cases do not modify the legal criteria of Article 101, but illustrate the breadth and flexibility of its factual scope. Traditional cartels remain central and are sanctioned as such. What expands is the range of configurations that the Authority considers capable of generating coordination (including, ownership links, financing arrangements, consortia, and monitoring tools).

Abuse of dominance

In 2025, abuse of dominance remained one of the main enforcement priorities of the AGCM. The core legal framework remains the traditional one, but the focus of the factual analysis has shifted. The recurring question is no longer “at what price does the dominant firm operate?”, but rather “who controls access, and under what rules?”.

This shift in perspective cuts across very different sectors, characterising both traditional industries and new digital markets, where market power increasingly manifests itself in the control of gateways, such as capacity, interfaces and technical standards. Over the past year, the AGCM has elevated these elements to central competitive variables, rather than treating them as background features.

This is reflected in the proceedings opened against the Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane Group in the ‘traditional’ transport sector (case A575, decision of 18 March 2025). The case does not revolve around explicit discrimination, but rather around the operational management of network capacity by the vertically integrated former monopolist. According to the opening decision, in a sector where the “product” is a time slot on a specific route, foreclosure effects may arise not only from a classic refusal to supply, but also from dilatory or non-transparent conduct aimed at disadvantaging in the allocation of the naturally limited capacity. In the past, similar cases have normally been closed with commitments designed to restore parity between the rivals (case A443, decision of 19 February 2014).

The same pattern appears in the decision concerning Ryanair (case A568, decision of 19 December 2025), where the alleged abuse lay in access to flight inventory. The Authority found that a complex set of technical and contractual measures (including facial recognition procedures, intermittent booking blocks and account cancellations) obstructed agencies’ access to the website of Ryanair (leader on routes to and from Italy) and prevented the integration of its flights with other tourism services. After jointly examining technical interfaces and contractual conditions, the AGCM concluded that certain design and interoperability choices may formally preserve access to inputs while, in practice, neutralising it and giving rise to potential foreclosure effects. Ryanair was fined more than EUR 255 million, and the decision is currently under appeal.

In digital ecosystems, control of the access point takes an even more sophisticated form. The decision against Apple (case A561, decision of 16 December 2025) shows how the design of a tool formally aimed at protecting privacy may, in fact, amount to an abusive strategy. The AGCM did not challenge the legitimacy for an OS producer to impose tools aimed at enhancing privacy (in this case, the well-known App Tracking Transparency policy), but rather the imposition on third parties of conditions that were neither objective, nor transparent, nor necessary, together with the asymmetric manner in which those tools were implemented. Put simply, according to the Authority, privacy may constitute a legitimate objective, but it cannot operate as a safe harbour where design choices shift burdens onto rivals and, in practice, restrict competition. Apple was fined more than EUR 98 million, and has announced its intention to appeal the decision.

The Meta/WhatsApp proceedings (case A576, opened by decision of 22 July 2025) ultimately fit within the same perspective, with the Authority expressing concerns that control over the leading messaging system could be leveraged to support expansion in the AI chatbot services market. Beyond the specific substance of the case, these proceedings are notable because they represent one of the very rare instances in which the AGCM adopted interim measures at an early stage (i.e. before a final assessment on the merits), reflecting a more precautionary stance in fast-moving digital markets. The Authority thus shows an awareness that the pace of antitrust enforcement is ill-suited to the rapid evolution of these markets, characterised by strong network effects and default dynamics that may cause competitive outcomes to crystallise before a final decision is adopted.

Attention to market access in 2025 also extended to ‘green’ markets. In the Novamont/Eni case (case A573, decision of 10 June 2025), the Authority considered that a network of exclusivities and incentives could produce structural foreclosure in a sector where demand is strongly shaped by environmental regulation. Having been found dominant in the market for bioplastics for shopping bags, the firm allegedly built a “two-level” exclusivity, binding both converters (direct customers) to use its material and large-scale retailers (indirect customers) to use products made with that material. The result is a circuit which, in the Authority’s view, simultaneously controls access to demand and to sales channels, thereby hindering market development and reducing competitive pressure by preventing rivals from reaching minimum efficient scale and from validating alternative technologies. Eni and Novamont were fined more than EUR 32 million.

All in all, over the last year, the exploitation of a dominant position has played out above all through control over access to the market. Capacity, interoperability, downstream channels and design choices thus become central elements of market power. The risk of abuse no longer arises only from aggressive clauses or “wrong” prices, but from the management of systems - technical, contractual and procedural - that, over time, shape and condition the competitive opportunities of others.

Merger control

In 2025, merger control in Italy has not changed in nature, but has brought to the surface an already emerging trend from the previous year. The AGCM reasoned less in terms of point-in-time metrics, such as market shares and overlaps, and more in terms of trajectories. What matters today is not only whether a transaction strengthens a firm in the present, but whether it alters contestability in the next competitive cycle, especially where competition is played out through tenders or structural bottlenecks.

This approach explains why the most instructive cases of the year are therefore not those in which the Authority identified an immediate and visible horizontal effect and resolved it through divestiture remedies (for example, in the banking sector, case C12710 BPER/Banca Popolare di Sondrio, decision of 1 July 2025), but rather those in which it chose to look forward and to assess the prospective evolution of competition in the markets concerned.

In the Italgas/2i Rete Gas (case C12688, decision of 6 March 2025) and Hera/AIMAG (case C12711, decision of 24 June 2025) transactions, both in the natural gas distribution sector, the core of the analysis was not the static impact on market shares, but the effect on future tenders for the award of local concessions. In a market where access is not free but periodically reassigned through competitive bidding, the main competitive factors become size, operational experience and control of network data, which translate into a structural advantage enjoyed by the outgoing incumbent in preparing bids.

The resulting approach is to clear the transaction, but subject to a broad package of remedies - where appropriate, including divestiture and informational measures - designed to prevent the merger from turning into a rent in subsequent tender rounds. This is not a minor point, because in concession-based sectors the protection of competition passes first and foremost through the protection of the selection process, rather than through the static measurement of market shares.

The same forward-looking logic had already been applied in the telecommunications sector, where already in 2024 the AGCM cleared the acquisition of Vodafone Italia by Fastweb (case C12659, decision of 19 December 2024) subject to behavioural remedies aimed at ensuring access to data and infrastructure which, in a forward-looking perspective, would allow competitors to operate successfully on the market and to participate in tenders for telecommunications services launched by public administrations. A similar approach was repeated this year in the Poste/TIM dossier (case C12726, decision of 3 September 2025), which continues the major reshaping of the Italian telecommunications sector. Specifically, the AGCM treated a minority shareholding of 24.8 per cent as conferring sole control and focused its analysis on the vertical and conglomerate risks that, on paper, arose from the possibility that Poste Italiane could leverage its postal services network as a relevant distribution channel in telecommunications. The transaction was ultimately cleared without remedies, considering the set of robust market constraints (including developments in fixed-line services, the role of online and multi-brand channels, and competitive pressure from other operators and MVNOs) which, in the Authority’s assessment, reduced the likelihood of foreclosure concerns.

Beyond the individual cases, the 2025 case law depicts a merger control system that is stable but demanding, with the Authority remaining reluctant to impose outright prohibitions and preferring instead to adjust transactions through remedies. At the same time, it increasingly adopts an assessment criterion focused on future contestability, especially in regulated markets and in contexts where competition is played out through tenders or infrastructures.

In parallel, the past year was also marked by another trend: the growing centrality of litigation. It has become increasingly common for competitors to use judicial review as a competitive strategy, challenging clearance decisions and asking the administrative courts to overturn the AGCM’s assessments (Council of State, judgment no. 10384/2025; TAR Lazio, judgments nos. 20935/2025 and 91116/2025). This development is reinforced by the approach of the Italian administrative courts, which no longer display deferential restraint and now engage with the merits of the complex assessments underlying merger transactions, even annulling clearances on the basis of disagreement with technical evaluations that were once largely shielded from judicial review as expressions of the Authority’s technical discretion. These recent judicial developments make it clear that the AGCM decision no longer closes the game, but may open another one, with timing and uncertainty spilling over into closing mechanics, conditions precedent, post-closing obligations and risk allocation in transaction documentation.

In practice, in 2025 notifying a merger in Italy no longer means only persuading the AGCM on the merits, but also structuring the transaction in the knowledge that the decision may later be challenged. Merger control has become a double exercise: substance (effects and remedies) and resilience (the ability of the decision to withstand judicial scrutiny).

Private enforcement

In 2025, private enforcement in Italy has continued to gain traction, evolving from an ancillary phenomenon into a structural pillar of the antitrust framework. The change concerns not only the number of cases, but also the way in which damages actions interact with public enforcement.

Litigation continues to concentrate around a few major strands, mainly linked to the principal national and European cartels. The first, which aligns Italy with other European countries, is the wave of follow-on actions arising from the trucks cartel decided by the European Commission (case AT.39824, decision of 19 July 2016), which coincided with the transposition of Directive 2014/104/EU and proved decisive for the revival of private enforcement in Italy. At the same time, this strand has exposed the structural limits of the Italian system, which have still not found a solution in 2025. The cases are technically complex, dominated by issues of proving purchases made long ago and by the quantification of harm in a counterfactual scenario never observed, with economic expert evidence playing a central role. The result is a chronic lengthening of proceedings, and first-instance cases lasting more than ten years are no exceptional (see, for example, Court of Milan, judgment no. 216/2026), confirming the phenomenon typically described by the emblematic formula of the “Italian torpedo”. In essence, the Trucks experience has shown that even a very solid public infringement decision does not automatically translate into swift or predictable compensation.

Alongside the Trucks strand, and potentially more incisive in the medium term, is the emerging litigation linked to the Italian corrugated cardboard cartel (case I805, AGCM decision of 17 July 2019). This is a national infringement, with a broad base of downstream customers, relatively simple commercial relationships and an overall damage estimate close to EUR 2 billion. This combination makes the case a natural candidate for a new wave of follow-on actions, and indeed by the end of 2025 dozens of companies had already brought claims, both individually and collectively.
It therefore constitutes an important testbed to assess whether the Italian system is capable of absorbing widespread damages litigation without reproducing the inefficiencies that emerged in the Trucks experience.

This outlook extends naturally into the near future. Recent and “strong” AGCM decisions, such as the Fonderie case (case I866, mentioned above), if confirmed on judicial review, display all the features likely to generate a new wave of follow-on actions. Should this occur, it will reveal to what extent Italian courts have truly absorbed the logic of the Directive, and to what extent they remain anchored to a traditional civil-law model, which is poorly suited to managing serial antitrust damages litigation.

Lastly, as regards the relationship between private and public enforcement, the year was characterized - beyond the trend already emerging in recent years of an increasing attention paid in the AGCM’s most recent decisions to the effects of conduct even in cases of serious and by-object infringements, with a view to facilitating future claims for damages (for example, see case I805, AGCM decision of 17 July 2019) - also by two further trends. First, the Authority’s growing openness to granting access to documents from the investigative file to injured parties, even after the conclusion of the proceedings. Second, the increasing involvement of the AGCM by civil courts (in particular, the Court of Rome, more so than that of Milan), in requests for guidance on the quantification of harm pursuant to Article 17(3) of Directive 2014/104/EU, which leads to a genuine interpenetration between the private and public enforcement planes.

Legislative developments

On the legislative front, the main novelty is the tightening of the procedural framework governing AGCM market investigations, which no longer operate in a grey area. As from January 2025, with Presidential Decree No. 214/2024 amending the AGCM procedural regulation (Presidential Decree No. 217/1998) and completing the path initiated by Law No. 136/2023, investigations formally remain non-adversarial, but become more rule-bound and, above all, more clearly integrated into the enforcement process. The opening must now be published and more fully reasoned; requests for information and hearings are standardised; the handling of confidentiality is tightened through deadlines and procedural steps; and it is clarified that inspections may also be carried out in this context, thereby undercutting challenges to the breadth of the Authority’s powers. The decisive step, however, lies elsewhere. The reform makes explicit the link between investigation and infringement, allowing the AGCM to move from one to the other without artificial breaks where indicia of illegality emerge. In practice, the market investigation ceases to be merely a mapping exercise and becomes a formal gateway to sanctioning proceedings, bringing the Italian framework closer to that of other European systems.

The other novelty, which ultimately did not materialise, concerned the introduction of a standstill obligation for concentrations notified to the AGCM. Following the Authority’s recommendation (ref. AS2045 of 20 December 2024), which expressly proposed amending the national antitrust statute (Law No. 287/1990) to suspend the implementation of transactions until the AGCM’s authorisation, the proposal formally entered the parliamentary debate on the 2025 Annual Law for the Market and Competition (see amendments nos. 9.0.19 to 9.0.2). During the legislative process, however, it was abandoned, despite the Authority’s subsequent reminder in a parliamentary hearing (Bill C. 2682, hearing of 11 November 2025). The final text of the law thus confirmed the traditional framework, which allows closing while the Authority’s assessment is still pending.

This choice signals a structural tension in the Italian system, which continues to combine increasingly intrusive ex post judicial controls (see above, Section 4) with the absence of a true ex ante safeguard on the implementation of mergers. What emerges is therefore a growing gap between a legislator that prioritises deal speed and an administrative judiciary that strengthens review of competitive assessments, thereby leaving the fate of transactions uncertain for years.

Concluding remarks

2025 did not mark a doctrinal turning point in Italian competition law. The legal parameters applied by the AGCM remained the familiar ones, and the regulatory framework was not rewritten. The change lay in the way those parameters are applied to markets increasingly defined by structure, access and design, rather than by price competition in the strict sense.

Looking across Article 101, Article 102 and merger control, a common thread emerges. The Authority shows decreasing interest in formal labels and increasing attention to the dynamic and concrete configuration of competitive dynamics, which is no longer mere background or context, but the very core of competitive analysis. In parallel, private enforcement has passed the threshold of marginality and entered a phase of transition: still slow, but progressively more aligned with the model of the Directive.

Added to this is a more demanding institutional environment, with market investigations transformed into tools more directly connected with enforcement, and judicial review becoming more penetrating - especially in merger cases - thereby introducing an additional layer of uncertainty even after formally favourable decisions.

In sum, antitrust risk no longer arises only from explicit agreements or “wrong” prices, but from the way markets, platforms, and structural relationships are designed and managed over time.