Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – France

Years go by and, yet, not much has changed since last year. 2024 annual post started with stating that it was a record 15^th anniversary for the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) (Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2024 – France | Kluwer Competition Law Blog). Same can be said in the field of merger control for 2025. The record was once again broken, with a total of 328 control decisions issued in 2025, “up 11% on the previous record in 2024” (Press release, 8 January 2026). On the other hand, the total amount of fines significantly reduced, from €1.4 billion in 2024 to €379,255,000 in 2025 for five antitrust decisions with fines (Press release, 8 January 2026). Nevertheless, these decisions, as well as French case-law, remain important as they consolidate new principles, such as the interpretation of abuse of exploitation in the March Apple decision (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-02, 31 March 2025), and thus participate in the strengthening of the fight against anticompetitive practices. Finally, the FCA remains very active in its advisory role as well, setting out guidelines and opinions in very diverse sectors, such as agriculture, veterinary medicines or the environmental impact of artificial intelligence (Press release, 8 January 2026) in line with the main themes laid out by the 2024-2025 roadmap (2024-2025 Roadmap): sustainability, digital environment, reindustrializing, etc.

Another record year in merger control

The year 2025 was a prolific year for merger control. A total of 328 operations were carried out this year, representing an 11% increase compared to the previous year. Among the merger reviews conducted, half pertained exclusively to the large-scale retail sector. The vast majority of these decisions resulted in clearances without commitments; such was the case for the “acquisition of Auchan stores by Lidl” (Press release, 22 September 2025; FCA, dec. n° 25-DCC-214, 22 September 2025). However, some were subject to commitments to guarantee the maintenance of sufficient competition and to protect consumer interests. The FCA thus granted conditional authorization for: the “acquisition of Casino stores by Auchan” (Press release, 21 March 2025; FCA, dec. n° 25-DCC-65, 21 March 2025) the “acquisition of Cora and Match stores by Carrefour” (Press release, 13 March 2025; FCA, dec. n° 25-DCC-56, 13 March 2025) as well as the “acquisition of Bio&Co stores by Marcel&Fils” (Press release, 8 October 2025; FCA, dec. n° 25-DCC-222, 8 October 2025).

However, faced with this increase in merger control activity and the resources required for deployment, the FCA has brought back to the heart of debates the question of potentially updating these concentration thresholds, which could perhaps be considered somewhat obsolete in light of this upsurge in operations. Compared to 2015, which saw only 192 reviews, the figures for 2025 have practically doubled (Press release, 8 January 2026). For this reason, in its press release dated April 10, 2025 (Press release, 10 April 2025), the FCA has relaunched reflections on the assessment of mergers and acquisitions occurring below the control thresholds. Challenging the Illumina/Grail ruling (Illumina/Grail, 3 September 2024, C-611/22 P and C-625/22 P; Illumina/Grail: Facilitating Acquisitions Strategies for the Future? - EU Law Live), the FCA proposed a modernization of merger control through the lens of three proposals: “1) introduce a call-in system, 2) provide for new notification thresholds based on the market power of the companies concerned, or 3) prioritize antitrust control of problematic operations”1.

This initiative aims to take the opposite view of Article 22 of the Merger Regulation, specifying conditions for these call-in powers, which must be based on: “i) a turnover threshold that can be easily assessed by the companies concerned; ii) a local nexus criterion to the French territory to prevent concentrations with no consequences on the national territory from falling within the scope of the mechanism; iii) a criterion for identifying a risk to competition on French territory; iv) implementation periods for the call-in power that are clearly defined and sufficiently short to ensure the necessary predictability for companies” (Press release, 10 April 2025).

Pending such modifications, the FCA did not hesitate to apply for the first time the solution established by Towercast (Towercast, 16 March 2023, C‑449/21) in its fight against anti-competitive practices.

The strengthening of the fight against anticompetitive practices

Abuse of dominance

The FCA has imposed fines in two abuse of dominance cases in 2025, the first, of €150 million, against Apple (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-02, 31 March 2025), and the second, of €4.6 million against Doctolib (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-06, 6 November 2025).

In the latter, the platform abused its dominant position in the online medical appointment booking and remote medical consultation solutions sectors. It combined exclusivity clauses, tying, as well an anticompetitive acquisition of its main rival (FCA Press release, Nov. 6, 2025). It is notably the first application of the Towercast solution (Towercast, 16 March 2023, C‑449/21) by the FCA, even though the fine remained limited regarding that particular abuse, €50 000, to ensure respect of principles of proportionality and necessity of the fines. Doctolib was already in a dominant position prior to the acquisition in July 2018 – the dominant position having been established as from 2017, market shares systematically being above 50% between 2017 and 2022 (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-06, 6 November 2025; E.g. para. 399; para. 670). The platform “MonDocteur” was its main rival and Doctolib stated in internal documents that it needed to be “integrated” in order to “kill competition” (E.g. para. 692). Its acquisition was hence only part of a strategy to eliminate competition (E.g. para. 697), which led to an increase of prices without loss of clients, as Doctolib saw the acquisition as a means of “reducing pricing pressure” and a lever for “increasing its prices by 10 to 20%” (E.g. para. 714; for further explanations: First Sanction Under Article 102 TFEU for Predatory Acquisitions by the French Competition Authority | Kluwer Competition Law Blog).

The Apple case sanctioned the tracking of data in mobile applications on iOS devices, clarifying the conditions for abusive exploitation (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-02, 31 March 2025). In 2020, Apple introduced a transparency feature for mobile app tracking called “App Tracking Transparency” (“ATT”) with the aim of better protecting user privacy. However, this feature was first fined by the CNIL (the Commission in charge of protecting privacy and data in France, amongst others) in December 2022 (del. SAN-2022-025, 29 December 2022). The default activation of the “Personalized Ads” privacy settings in the App Store did not allow users to validly consent to the processing of their personal data in violation of Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act. Apple therefore updated the ATT, except that it was done asymmetrically, with the consent collection process being significantly more difficult for users on third-party apps than on Apple apps.

The abuse lay in this asymmetry between Apple and third-party developers, and the excessive complexity of the ATT system. Developers were subject to a double consent requirement for the collection and processing of third-party data (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-02, 31 March 2025; E.g. para. 536; 541), while Apple had set up a single window for its own applications and data collection, leading to differences in treatment (E.g. para. 541), and automatically undermining the neutrality of the system (E.g. para. 528). The user’s refusal to consent resulted in only one window, while acceptance resulted in a multiplication of these windows for publishers, subjecting access to the platform to disproportionate conditions. Abuse of exploitation was characterized here under three conditions. Firstly, the directly or indirectly imposed nature of the transaction conditions implemented by the dominant company (E.g. para. 492), Apple’s monopoly allowing it to impose ATT in the App Store. Secondly, the unfair nature of these conditions, relating to the “reasonable” aspect of the dominant company’s behavior (E.g. para. 493), which was not the case here due to lack of neutrality and excessive complexity. Finally, the unfavorable nature of these conditions for business partners, consumers, or third-party companies (E.g. para. 495), the consent rate being significantly reduced after the ATT’s implementation for third parties.

Although the “reasonable” aspect has been debated, opening the doors to an arbitrary appreciation of the competition authorities for some, with a particularly broad scope for assessment, it does seem necessary to rebalance relationships. It also is in line with the most recent developments on abuse of dominance, which French Courts has adopted as demonstrated by a ruling issued on the 25^th of June, 2025 (Cour de cassation, 25 June 2025, n° 23-13.391). The abuse, in this case, is known in the pharmaceutical sector as the “capture of the regulator”: a dominant laboratory spreads alarmist, or misleading, information about a generic drug to prevent its marketing. The FCA has sanctioned such abuse but the Paris Court of Appeal had overturned the decision, notably stating that the discourse could be a matter of public interest (Cour de cassation, 25 June 2025, n° 23-13.391; E.g. para. 58). However, the Commercial chamber of the Highest Court overturned the ruling, which had failed to examine whether this discourse pursued an anticompetitive objective aimed at preventing the use of this drug (E.g. para. 59). What is worth observing is the reasoning adopted by the Court in this ruling, aligning with recent European decisions. Indeed, points 48 to 52 are a perfect reminder of the last years’ modernization of abuse, on abusive exploitation, the role of intent or relevant circumstances, recalling decisions such as European Superleague Company (European Superleague Company, 21 December 2023, C-333/21), Servizio Elettrico Nazionale (Servizio Elettrico Nazionale, 12 May 2022, C-377/20) or Google Shopping (Google Shopping, 10 September 2024, C-48/22 P).

Cartels

2025 was quite a calm year in terms of anticompetitive agreements, with two decisions with fines, compared to six in 2024. Decision 25-D-03 sanctioned no-poach agreements in the engineering, technology consulting and IT services sectors (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-03, 11 June 2025; Press release, 11 June 2025) for a total of €29.5 million. Decision 25-D-07 sanctioned an anticompetitive agreement in the road fuel distribution sector in Corsica (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-07, 17 November 2025; Press release, 17 November 2025) for a total of €187.4 million.

Regarding the first decision, technology sectors “are characterised by the strategic importance of human resources” (Press release, 11 June 2025). Hence, prohibiting hiring each other’s employees in this context, using no-poach agreements, furthermore, with no time limit, was considered as an anticompetitive practice by object by the FCA. It was trough a leniency application submitted by one of the companies that the FCA learned of theses practices, witness to the success of this negotiated procedure.

Regarding the second decision, geographical context was of importance, as Corsica is an island and is hence not subject to the same competitive conditions to mainland France, and particularly in the road fuel distribution sectors. Indeed, “there are no refineries on Corsica and only two fuel depots” (Press release, 17 November 2025) owned by DPLC, and the sector is highly concentrated, with no competitive pressure, for instance, by food retail operators, which is the case in mainland (Press release, 17 November 2025). DPLC shareholders entered into an anticompetitive agreement, between 2016 until January 2023, as access to the fuel products stored in the only two depots were conditioned upon being a shareholder. Non-shareholders operators were hence subordinated to their rivals, being dependent on them for their supply of fuel products. This led to a market discrimination for non-shareholders that are facing less advantageous conditions, and potential increase of prices for a very important product, fuel, as consumers are dependant on their cars in their daily lives, which was considered in the motivation of the fines.

On another topic, freedom of speech and competition law were once again tackled by the French Highest Court in a ruling issued on October 15^th, 2025. After the abuse of dominant position for misleading discourse by dominant pharmaceutical company (Cour de cassation, 25 June 2025, n° 23-13.391), it was an anticompetitive agreement by the French union of dental surgeons that further allowed the commercial court to draw the line between those two topics (Cour de cassation, 15 October 2025, n° 23-21.370). The Union stated that freedom of speech and defending professional interests could justify calling out for boycott certain platforms that were allegedly a threat to the dentist profession. However, such is not the case when the message is misleading and does not stand on factual considerations. The French Highest court thus upheld the FCA decision (FCA, dec. n° 20-D-17, 12 November 2020) since the Union exceeded the limits of freedom of speech and freedom of association by deliberately encouraging its members to refuse to join other networks, committing an anticompetitive agreement (Cour de cassation, 15 October 2025, n° 23-21.370).

Finally, the French Cour de cassation also reinforced the role of private action and Directive 2014/104/EU by interpreting article 1240 of the French Civil Code, relating to tortious liability, in light of the latter (Cour de cassation, 19 March 2025, n° 23-20.418). In this case, the agreement and the harmful acts, for the victim, had taken place between 2001 and 2011, i.e. before the directive was adopted and entered into force. Following an FCA decision sanctioning the agreement on October 18, 2017, the victim sought compensation for his loss in November 2018, using the decision as evidence of fault. The Highest Court upheld the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, stating it was necessary to interpret national law in a manner consistent with Directive 2014/104/EU of November 26, 2014, in that it provides that the wrongful anticompetitive practice is presumed to be irrefutably established by the final decision of the national competition authority (Cour de cassation, 19 March 2025, n° 23-20.418; para. 7). Hence, article 1240, that requires a fault, a damage and a causality link between the fault and the damage needed to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Directive, the fault being proven by the FCA decision sanctioning the anticompetitive agreement, even though it took place before the adoption of the Directive.

An important advisory role

Digital and environmental sectors remain areas of intense activity, as demonstrated by the opinions issued by the FCA. It examined the competitive issues related to the energy and environmental impact of AI through a study (Press release, 17 December 2025). As a follow‑up to its opinion on generative AI (FCA, opinion 24-A-05, 28 June 2024), the FCA is now examining the impact of AI in the energy and environmental sectors. Reflecting current societal debates, the FCA highlights the main problems related to competition law, namely: 1) difficulties in accessing the electricity grid and energy prices may affect the competitive dynamics of the sector; 2) the rise of “frugal” AI services (i.e., the search for efficiency that incorporates the minimization of environmental impact) is likely to encourage the development of new offerings, allowing certain players, and notably smaller companies, to compete with the sector’s largest actors; 3) ongoing standardization, and specifically the implementation of methods for determining the environmental footprint, appear fundamental to guaranteeing competition between players based on their respective merits. Thus, faced with these challenges, the Authority emphasizes “the need for reliable and transparent data on the energy and environmental footprint of AI, in order to allow competition to take place on these aspects” (Press release, 17 December 2025).

Conclusion

Ultimately, the year 2025 has proven to be a prolific year, particularly in terms of merger control and opinions issued by the FCA. However, while anticompetitive practices and the resulting sanctions were fewer in number, they remain nonetheless significant, as evidenced, for instance, by the sanction against Apple (FCA, dec. n° 25-D-02, 31 March 2025) in the mobile app advertising sector on iOS devices. No doubt that 2026 will also be a rich year for antitrust law in France, with all these achievements being consolidated, notably by French Courts.

• 1D. BOSCO, « Concentrations ‘sous les seuils’ : quel outil de contrôle ?», Contrats Concurrence Consommation, n° 3, March 2025, comm. 47.