Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – European Union

After 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, we continue to keep you up to date with the latest developments in competition law and policy on EU level from 2025. 

Article 101 TFEU

First No-poach Cases on EU level

With an otherwise very slow enforcement of Article 101 TFEU on EU level, the most noteworthy development came with the Food delivery services case on Delivery Hero and Glovo (find a comment on the case here). The companies agreed not to hire each other’s employees, exchanged commercially sensitive information, and divided geographic markets, with all practices treated as a single competition law infringement. Interestingly, the Commission classified the no-poach agreement as a „by-object“ restriction, underlining that they are inherently harmful to competition. However, as usual, all relevant supporting information counted. A central feature was Delivery Hero’s minority stake in Glovo, which enabled access to sensitive information and facilitated alignment of competitive strategies despite the companies remaining legally independent. Consequently, the decision expands cartel enforcement by showing how minority shareholdings can act as a conduit for collusion, even without formal control or merger review.

Much-discussed was also AG Emiliou’s opinion in the Tondela case (C-133/24, find a comment on the case here), the first opportunity for the European courts to approach no-poach. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Portuguese professional football clubs faced financial instability and uncertainty after the season was disrupted and contracts were terminated early. In that context, they agreed not to sign players who had unilaterally terminated their contracts with other clubs. The agreement applied across participating clubs and prevented those players from being hired by rivals despite being contractually free. The centre of the questions: should no-poach automatically be treated as a “by object” restriction or instead require a contextual “by effect” analysis under EU competition law? AG Emiliou found that no-poach agreements are in principle „by object“ restriction but, as demanded time-and-again by ECJ case law, took the agreement’s legal and economic context into account. He concluded that those particular agreements demanded a „by effect“ analysis, because their genuine purpose was to safeguard the fairness and integrity of the sporting contest disrupted by the pandemic. The judgment by the Court is expected for 30. April 2026.

Exceptions and Justifications for Sport Governing Bodies

Let us continue with sport cases. AG Emiliou did not only opine in Tondela, but also on RRC Sports and Rogon (C-209/23 and C-428/23 find a comment on the cases here). In RRC Sports and Rogon, football agents and agencies challenge FIFA’s Football Agent Regulations and their national implementation, arguing that rules such as fee caps and licensing requirements restrict competition and harm agents economically. Both cases raise the question whether sports governing bodies can lawfully regulate the agent services market under EU competition law (and internal market law). The interesting part concerned exceptions and justifications.

First, the „purely sporting“ exception was rejected as the fee caps and licensing rules directly regulate an economic activity (agent services) and have significant market effects, thus, not solely connected to sport. Second, the AG did not genuinely apply the Albany International exclusion, but instead (controversially) treated it as part of the sporting-rules analysis, effectively refusing to recognize a separate category where the ‘nature and purpose’ or the agreement justifies the exclusion of Article 101(1) TFEU.

Third, the AG applied the Wouters/Meca-Medina test to assess whether FIFA’s agent rules could be justified by legitimate public interest objectives (e.g. integrity of sport, protection of players), requiring that the rules be necessary, proportionate, and not eliminate all competition. He also added safeguards, such as links to recognised public interests, some level of state acceptance, and procedural transparency, to prevent overly broad reliance on this justification. The AG ultimately suggested that such rules can in principle be justified under this framework, subject to verification by the national courts of their necessity and proportionality. Finally, the approach closely parallels the mandatory requirements doctrine in internal market law, as both involve balancing restrictions against legitimate public interests through a proportionality analysis.

Fourth, coming to Article 101(3) TFEU and rare judicial guidance on that provision. The AG adopted a broad interpretation, accepting that even non-economic benefits, such as protecting young athletes or improving the “football ecosystem”, can qualify as efficiencies if they produce tangible positive effects on the relevant market. He further suggested that a fair share for users can be assessed collectively across different groups (e.g. players, clubs, fans), and that rules like FIFA’s agent regulations could therefore be justified if these conditions are met, subject to verification by national courts. It’ll be interesting to see if the Court follows the AG in these cases for which the judgments are likely to be delivered in early summer 2026.

Informal Guidance on the Rise: Sustainability and Joint Negotiation for SEPs

While informal guidance seemed dead for a long time, the Commission revived it in 2025. Two guidance pieces concerned sustainability issues, one joint negotiation of licences for standard essential patents (SEPs). In all press releases, the Commission emphasised that companies could seek informal guidance for novel (sustainability) initiatives, reducing legal uncertainty and encouraging compliance.

Firstly, the EC issued their first-ever opinion on a sustainability agreement in the agricultural sector under Article 210a of the CMO Regulation. The opinion concerned a cooperation agreement in the French wine sector. It clarified that agreements pursuing sustainability objectives may be allowed where they generate real benefits, are necessary and proportionate, and do not eliminate competition. In particular, the cooperation aimed at improving environmental sustainability (e.g. reducing pesticides and promoting more sustainable production methods) produced objective benefits and consumers would receive a fair share of the benefits, including through more sustainable products and long-term environmental gains, while the agreement did not lead to appreciable price increases or market foreclosure. Thereby, the Commission provided practical guidance on how such agreements will be assessed under Article 101 TFEU. It also signalled a more flexible, effects-based approach to non-economic benefits, such as environmental protection, within competition law analysis.

Secondly, the Commission issued its first-ever guidance on a sustainability agreement under the 2022 Notice on Informal Guidance. The guidance concerned a sustainability agreement among European port terminal operators aimed at accelerating the shift to zero-emission equipment through joint purchasing and setting common technical standards. Such agreements can be compatible with Article 101 TFEU where it helps overcome market barriers (like high costs and lack of interoperability) and delivers environmental benefits. It also included several safeguards to ensure that competition was preserved: participation was voluntary, independent purchasing remained possible, demand pooling was limited, and exchanges of sensitive information were restricted to what was strictly necessary. Again, the Commission is underlining their sustainability-friendly approach, showing how cooperation that restricts competition can still be lawful if it is targeted, proportionate, and generates clear environmental efficiencies without foreclosing the market.

The last guidance did not concern sustainability matters but a cooperation arrangement for licensing negotiations of SEPs in the automotive sector. The EC indicated that joint negotiation groups can be compatible with Article 101 TFEU where they improve efficiency and rebalance bargaining power between licensees and patent holders. Again, pro-competitive safeguards played a crucial role: the arrangement can be permissible because it can reduce transaction costs, address information asymmetries, and facilitate access to fair (FRAND) licensing terms, while safeguards prevent collusion or exclusionary effects. Overall, the Commission concluded that such cooperation may be lawful if it is limited to what is necessary, preserves independent commercial conduct, and does not undermine innovation or competition, illustrating again a flexible, effects-based approach to cooperation agreements.

News on RPM in the Luxury Sector

The main Article 101 TFEU enforcement case of 2025 was the fining decision against Gucci, Chloé and Loewe (find a comment on the case here). All three were fined for resale price maintenance (RPM) practices – enforcing recommended prices as fixed prices, limiting discounts and sales periods, monitoring retailers, and intervening when prices deviated – and Gucci also for restrictions on online sales by its resellers. Typically for RPM-related practices, the conduct was treated as a by object restriction of competition, as it removed retailers’ pricing independence, reduced intra-brand price competition, and likely led to higher prices and less consumer choice, while also protecting the brands’ own direct sales channels from competition. Regardless of arguments about brand image or luxury positioning, the case underlines key red flags, such as turning recommended prices into de facto fixed prices, limiting retailers’ freedom online and offline, and aligning resale prices with suppliers’ own distribution channels.

Article 102 TFEU

The European Commission’s Shrinking Decisional Practice

During 2025, the European Commission’s enforcement actions relating to Article 102 TFEU were quite scarce, if one compares them to its recent history.

It issued a whooping €2.95 billion fine against Google for breaching the abuse of a dominant position prohibition by distorting competition in the adtech industry. The reasoning behind the case is more or less straightforward: the dominant undertaking favoured its own online display advertising technology services to the detriment of competing providers of those same ad tech services, advertisers and online publishers. Given Google’s presence on all sides of the ad tech chain, the European Commission ruled that it had engaged in self-preferencing of its own ad tech services with detriment to its competitors. Such a finding ignited the most salient aspect of the case; Google holds a conflict of interest along the adtech supply chain (find a comment on the case here).

From the perspective of remedies, the European Commission held that the only way in which Google could eliminate the conflict of interest is that of divesting part of its services. In other words, structural remedies are definitely back in the Commission’s toolkit. However, it is not only up to the European Commission to deliver on its promises. Geopolitical pressures and the dominant undertaking’s reluctance to collaborate are currently making Google’s divestiture in the adtech industry less feasible.

Pending Google’s proposed remedies to address its abusive conduct, the European Commission managed to finalise its case against Microsoft for the tying of its communication and collaboration tool Teams with its productivity suites, including apps such as Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook (on procedural aspects see below). Tying the service entailed that it gained a distribution advantage over its competitors, which may have been further exacerbated by interoperability limitations between Teams’ competitors and Microsoft’s offerings.

Subsequently, Microsoft introduced changes to its distribution of Teams that did not quite meet the mark placed by the European Commission to solve the anti-competitive concerns of the conduct. In August 2023, Microsoft proposed to sell its productivity suites without Teams at a lower price and improve interoperability with products like Zoom and Salesforce. Microsoft expanded the scope of those commitments in the following years by, for instance, including recurrent opportunities for consumers to switch to productivity suites without Teams, as well as introducing increasingly robust interoperability and portability solutions.

In 2025, the European Commission market-tested the commitments and forced the dominant undertaking to amend its initial proposal of commitments, which it finally accepted. As a consequence of the EU’s intervention in the case, Microsoft decided to unilaterally align its worldwide suite offers and pricing with these commitments.

The Court of Justice Puts the Pedal to the Metal

If anything, the Court of Justice’s rulings when considering the application of Article 102 TFEU stretched and re-considered (once again, and surely not for the last time) the refusal to supply conditions of Bronner (Case C-7/97).

A long list of rulings has carved out how the strict legal requirements of refusal to supply must be interpreted, but the Court of Justice’s recent Android Auto judgement (Case C-233/23) tops them all (for a comment on the case, see here). The preliminary ruling originates in the Italian competition authority’s application of this category of conduct, where no actual refusal was given (Google denied a downstream competitor’s interoperability request to be integrated into its Android Auto functionality, available in cars) and there was ample space for competition in the downstream market.

The Court of Justice declared that the refusal to supply is to be specialised where incumbent digital platforms take markets by storm. According to the Court, a line must be drawn between those where the dominant undertaking develops its infrastructure for the needs of its own business and the scenario where it does not. In the former set of cases, the settled case-law of refusal to supply applies since an undertaking, even if dominant, remains, in principle, free to refuse to conclude contracts (paras 41 and 42 of the ruling). When the dominant undertaking develops its infrastructure with a view to enabling third-party undertakings to use the infrastructure, the requirement that the infrastructure is indispensable for carrying on the business of the entity applying for access does not apply (para 44). From this statement, which alters the terms of refusal to supply, the competition authority must not prove whether an elimination of competition in the downstream market has taken place. Instead, it is enough for the enforcer of Article 102 TFEU to demonstrate the attractiveness to the users in the downstream and competitor service to access the dominant undertaking’s platform to establish the existence of anti-competitive effects (para 59).

The Court of Justice remarked on the importance of examining the original purpose of the infrastructure held by the dominant undertaking on its Lukoil judgement (Case C-245/24, see a review of the case here). In line with the ruling, the Bronner conditions can be applied to semi-regulated environments, since the legal basis on which control over the infrastructure is exercised is immaterial for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU (para 56 of the ruling). Such an assessment, the Court confirmed, must consider whether the current operator acquired the infrastructure at a market-conforming price (para 54).

Mergers

Kicking-off Major Merger Policy Reform

In spring 2025 the European Commission kicked off a major merger policy reform: the review of the Horizontal and Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines (see a previous blogpost on this here). The Commission started with a wide-ranging public consultation together with workshops and conferences on the topic. The review is not just of technical nature. It is supposed to rethink merger control by reflecting also issues like globalisation, digitalisation, innovation, resilience, sustainability, defence, and labour-market concerns of market power. Already the consultation points to possible changes, such as stricter structural indicators or new theories of harm, including loss of innovation, elimination of nascent competitors (e.g. “killer acquisitions”), and risks to supply chains or strategic autonomy. At the same time, the review indicates a possible broader consideration of efficiencies and public-interest goals, such as innovation (see previous blogpost here), investment, scale, and the green transition. The draft revised texts are supposed to be consulted in Q2 of 2026 with an adoption by the end of 2026 – stay tuned!

Retained Relevance of Article 22 EUMR: Brasserie Nationale and Munhowen

The case Brasserie Nationale and Munhowen (T-289/24, see also here) clarifies when below-threshold mergers can still be referred to the Commission (see statement of the Commission also here), following the Illumina/Grail debacle. The General Court’s judgment (currently under appeal) confirmed that Article 22 EUMR remains available but only under strict jurisdictional conditions. It held that – contrary to the situation in Illumina/Grail – a Member State may request a referral only if it has competence under its own national law or lacks a merger regime altogether, like Luxembourg, and that the Commission has discretion to accept such referrals where the deal may affect trade and competition. Regarding procedural conditions, the GC clarified that referral deadlines depend on sufficient information being provided and that third-party complaints can trigger scrutiny.

Notable European Commission Merger Enforcement

2025 brought only a limited number of notable merger cases but again no prohibition decision by the EC. Yet, three clearance decisions caught the eye.

The SES/Intelsat (M.11602) merger involved SES acquiring Intelsat to create a global, multi-orbit satellite operator combining geostationary and non-geostationary capabilities. The Commission assessed horizontal overlaps in satellite capacity and connectivity services, as well as potential vertical concerns related to access to satellite infrastructure. It ultimately found that the parties faced strong and growing competition from global players such as Starlink, Viasat/Inmarsat, and Amazon Kuiper, and that the merged entity would not have the ability or incentive to foreclose rivals. The transaction was therefore cleared unconditionally. What is particularly noteworthy is that the case reflects a more global and forward-looking assessment, emphasising competition from powerful non-European players and rapid technological change rather than static market shares. It also highlights the importance of scale and multi-orbit capabilities in satellite markets, suggesting that consolidation may be necessary for European firms to remain competitive. Finally, the decision illustrates the Commission’s willingness to clear mergers in concentrated industries where strong innovation and entry dynamics constrain market power. Strategic sectors are on the rise – it will be important to see how this is transposed to the new guidelines.

Naspers / Just Eat Takeaway (M.11936) is noteworthy because the Commission’s concerns did not arise from overlaps between the merging parties, but from Naspers’ pre-existing minority shareholding in Delivery Hero, a direct competitor of JET. The case shows that even non-controlling minority stakes can create a “structural link” capable of weakening competition by aligning incentives between rivals. The Commission’s theory of harm was that this link could reduce JET’s incentives to compete aggressively or facilitate coordination between JET and Delivery Hero. It therefore treated the minority shareholding as a central competitive concern, even though such stakes are normally outside merger control jurisdiction unless linked to a controlling transaction. The transaction was cleared only subject to significant remedies, notably requiring Naspers to reduce its stake and relinquish influence (e.g. voting rights and board involvement) in Delivery Hero. Overall, the case is important because it highlights the Commission’s increased scrutiny of minority shareholdings and cross-ownership links, showing that even indirect connections between competitors can trigger intervention.

Lastly, Mars / Kellanova (M.11753) was a noteworthy merger case in 2025, since the Commission focused on a „bargaining power“ theory of harm. The concern was that combining Mars’ strong brands with Kellanova’s products (e.g. Pringles and cereals) would give the merged firm greater leverage in negotiations with retailers, potentially leading to higher consumer prices. This plays a crucial role in today’s context of raising consumer food prices, inflation, private-label growth, and increasing retailer consolidation. However, after extensive evidence (including retailer feedback and consumer purchasing data), the Commission found no convincing proof of the initial theory of harm, notably because consumers would not switch stores significantly if certain brands were unavailable. Consequently, the EC cleared the merger without commitments. Overall, the case underlines a balanced approach, showing both the Commission’s willingness to pursue novel theories of harm and its readiness to abandon them where robust empirical evidence does not support intervention.

Digital Enforcement

A Year of Firsts for the Digital Markets Act

The Digital Markets Act’s obligations were applicable from March 2024 for most gatekeepers. The first enforcement actions coming from the European Commission have fructified in 2025, including the exercise of the enforcer’s punitive and non-punitive powers.

First, the European Commission sanctioned Apple and Meta for infringements of Articles 5(4) and 5(2) DMA, with €500 and €200 million (Cases DMA.100109 and DMA.100055). Apple was fined, yet again (remember, Case AT.40437 – App Store Practices (music streaming) for hindering the chances of app developers to steer users to direct channels of purchase and promotional offers (see a comment on both here).

As opposed to the Article 102 TFEU case, the European Commission interpreted Article 5(4) in quite narrow terms to establish that Apple had overtly ignored the steering mandate embedded in the DMA. The two main causes of the infringement, according to the enforcer, were that i) Apple charged app developers each time they managed to steer users (contrary to the free-of-charge principle of the provision); and ii) the gatekeeper imposed undue limitations on its exercise (for instance, on the form, messaging, and format of steering). Apple subsequently updated the technical implementation of its steering policy in June 2025, which the European Commission is still reviewing.

Meta’s pay or consent subscription model also met the European Commission’s sanctioning rage. The rationale underlying the decision pointed to the fact that Meta’s pay or consent subscription model did not provide a specific choice and effective consent to end users in the sense of Article 5(2) DMA. Following the EDPB’s line of reasoning in its Opinion 08/2024, the DMA’s enforcer established that its subscription model forced users to choose the option of continuing to use Meta’s social networks for free in exchange for their consent to the processing of personal data. There was no equivalent alternative that was sufficiently attractive for consumers to choose an option that did not involve the processing of personal data. As a response to the enforcer’s action, Meta now offers a third option for users that would collect less personal data for its pay-or-consent advertising model on Facebook and Instagram.

Building on the knowledge it construed in the case against Meta, the European Commission issued, alongside the EDPB, the draft of the Joint Guidelines on the Interplay between the Digital Markets and the General Data Protection regulation (see an overview of their content here). Throughout the document, the European Commission highlights the instances where data protection and the DMA’s application may overlap, with some frictions in terms of how anonymisation techniques may be interpreted under Article 6(11) DMA or the correct interpretation of consent in the context of Article 5(2) DMA.

Expanding on its punitive efforts, the European Commission triggered a new non-compliance procedure against Google for the implementation of its site reputation abuse policy as potential infringements of Articles 6(5) and 6(12) DMA.

Second, the European Commission completed its findings on its first specification proceedings relating to Apple’s compliance with the vertical interoperability obligation under Article 6(7) DMA (Cases DMA.100203 and DMA.100204). Once the whole process was completed, the European Commission set out the long list of implementation measures that the gatekeeper will have to implement to comply with the provision’s technical requirements. Those measures concern how Apple processes the requests of interoperability access seekers to its proprietary services, as well as the features that are now open for business users to access in equivalent terms to the gatekeeper. For instance, a new release of iOS will bring AirPods-like pairing to third-party devices.

Against the background of its first enforcement actions, the DMA’s first review (that must be performed, at the very least, every three years) has been broiling amongst stakeholders and the enforcer. In June, the European Commission launched a public consultation to seek the feedback, evidence and arguments of all involved stakeholders with the DMA’s application. These findings will inform its report, to be issued in May 2026, documenting whether the regulation must be adapted to state-of-the-art technologies or whether it should adjust its enforcement in any given direction. In a similar fashion, the European Commission is looking into the potential designation of two cloud computing providers (Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure) via the qualitative pathway. In a separate market investigation, the Commission is also gathering information from relevant market players to assess whether the current DMA obligations are effective in addressing practices that limit competitiveness or are unfair in the cloud sector.

Aside from the DMA, other relevant digital developments might impact the application of competition law, such as the ongoing process of the Digital Omnibus Regulation Proposal (especially, with regards to how undertakings will be able to process and monetise, personal data in their AI systems). The twin regulation to the DMA, the Digital Services Act, has also seen some salient milestones, notably the fining of social network X for its transparency obligations and the issuing of the draft Guidelines 3/2025 on the interplay between the DSA and the GDPR.

State Aid

Adopting and Applying the CISAF

The Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), adopted on 25 June 2025, is a central tool of the EU’s Clean Industrial Deal, designed to enable Member States to support decarbonisation, clean energy, and industrial competitiveness through more flexible and faster State aid rules. It replaces the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (see on the assessment of the TCTF here) and provides a stable framework until 2030, allowing governments to grant aid more quickly for key areas. The CISAF covers: (i) accelerating renewable energy and low-carbon fuels rollout, (ii) temporary electricity price relief for energy-intensive users, (iii) decarbonisation of industrial processes, (iv) support for clean technology manufacturing capacity, and (v) de-risking private investments in clean energy, industry, infrastructure, and the circular economy. A key overall takeaway is the EU’s shift toward a more active industrial policy, enabling large-scale public support to compete with global subsidy regimes while accelerating the green transition. At the same time, the framework retains core safeguards, requiring aid to remain necessary, proportionate, and limited in its distortive effects. The new framework was already applied multiple times, the first time to approve a €11 billion French scheme to support offshore wind energy in August 2025. 

State aid and ISDS: Antin Continues the Micula Saga

In spring 2025, the Commission issued its decision in the Antin case (SA.54155, see also analysis here), which sits at the intersection of EU State aid law and investment arbitration after Spain was ordered to compensate investors under the Energy Charter Treaty and the ICSID system. The key question of the case was whether different stages of that process – joining the treaty system, the arbitral award itself, its court enforcement, and any voluntary payment by the State – could amount to State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission’s approach was to treat Spain’s original consent to arbitration, and especially any later payment of the award, as attributable to the State, while also suggesting that the award and its implementation could confer an economic advantage. That reasoning is controversial because arbitral awards and court enforcement are essentially compensatory and declaratory: they confirm a right to damages, rather than grant a fresh State benefit. That could make imputability difficult to establish for the award itself and even harder for forced execution by domestic or foreign courts, which act without real State discretion. Also, an advantage is hard to argue since compensation for loss usually restores the status quo rather than giving the investor something extra. The broader concern is that the Commission may be stretching State aid law too far by assuming that anything linked to an unlawful intra-EU arbitration system automatically becomes aid. The result is a legally important but still unsettled area, where the boundaries between treaty liability, damages, and State aid remain far from clear. I am sure, we will see the CJEU solving that matter rather sooner than later!

Paks II Appeal: Public Procurement and State Aid Intertwined

The Paks II saga (C-59/23 P) is alive and kicking. In May 2015, Hungary notified State aid for the construction of two nuclear reactors at Paks II, to be built by the Russian company Nizhny Novgorod Engineering Company Atomenergoproekt under a directly awarded contract and financed through a €10 billion Russian revolving credit facility (facilitated through an intergovernmental agreement) plus €2.5 billion grant from the Hungarian budget. The Commission found the measure to constitute compatible State aid and declined to assess the procurement aspects, noting that a separate infringement procedure had already concluded that Hungary had not breached EU public procurement rules.

The General Court dismissed Austria’s challenge and upheld the Commission’s decision approving the aid. It found that the Commission was not required to assess compliance with EU public procurement rules in the State aid procedure, because the alleged procurement issues were not indissolubly linked to the aid measure and had been addressed separately under Article 258 TFEU. The Court of Justice instead set aside the General Court’s judgment, holding, on the contrary, that the Commission must assess compliance with other EU law rules (such as public procurement) where those elements are indissolubly linked to the State aid measure. It found that the direct award of the construction contract could not be separated from the aid – they were integral to achieving the objective of the measure –, so the Commission erred by not examining its legality when declaring the aid compatible. The Court of Justice rejected the argument on parallel infringement proceedings, holding that the existence or outcome of an Article 258 TFEU procedure does not relieve the Commission of its duty to assess compliance with EU law within the State aid procedure. Even if procurement issues were examined separately, the Commission must still verify them where they are indissolubly linked to the aid and cannot simply rely on parallel proceedings to avoid that assessment.

Taking over the Economic Continuity Test for State aid law

The notion of undertaking spans the whole sphere of competition law. Only a couple of years ago, the ECJ held in Skanska that the economic continuity test applies to private enforcement of competition law. Now, the Court of Justice also underlined this for State aid law. The Scai case (C-588/23) concerned a Commission decision ordering Italy to recover incompatible State aid from Buonotourist, a bus transport company, which later became insolvent. After failing to recover the aid from Buonotourist, the Italian authorities ordered Scai, which had taken over its staff and assets and continued similar activities, to repay the aid on the basis of economic continuity between the two undertakings. The recovery order was contested by Scai on the ground that it was not identified in Commission decision. The ECJ sided with the Commission and confirmed that recovery obligations follow the economic unit rather than the legal entity, preventing companies from avoiding repayment through restructuring or insolvency. It emphasised that national authorities and courts must assess economic continuity using established criteria, including the identity of activities, assets, workforce, and timing of transfers. The Court also clarified that an undertaking like Scai, which is required to repay aid on this basis, must be able to challenge the recovery decision, even if it was not expressly identified in the original Commission decision. Overall, the ruling strengthens the effectiveness of State aid recovery by preventing undertakings from avoiding repayment through restructuring, while aligning State aid enforcement with broader EU competition law principles on economic continuity.

The Commission’s Sole Authority = National Courts Limited Competence to Review the Implementation of Approved State aid Schemes

In Tiberis (C-514/23), an Italian company operating a hydroelectric plant received aid under a Commission-approved renewable energy scheme (approved under the 2014-2020 guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy, EEAG), but was later required by the Italian granting authority to repay part of that aid. Tiberis challenged the repayment decision before an Italian court, arguing that a specific “negative incentive mechanism” used to calculate the aid was unlawful under EU energy directives. The national court referred questions to the Court of Justice, essentially asking whether it could review the legality of that mechanism within the approved aid scheme. The CJEU found that the mechanism was inextricably linked to the functioning of the aid scheme, meaning that reviewing it would amount to reassessing the compatibility of the aid itself, which is exclusively for the Commission. As a result, the Court declared the request inadmissible, confirming that national courts cannot review aspects of an approved aid scheme that are closely tied to its compatibility with the internal market.

Non-selectivity of General Tax Measures

The Mielca case (C-453/23) arose from a dispute in Poland, where a company sought a tax exemption but was refused by the municipal authority on the grounds that granting it might constitute unlawful State aid. Under Polish law, like in many Member States, immovable property is subject to property tax. However, the buildings of railway infrastructure are exempt from property tax on condition that that infrastructure is made available to rail carriers. The company relevant in this case decided to make their rail line available to a rail carrier, but the city of Mielca refused the exemption. At the heart of the case was a typical legal question for State aid tax cases: when does a tax exemption qualify as “selective”? The CJEU ultimately found that the exemption did not constitute State aid because it formed part of the normal reference tax system and did not exclude any specific category of undertakings. Since the measure applied broadly and did not target particular sectors or companies, it lacked the selectivity required for State aid classification. This reasoning reflects a nuanced approach respecting Member States` tax autonomy: the mere existence of conditions for accessing a tax benefit does not automatically make it selective. What matters is whether those conditions differentiate between comparable undertakings in a way that favours some over others.

Foreign Subsidies Regulation

A lot of Firsts: European Commission Publishes the e&/PPF Commitment Decision

The case concerns the proposed acquisition by Emirates Telecommunications Group (e&), a UAE state-controlled operator, of telecom assets of PPF across several EU markets, triggering the European Commission’s first in-depth (Phase II) review and conditional clearance decision under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation’s merger tool (see for further analysis here). The Commission assessed the notion of foreign subsidy and distinguished between different measures: while a market-based loan was not considered a subsidy, an unlimited state-backed guarantee and certain state-linked financial contributions were treated as foreign subsidies. The Commission then applied a structured approach to assess distortion, first identifying affected economic activities and then evaluating distortions. It also distinguished between distortions of the acquisition process – and found none – before continuing with whether the subsidies could enhance the merged entity’s competitive position particularly through improved access to financing. It held that distortions can arise post-acquisition if the beneficiary is able to leverage subsidised resources to expand, invest more aggressively, or outcompete rivals. Importantly, the Commission rejected a narrow view limited to acquisition-related advantages and confirmed that the FSR captures longer-term competitive effects. This means that even if subsidies did not decisively influence the purchase itself, they may still be problematic if they distort market behaviour after the merger. The Commission also adopted a strict stance on the “balancing test,” requiring companies to demonstrate that any positive effects stem directly from the subsidies themselves, not merely from the transaction. Where this could not be shown, the focus shifted to remedies.

From Firsts to Seconds: the ADNOC/Covestro Commitment Decision

With ADNOC/Covestro, the Commission issued the second commitment decision under the FSR merger tool (see for further analysis here). The Commission examined whether several forms of support linked to the Abu Dhabi state, including an unlimited guarantee, a capital increase, and favourable fiscal treatment, qualified as foreign subsidies and, if so, whether they distorted competition in the EU. The Commission took the view that the capital increase did not merely accompany the deal but instead directly facilitated it, finding it instrumental in making the transaction happen. Consequently, it fell within the Regulation’s category of “most likely distortive” subsidies, next to the unlimited guarantee. The Commission also held that the capital increase may have deterred other investors from making an offer, leading to a distortion in the acquisition process. Nonetheless, the Commission continued with assessing the distortion of the combined entity post-transaction. The Commission looked closely at how the subsidies could shape Covestro’s behaviour after closing, particularly by improving financing conditions and supporting a more aggressive investment strategy. Its approach was explicitly forward-looking: the concern was not just whether ADNOC could bid more strongly, but whether the merged business would gain a lasting competitive advantage in EU markets. It took a similar view: In line with e&/PPF, the Commission requires the parties to substantiate claimed positive effects of the subsidy, not the transaction. The Commission found that the parties had not shown any subsidy-specific positive effects strong enough to offset those concerns. It therefore cleared the deal only subject to commitments, including measures aimed at neutralising the guarantee and preserving access to Covestro’s sustainability-related intellectual property.

Ongoing Ex-officio Enforcement

Ex officio investigations are also proceeding quietly and not so quietly. The Commission is currently undergoing three ex-officio investigations, covering the wind energy, security equipment, and nuclear sectors.

In the wind energy sector, we now know that they were investigating Goldwind, headquartered in China, and active in the internal market through subsidiaries, assessing whether possible foreign subsidies in the form of grants, preferential tax measures, and preferential financing through loans distort the internal market.

The security equipment case involving Nuctech is known for already triggering CJEU proceedings (see for an analysis also here). In April 2024, the European Commission conducted its first unannounced inspections at the EU premises of the Chinese manufacturer of security scanning equipment. The company challenged the inspections with interim proceedings but in August 2024, the General Court rejected Nuctech’s request, and this outcome was subsequently upheld by the Court of Justice on appeal in March 2025 – litigation in the ordinary proceedings is still ongoing. In November 2025, the Commission also opened in-depth investigation focussing on whether grants, preferential tax measures, and preferential financing in the form of loans by the Chinese state improved Nuctech's competitive position in the internal market and may have negatively affected competition. This may have happened through Nuctech offering, in tender contracts, prices and conditions that cannot be reasonably matched by other market players.

Little is known on the last ex-officio investigation concerning the Dukovany and Temelín nuclear power plants in Czech Republic. The EC is investigating whether Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power has received foreign subsidies that could distort competition and the EU’s internal market. So far, it has not entered an in-depth investigation.

Review and Guideline Consultation

Currently, the EC is undertaking different approaches to review the FSR after the first years of enforcement. In 2025, a focus was the consultation (see for an analysis here) on the FSR Guidelines that ended in their publication in early 2026 (see for an analysis here). The consultation centred around the notion of distortion and the balancing test. The ultimate guidance explains the Commission’s structured two-step test for distortions, assessing first whether a subsidy improves a company’s competitive position and then whether it actually or potentially harms competition in the internal market. At the same time, the Guidelines also confirm a broad and relatively flexible distortion test, covering not only direct market effects but also future conduct, connected markets, aggressive pricing, risk-taking investments, acquisitions, and public procurement bids, as already shown by the first two merger cases. They further refine the balancing test, giving the Commission flexibility in weighing negative effects against potential benefits, while stopping short of imposing a strict obligation to consider all positive impacts. The focus lies on positive effects that are specifically caused by the subsidy itself rather than by the broader transaction or activity, in line with the above-explained decisional practice. Overall, the Guidelines provide greater transparency on the Commission’s analytical framework but largely confirm a broad and discretionary approach, reflecting its growing enforcement practice without fundamentally altering the underlying rules.

Sanctions

Commission Enforcement Activities

In 2025, the EC handed down two settlement decisions according to Article 10 of Regulation 1/2003 that sanctioned undertakings which accepted their liability (cases End-of-life vehicle recycling & Food delivery services) and one prohibition decision without settlements involved, against a number of manufacturers in the case of Automotive Starter Batteries - the most recent enforcement action (see the full commission statistics and accumulated amounts of fines here).

15-year-long Cartel in the Car Recycling Sector Ends with Fines

In the case of End-of-life vehicle recycling, the Commission fined 15 car manufacturers and industry association ACEA about €458 million for a 2002–2017 cartel on end‑of‑life vehicle recycling: they coordinated a “zero-treatment-cost” approach (not paying dismantlers) and agreed not to advertise recyclability and recycled-content information, with ACEA facilitating contacts. Mercedes-Benz received full immunity for revealing the cartel, while several firms obtained leniency reductions and all parties settled (10% fine reduction); the case was coordinated with the UK CMA.

Starter Batteries, Recent Commission Fine

The European Commission fined Exide, FET (and its predecessor Elettra), Rombat, and the trade association EUROBAT about €72 million for a 2005–2017 EEA‑wide cartel affecting sales of automotive starter batteries to car and truck manufacturers (OEMs). The firms, facilitated by EUROBAT, coordinated and published “EUROBAT premiums” linked to lead input costs and used them as a common pricing surcharge in OEM negotiations, which could keep prices higher than under normal competition; such coordinated surcharges are unlawful even if individual raw‑material surcharges can be legitimate. Clarios received full immunity for revealing the cartel, FET and Rombat obtained leniency reductions, EUROBAT was fined €125,000, and the Commission closed proceedings against Banner and Kellen.

Commitment Decision in Microsoft Teams

Besides, the Commission adopted a commitment decision under article 9 of regulation 1/2003 against Microsoft in the context of their product Microsoft Teams (see here and here). Thereby, it accepted legally binding commitments from Microsoft to resolve concerns that it abused dominance by bundling (“tying”) Teams with Office/Microsoft 365, disadvantaging rival collaboration tools through bundled distribution and limited interoperability. Microsoft must offer cheaper suites without Teams, let customers switch, improve interoperability for competitors, and enable data portability; the measures were strengthened after a May–June 2025 market test, will be monitored by a trustee, and can be enforced with significant fines for non-compliance.

Judicial Review

Regarding jurisprudence on antitrust enforcement, there were less cases on classical review of fines but more on other procedural matters this year as you will see.

The EU’s General Court only dealt with two challenges of a cartel fines, in Case T-84/22 - UBS Group (G10 currencies), and in Case T-441/21 – UBS Group (European Government Bonds). Except the partial identity of the parties involved, the two cases are not directly interrelated. Both, however, concern financial markets and are quite technical in nature which does not add to the readability of the judgments, same as the considerable length (over 2000 paragraphs in the Government Bonds case…). Fortunately, the Court of Justice has supplied the interested public with summaries of the judgments that include the main points as well as references to the full text (see here and here).

Significant Reduction of the Fine under Unlimited Jurisdiction in the G10 Currencies Case

In essence, in the G10 currencies case, the EU General Court largely upheld the Commission’s finding that Credit Suisse participated (Feb–July 2012) in an Article 101 TFEU infringement in the EEA G10 foreign‑exchange spot trading market by exchanging detailed, confidential trading information in private chatrooms, which reduced normal market uncertainty and therefore constituted a restriction of competition “by object” and part of a single and continuous infringement. However, it annulled the Commission’s €83.294 million fine because the Commission used an insufficient and partly irrelevant data sample to compute an adjustment factor in its proxy “value of sales” methodology, holding that better available data (Bloomberg BFIX) should have been used. Exercising unlimited jurisdiction, the Court recalculated and reduced the fine to €28.92 million (jointly and severally payable by the UBS/Credit Suisse successors), while otherwise confirming the infringement finding.

Only Modest Reduction of Fines in the Government Bonds Case

The EU General Court largely upheld the Commission’s finding that several banks participated in an EEA cartel in European Government Bonds (EGBs), involving trader coordination through chatrooms (including exchanges of sensitive information, price fixing and customer allocation) that formed a single and continuous infringement and a restriction “by object” under Article 101 TFEU. It rejected most procedural and substantive challenges (including rights-of-defence claims and trader-attribution arguments), and accepted that the Commission could still formally find an infringement for Natixis and BofA even though fines were time-barred. However, the Court reduced penalties for two banks: it found the Commission overstated the start date of UniCredit’s and, using its unlimited jurisdiction, cut UniCredit’s fine from roughly €69 million to €65 million; and it held the Commission should have used Nomura’s more precise “best available” data when computing the proxy used to set the fine, reducing Nomura’s fine from about €129 million to about €125 million, while leaving the rest of the decision intact.

Procedural Competition Law

Cases on Investigatory Powers of the Commission

Judicial Review of the Criteria of “Sufficiently Serious Indicia” for Inspections and Partly Successful Challenge of Michelin

In a rare example of a successful challenge of a decision ordering an investigation, in case T-188/24 – Michelin (cf. judgment and summary), the EU General Court partially annulled the Commission decision ordering Michelin to submit to a dawn raid in a tyres price‑coordination investigation, holding that while the decision’s reasoning sufficiently stated the subject and objective of the inspection under Article 20(4) of Regulation 1/2003 (and did not need to define the market or legal characterisation precisely), it must still be based on “reasonable grounds” supported by sufficiently serious indicia to avoid an arbitrary interference with the right to inviolability of premises under Article 7 of the Charter. After Michelin cast doubt on the Commission’s grounds, the Court carried out an in‑depth post‑inspection legality review and found the Commission had adequate indicia only for the main suspected period, not for an earlier period also mentioned in the decision. It therefore annulled the decision insofar as it covered that earlier period but otherwise upheld the inspection order and rejected a proportionality challenge.

Persisting Broad Leeway for Commission’s Investigatory Powers: Unsuccessful Challenge in Case Symrise

However, we cannot deduct a general trend of a stronger or more in-depth judicial review of decisions ordering inspections. As long as the claims of the parties challenging such decisions remain vague and unspecific, they will usually not succeed. In Case T-263/23 – Symrise, the General Court dismissed Symrise’s challenge to a Commission inspection decision under Article 20(4) of Regulation 1/2003. It held that the decision stated reasons sufficiently by indicating the suspected market and conduct (information exchange/coordination), and that terms like “inter alia” did not make the subject or purpose unlawfully vague given the early investigative stage. Furthermore, the Court found the decision was not arbitrary because the Commission had sufficiently serious indicia, assessed cumulatively (including third‑party information and an internal open‑source report), to suspect Symrise’s involvement. Proportionality arguments based on an allegedly open‑ended inspection failed because the inspection ended within a reasonable time, and a late-raised claim that the Commission should have used RFIs instead of an inspection was inadmissible. Procedurally, the Court ruled inadmissible Symrise’s attempt – raised only in its reply – to extend its annulment action beyond the initially challenged decision (covering inspections notably at premises in Germany) to also capture a separate, same‑day Commission decision concerning inspections at premises in France, because that would change the subject matter of the case.

No ”Fishing Expedition” and Limited Scope of Judicial Review of Investigatory Measures in Case Red Bull

A typical argument of claimants is that in fact, the commission engaged in a “fishing expedition”, meaning that they only had limited indicia of competition law infringements but broadened the scope of the investigation beyond that indicia to possibly discover further violations for which they did not have the sufficient indicia beforehand. Whereas such a claim can succeed when based on convincing arguments and proof – the Michelin case points in this direction – the Red Bull case shows that the judicial review still allows the Commission to pursue complaints even if based on allegations which do not (yet) constitute proof of infringements, given the early stage of the procedure.

In case T-306/23 – Red Bull (judgment only available in German or French), the General Court dismissed Red Bull’s action seeking annulment of a Commission decision ordering a dawn raid under Article 20(4) of Regulation 1/2003 in the “WINGS” case (proceedings now initiated, see here). The Court held that the decision was adequately reasoned and sufficiently specific as to the sector (off-trade energy drink distribution), the suspected conduct and legal bases, and the geographic focus (EU/EEA highlighting certain Member States but not limiting the inspection to their territories), and that cautious wording such as “in particular” or “possibly” did not make it an unlawful “fishing expedition” given the preliminary stage of the investigation. It also found the Commission had “sufficiently serious indicia” to justify the inspection, based on a detailed informal complaint by a major competitor and extensive follow-up submissions and contacts, without needing to verify all third-party references before inspecting.

Proportionality objections failed because the Commission could choose an inspection over requests for information where relevant evidence was unlikely to be provided voluntarily, and complaints about how the inspection was conducted in Austria or continued in Brussels (including alleged misconduct, press communication, data copying, and phone seizures) were legally irrelevant to the validity of the inspection decision and therefore rejected as inoperative. This latter point is particularly relevant when keeping in mind that review of specific investigatory actions such as seizures of material or searches of (professional and private) premises are subject to differing safeguards under national criminal procedural law. Sometimes, prior authorization of a national judge is required. Whilst this review cannot and should not include the validity of the Commission decision, it does add another layer of judicial protection regarding the application and execution of that decision.

If potential infringements of criminal procedural law guarantees cannot be contested before the EU courts in the context of a challenge of the decision ordering the investigation – as this judgment suggests – there might be a gap in judicial review which should be further investigated. Possible safeguards, also with regard to fundamental rights of affected persons (see in particular Art. 7 and 8 of the Charter), would be a more coherent use of pre-inspection judicial approval of specific investigatory action. Alternatively, one will need to consider whether possible illegality in obtaining certain elements of proof can be challenged in the context of an action against a prohibition and/or fining decision concluding a Commission proceeding.

RFIs have Teeth – Incomplete Information can Lead to Significant Fine

The European Commission fined Eurofield SAS and its former ultimate parent Unanime Sport SAS a total of approximately €172,000 for providing an incomplete reply to a formal request for information under Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, issued during the Commission's ongoing investigation into the synthetic turf sector. After an initial simple request in June 2023 yielded a reply the Commission identified as incomplete - based on comparison with documents obtained during unannounced inspections - a binding decision-based request was issued in October 2023, to which Eurofield again responded incompletely. The Commission found the infringement was committed at least negligently, noting that the parties failed to seek clarification despite having been alerted to the suspected incompleteness. The fine was set at 0.3% of the parties' combined total turnover, reflecting the seriousness of the conduct given the centrality of information requests to effective antitrust enforcement. A 30% reduction was applied in recognition of the parties' subsequent proactive cooperation, including their acknowledgment of liability and submission of the omitted documents. Notably, this marks the first time the Commission has used its powers under Article 23(1)(b) of Regulation No 1/2003 to sanction the provision of incomplete information in response to a formal request in an antitrust investigation, adding to a broader line of enforcement against procedural breaches alongside earlier cases involving destruction of evidence and breach of seals during inspections.

Other Procedural Competition Law Cases

There are two more cases, both based on preliminary references of national courts asking for interpretation of EU procedural competition law, that should be mentioned. First, KL & FM Baugesellschaft contributed to the existing jurisprudence on the protection of leniency and settlement procedures when dealing with disclosure of documents in a specific context of document sharing between Austrian competition and criminal law enforcement authorities. Second, Caronte deals with the timeliness of initiation of infringement proceedings by NCAs which the court held to be too strictly regulated in Italy.

Protection of Leniency Statements and Settlement Submissions from Disclosure in National Criminal Proceedings

In Case C-2/23 – KL & FM Baugesellschaft (see judgment and blog post on it), the Court of Justice had to rule on the protection of leniency applications and settlement submissions as well as their annexes in national criminal proceedings. It held that Directive 2014/104 (Damages Directive), under which certain safeguards and limits of disclosure apply according to Article 6, was inapplicable because the case concerned criminal investigations, not damages actions, and treated the issues instead under Article 101 TFEU and Article 31(3) of Directive 2019/1. It ruled that Article 101 TFEU does not, in principle, bar a national “mutual assistance” mechanism requiring competition authorities/cartel courts to transmit their files (including leniency and settlement materials) to prosecutors, but only insofar as the mechanism does not undermine the effectiveness of Article 101 by weakening leniency incentives. It further held that Article 31(3) protects only the leniency statements and settlement submissions themselves – not supporting documents or information submitted to substantiate them (e.g., annexes/pre-existing evidence). Finally, reading Article 31(3) in light of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, the Court drew a distinction on access in criminal proceedings: access may be granted to accused persons when necessary for defence rights and subject to case-by-case balancing, but national law must not allow access for other parties such as injured persons seeking compensation, because that would negate the EU-level protection of leniency/settlement submissions.

No Strict Deadlines to Initiate Proceedings but Balancing Between Effective Enforcement and Procedural Rights of Parties

In its judgment in Case C-511/23 – Caronte (see judgment and previous blog posts here and here), the Court of Justice held that Directive 2019/1 and Article 102 TFEU, read with the principle of effectiveness, preclude Italian rules requiring the national competition authority (AGCM) to open the inter partes stage of an antitrust case (by issuing a statement of objections) within 90 days from when it has “knowledge of the essential elements” of the alleged infringement, on pain of automatic annulment of the final decision and a bar on reopening proceedings (ne bis in idem). The Court reasoned that, although Member States may set procedural time limits, such limits must not undermine the authority’s operational independence, its discretion to set enforcement priorities, or effective enforcement and cooperation within the European Competition Network; the strict 90‑day trigger and its drastic consequences create a systemic risk of impunity without being necessary to protect defence rights, necessary safeguarding of which the Court nonetheless underlines.

Private Enforcement

With regard to private enforcement, 2025 has again been a year with lots of developments in the different EU member states (covered in the respective articles on the blog), but also some notable developments on the EU level where involvement of the Court of Justice can be triggered by preliminary references by national courts on the interpretation of the damages directive and primary EU competition law. The four judgments of the Court in 2025 on such matters mainly dealt with the statute of limitations (Nissan), competence under private international law (Heineken and Apple Apps), and collective actions (ASG 2).

Limitation Periods only Start Running after NCA Decisions Become Final (Including Judicial Review)

In its judgment in C-21/24 – Nissan Iberia, (see also the in-depth blog post and the previous blog post on the opinion) the Court of Justice held that, for follow‑on damages actions based on a national competition authority decision that is subject to judicial review, the limitation period cannot start running before that decision becomes final and the relevant information is made public in an appropriate way (e. g. in the official journal). Because a non‑final authority decision is not binding on the court ruling on damages, treating the publication of the non‑final decision as sufficient “knowledge” (thus triggering the statute of limitation) would make the right to compensation under Article 101 TFEU excessively difficult. The Court contrasted this with Commission decisions, which bind national courts under Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 and can therefore trigger limitation upon official publication without waiting for finality. It therefore ruled that EU law precludes national case-law under which the limitation period starts before finality of the infringement decision.

In a ruling, again predominantly based on the principle of effectiveness, the Court thereby further strengthened claimants’ rights. Whereas this was seen by some commentators as another big success in the journey to establish an effective regime of private enforcement in the EU, others might have missed a more balanced approach in the Court’s judgment, which barely touched upon the positive and necessary aspects of limitation periods for legal certainty i.a.

International Jurisdiction for Damages Case Includes Claims Against Foreign Subsidiary

In C-393/23 – Athenian Brewery and Heineken (see judgment and earlier blog post on backgrounds of the case), the Court of Justice held that Article 8(1) of the Brussels I Recast does not prevent a court seized at the parent company’s domicile from assuming jurisdiction over follow‑on damages claims also against a foreign‑domiciled subsidiary, where the claimant invokes the EU-law presumption that a parent holding (almost) all of a subsidiary’s capital exercises decisive influence and may be jointly and severally liable for the subsidiary’s competition infringement. At the jurisdiction stage, the national court need not determine liability on the merits; it may limit itself to checking that decisive influence cannot be excluded a priori and that the claims are not artificially framed to anchor jurisdiction. This is conditional on the defendants being able to rebut the presumption already at that stage by producing firm evidence (for example, that the parent does not in fact own (almost) all of the subsidiary’s capital or that the presumption should be rebutted).

Jurisdiction in the Netherlands for possible (collective) damages claims by app store customers against Apple

In a significant ruling, based on a request for preliminary ruling (see our blog post on the background), on jurisdictional questions in digital competition cases, the Court of Justice, sitting as the Grand Chamber (see judgment and résumé), interpreted Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 to determine which court within a Member State has territorial jurisdiction over a representative action for damages arising from allegedly anticompetitive conduct in the context of app store purchases. The case concerned two Dutch foundations bringing collective actions against Apple, claiming that Apple's commission of 15–30% on app store purchases constituted an abuse of dominance passed on to consumers as excessive costs. The referring Dutch court, while satisfied of its international jurisdiction - given that the App Store NL specifically targets the Dutch market - was uncertain which court within the Netherlands had territorial jurisdiction, since online purchases lack a clearly identifiable physical place of purchase and linking jurisdiction to each user's residence would fragment proceedings across numerous courts.

The Court held that the connecting factors under Article 7(2) must be adapted to account for the specificities of digital markets and representative actions brought on behalf of unidentified but identifiable victims. It reasoned that damage from purchases made in the virtual space of the App Store NL can occur throughout the entire Dutch territory, irrespective of users' physical locations at the time of purchase. Since the applicant foundations exercised an independent right of action to defend collective interests rather than acting as assignees of identified victims, requiring a court to determine the precise place of damage for each individual victim would be impracticable. The Court concluded that any court with substantive jurisdiction to hear such a representative action has both international and territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, understood as the entire territory of the affected market. This approach, the Court found, satisfies the Regulation's objectives of proximity, predictability, and sound administration of justice, and does not preclude national rules centralising jurisdiction for representative actions, which in competition cases involving complex economic analysis and digital platform practices are likely to facilitate both the exercise of the right to compensation and efficient judicial management. Following this preliminary ruling, it is now for the Rechtbank Amsterdam to apply the Court's guidance and rule on the substance of the case, including whether Apple's conduct indeed constitutes an abuse of dominance and, if so, the extent of the damage suffered by App Store users in the Netherlands.

Limits on Collective Actions under National Law Must be Balanced Against the Principle of Effectiveness

In C-253/23 – ASG 2 (see judgment and in-depth blog post), the Grand Chamber held that EU law may preclude a national-law interpretation that bars injured parties from assigning cartel-damages claims to a legal services provider for a collective (or at least grouped) form of enforcement, but only if that bar makes exercising the EU right to full compensation practically impossible or excessively difficult. Directive 2014/104 does not require Member States to create such a collective mechanism, yet it does envisage damages actions being brought by assignees, so national rules on assignments and collective vehicles must comply with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. The referring court must assess, in light of all available national remedies, whether alternatives exist and whether specific features of individual actions (not merely their costs) prevent effective enforcement; if the group action is the only effective route, Member States may still regulate legal-service providers to prevent conflicts of interest and abusive conduct. If incompatibility is found, the national court must first attempt an EU‑conforming interpretation; only if that is impossible without contra legem interpretation must it disapply the national rule.

Whereas the ECJ’s judgment has gotten quite some attention at the time, it did not have immediate consequences for collective actions but simply required the national court to assess (again), whether there were alternatives to the collective action which would not render the private enforcement excessively difficult. This was the question all along which the national court could not escape by making a reference to the ECJ. Whilst answering it is not easy, a better and easier solution in this case could be a differing interpretation of the German law at hand – with or without need for conforming interpretation with EU law – a path forward that other German courts already chose before this preliminary reference and which has not been altered by it.

Legislative Developments and Outlook

Recent legislative developments in EU competition law have been marked more by process signals than by concrete reform. In 2024, the Commission consulted stakeholders on draft guidelines for applying Article 102 TFEU (see here for an appraisal), but through 2025 there has been no clear follow‑up in the form of an updated draft, adoption timetable, or even a public clarification of objectives – leaving it uncertain whether the exercise is intended to recalibrate substantive standards (e.g., effects analysis, exclusionary abuses, remedies) or merely to consolidate existing case-law.

A similar “on‑the‑agenda, but not yet on‑the‑table” dynamic applies to recurring discussions about revising Regulation 1/2003 (and Commission Regulation 773/2004): although the reform topic surfaces periodically, also on the blog, (often linked to enforcement efficiency, investigative tools, and procedural safeguards), there is still no concrete Commission proposal pointing to imminent legislative change. However, noteworthy was the public consultation held in autumn 2025 (see results here) after it had already consulted stakeholders for a first time in 2022 (see details). The latest publicly communicated development was a “reality check workshop” with stakeholders in December 2025. Further steps, however, remain vague and unprecise.

The same pattern of indeterminate translation from diagnosis to action appears in the debate on competitiveness and wider issues of industrial policy. The 2024 Draghi report generated significant political attention (also reflected on the blog at the time here and here), and the Commission stated that its findings would feed into work on “sustainable prosperity and competitiveness” including the Clean Industrial Deal; yet roughly a year later, it remains unclear which competition-law instruments (if any) will be adapted to operationalise those themes, beyond general strategic messaging. Likewise, the Commission’s “competitiveness compass” launched in January 2025 has so far remained high-level, with limited visible conversion into specific competition policy initiatives or legislative proposals. Overall, the picture for 2025 is one of relative policy stagnation in core competition law reform, with political bandwidth seemingly directed toward other dossiers, while competition policy proceeds mainly through case enforcement rather than new legislative frameworks.