Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – Canada

This past year marks the end of a multi-year series of transformative amendments to Canada’s Competition Act (Act). The most recent suite of amendments came into force in June 2025, ushering in a new private access regime. The completion of this multi-year process also prompted the Canadian Competition Bureau (Bureau) to promulgate draft guidance setting out the Bureau’s enforcement position on almost all of the civil provisions of the Act.

In this annual review, we detail the private access regime following the most recent changes to the Act, analyze the latest draft guidance from the Bureau in response to the amended Act, and highlight enforcement trends to predict what might come next.

The New Private Access Regime

June 2025 Amendments

Amendments to the Act that came into force on June 20, 2025 made three key changes to the provisions governing private access to the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal). First, as of June 20, 2025, private parties may be permitted to bring applications to the Tribunal with leave under both the civil misleading advertising and civil anti-competitive commercial agreements provisions of the Act. Provided they were granted leave of the Tribunal, private parties already had a limited ability to bring applications under the abuse of dominance provisions (since amendments to the Act in June 2022), as well as under the provisions for refusal to deal, price maintenance, exclusive dealing and market restriction).

Second, these amendments also changed the standard for leave. Previously, leave was only available where private parties could show that their business was directly and substantially affected by the conduct (though a slightly different test applied for price maintenance). Now, this test has been softened to consider the impact on the applicant’s business “in whole or in part”. Moreover, private parties can now request leave to bring an application under the deceptive marketing, abuse of dominance, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing and market restriction provisions of the Act in a different manner: by showing that their application is in the public interest. For the deceptive marketing provisions of the Act, this public interest test is the only way to secure leave.

Finally, additional relief is now available to private applicants that is not available to the Bureau. Private applicants are able to avail themselves of “disgorgement” remedies under the civil anti-competitive commercial agreements and abuse of dominance provisions of the Act (among others). These remedies empower the Tribunal to order payments to affected parties of an amount up to the value of the benefit derived from the impugned conduct.

The First Private Access “Public Interest” Case

On the same day as these provisions came into force, a private party filed an application for leave to proceed against Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, and Google Canada Corporation as well as against Apple Inc. and Apple Canada Inc. to pursue allegations of abuse of dominance and anti-competitive commercial agreements contrary to sections 79 and 90.1 of the Act. This was the first application brought on the basis of the new public interest ground for leave. In Martin v Alphabet Inc. (Martin), the applicant sought leave to bring an application alleging “that Google controls over 90% of the general search engine market in Canada” and “maintains its dominance through exclusionary practices and anti-competitive revenue sharing agreements with web browsers, original equipment manufacturers and wireless carriers that require Google’s general search engine to be installed as the default product.” The applicant alleged that this conduct constituted a practice of anti-competitive acts and produced anti-competitive effects for the purposes of the Act’s abuse of dominance provisions. The applicant further alleged that certain revenue-sharing agreements between Google and Apple were anti-competitive agreements within the meaning of the section 90.1 Act.

The Competition Tribunal issued its decision on Mr. Martin’s leave application on January 13, 2026, adopting a modified version of the common law three-factor test for obtaining leave to proceed to pursue a case in Canada’s courts based on public interest standing (e.g., to assert a constitutional claim). The test adopted by the Tribunal asks three questions:

·       Is the proposed application a substantial and genuine competition law dispute that warrants resolution by the Tribunal under the provision for which leave is requested?

·       Does the applicant have a genuine interest in the proposed application?

·       Is the proposed proceeding a reasonable and effective means to determine the competition issues raised?

In Martin, the Tribunal dismissed the application for leave to proceed. It found that although the proposed application raised genuine competition law issues under the first prong, the applicant failed to satisfy the remaining two factors. With respect to the second factor, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence failed to meaningfully address his “real stake” in the proposed proceeding, his “engagement” with the issues and his “real and continuing interest” in the matter. With respect to the third and final factor, the Tribunal held that the applicant “provided no evidence to show the resources he will have for the proposed application”, nor did he “explain anything about how the law firm plans to advance the proposed application on the merits.”

Since the application for leave in Martin was filed, other private applicants have commenced three separate applications for leave at the Tribunal. Two of these applications (The Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic v Apple Canada Inc. and Consumers Council of Canada v Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.) have been brought under the public interest leave provisions by public interest groups.

The Tribunal’s decisions in these cases will continue to be an important area to watch, as the interpretation of these new provisions will inform the scope and impact of the private access regime for years to come.

Anti-Competitive Conduct

Recent Amendments

Beyond private enforcement, in recent years, the Act’s key civil enforcement provisions have been amended, including by adding remedies that the Bureau can seek from the Tribunal. Two of the most prominent amendments are to the abuse of dominance and anti-competitive commercial agreements provisions:

·       Abuse of Dominance: The December 2023 amendments changed the statutory language in the abuse of dominance provisions to allow the Tribunal to issue a prohibition order if an applicant can establish that a (i) dominant firm is either (ii) engaged in a practice of anti-competitive acts or (iii) engaged in conduct that had the effect (or likely effect) of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market. Broader remedies (including monetary penalties) are available if all three elements are proved.

·       Anti-Competitive Civil Collaborations: Amendments that came into force in December 2024 broadened the civil anti-competitive commercial agreements provisions governing agreements between competitors to also prohibit agreements between non-competitors (e.g., parties in a vertical, customer-supplier relationship) if (i) a significant purpose of the agreement (or any part of it) is to prevent or lessen competition in any market; and (ii) the effect or likely effect is to substantially prevent or lessen competition. Amendments from June 2024 broadened the remedies available for anti-competitive civil collaborations (including monetary penalties) in addition to opening these provisions to private access, as described above.

Draft Anti-Competitive Conduct and Agreements Enforcement Guidelines

Partly in response to these amendments, on October 31, 2025, the Bureau released draft guidelines that cover most of the reviewable conduct (non-criminal) provisions of the Act. These provisions address anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, exclusive dealing, tied selling, market restriction, price maintenance and refusals to deal. The Bureau calls these the “anti-competitive conduct and agreements” or “ACCA” provisions (and the draft guidance, the “ACCA Guidelines”). The ACCA Guidelines are anticipated to replace three sets of prior Bureau guidance (on abuse of dominance, civil anti-competitive commercial agreements  and price maintenance).

The ACCA Guidelines are divided into sections that mirror the steps the Bureau would take to assess a fact pattern. They begin with market power and market definition (section 2), then consider impact and remedies (sections 3 through 5), before categorizing conduct into particular conceptual (section 6) and legal categories (section 7). As such, multiple sections can inform the interpretation of a single concept in a statutory provision, and they must be read with care.

In light of the recent amendments to the provisions discussed above, two key pieces of guidance are:

·       Abuse of Dominance: Although there is now a statutory route to obtain prohibition orders under the abuse of dominance provisions of the Act premised on a practice of anti-competitive acts alone, the ACCA Guidelines indicate that the Bureau will be more inclined to take enforcement action where there is evidence of competitive harm. The guidance also confirms that the Bureau will continue to rely on its existing market share screens to assess whether a firm is dominant, and that it is generally unlikely to investigate high pricing unless it is tied to other anti‑competitive conduct.

·       Anti-Competitive Agreements: The ACCA Guidelines set out the Bureau’s view of the application of the Act’s anti-competitive agreements provisions to agreements that are not between competitors. The Bureau notes that it will focus on whether the agreement has the effect of harming competition since “if the agreement has the effect of harming competition it will likely also have a significant purpose to do so.” It is worth noting that the Bureau’s views in this regard remain, as yet, untested in a contested Tribunal hearing.

Merger Review

Draft Updated Merger Enforcement Guidelines

Last year also saw the Bureau release for consultation a draft of proposed revisions to its Merger Enforcement Guidelines (Draft MEGs). This revised guidance is meant to replace the Merger Enforcement Guidelines published in 2011 (2011 MEGs).

As with the ACCA Guidelines, the Draft MEGs are motivated by changes to the statutory framework for merger review under the Act that came into force June 20, 2024. As a result of these amendments, the Act now provides that mergers will be presumed to prevent or lessen competition substantially if they (a) either: (i) combine firms with more than a 30 percent aggregate market share, or (ii) result in a post-merger "concentration index" of more than 1,800 (determined by squaring the market shares of the participants in the relevant market); and (b) result in an increase in the concentration index of more than 100 from pre-merger levels. The concentration index thresholds entail, for example, that even a “six-to-five” merger would be presumptively anti-competitive. This presumption can be rebutted by marshalling evidence that the transaction would not have the presumed anti-competitive effects. These statutory changes have two immediate impacts on the content of the guidance itself:

·       Elimination of Safe Harbours. Perhaps the most significant change in the Draft MEGs is the elimination of the Bureau’s non‑statutory market share safe harbour thresholds. Safe harbours have historically served as a screening tool to limit the number of mergers subject to in‑depth review. Safe harbors provided greater regulatory certainty for businesses while also allowing the Bureau to concentrate on transactions more likely to impact competition. The 2011 MEGs stated that the Bureau would generally not challenge a merger on unilateral market power grounds where the merged firm’s post‑merger share was below 35 percent. By contrast, the Draft MEGs contain no safe harbours at all. Indeed, they note that mergers falling short of the statutory presumption thresholds described above may still be found to substantially lessen or prevent competition under the Act.

Guidance on Rebutting the Presumption. The Draft MEGs provide helpful guidance on how the Bureau will assess attempts to rebut the statutory presumption. The Bureau will employ a sliding scale: the further the thresholds are exceeded, the greater the demand for “persuasive evidence” to rebut the presumption. The commentary indicates that evidence of effective remaining competition, likely timely and sufficient entry, and other market‑specific constraints on any potential exercise of market power by the merged entity will remain central to the Bureau’s assessment.

The Draft MEGS also discuss a number of other topics reflecting the evolution of antitrust analysis. For example, the Draft MEGs emphasize the importance of dynamic competition. They also provide guidance on new topics important to the innovation economy, such as multi‑sided platforms (including the implications of network effects, economies of scope in data, and platform conduct that may foreclose or disadvantage present or future competitors), a framework for assessing labour market power, and the impact of technology on traditional antitrust theories of harm (such as algorithmic pricing and its relationship to a coordinated effects assessment).

Expansive Use of Evidence-Gathering Powers to Compel Production in Merger Review

From an enforcement perspective, the Bureau continued in 2025 to make substantial use of its evidence-gathering powers by obtaining production orders against relevant third parties to advance its merger reviews. The Bureau also secured orders in non-notifiable and post-closing merger reviews.

Section 11 of the Act allows the Bureau to secure court orders requiring the production of records or written responses (and even oral examinations) to support its ongoing investigations. During the course of a merger subject to mandatory pre-closing notification under the Act, the Bureau can itself issue a “supplementary information request” (the Canadian equivalent of a “second request”) to collect information from the merging parties. Section 11 orders are needed where the merger is not subject to the Act’s pre-closing notification regime, or where the Bureau wishes to collect information from third parties. While the Bureau’s use of this power is not new, the last several years saw an uptick in the Bureau’s use of section 11 orders and 2025 continued this trend. Of note, the Bureau sought and obtained section 11 orders in several cases against third-party market participants, not just the merging parties themselves:

·       Third Parties in Connection with Broadridge Investigation: This investigation involves a merger between two providers of wealth management and capital markets technology services. The merging parties had each filed pre-merger notifications with the Bureau and the Bureau did not issue a supplementary information request to extend its review. The parties completed the transaction despite concerns raised by the Bureau, following which the Bureau sought section 11 orders to advance its inquiry. The original orders against the merging parties were made in November 2024. Later in 2025, the Bureau secured section 11 orders mandating production from Canada’s six largest financial institutions on the basis that they would have been actual or potential customers of the merging parties.

·       Third Parties in Connection with Kinectrics Holdings Investigation: This investigation involved the acquisition of Kinectrics Holdings by BWX Technologies (two participants in the nuclear medicine sector). This transaction was also subject to the Act’s pre-closing merger notification regime. Further to that regime, the Bureau issued supplementary information requests to Kinectrics Holdings and BWX Technologies. In addition, however, the Bureau also sought section 11 orders requiring production from suppliers of inputs used to develop nuclear medical isotopes (Bruce Power, Ontario Power Generation and Framatome Canada as well as from a competitor in the nuclear medicine space (Novartis).

The Bureau also continued its track record of investigating mergers not subject to mandatory pre-closing notification and review under the Act, leveraging these same powers to investigate at least one such transaction in 2025. A disproportionate number of litigated merger cases in Canada have arisen from mergers that were not subject to pre-closing review and notification regime under the Act. Continued activity in this space suggests that this will remain a key area of Bureau enforcement.

Deceptive Marketing

Guidance on Environmental Claims

Deceptive marketing may have been the Bureau’s most active priority in 2025. Notably, the Bureau finalized its environmental claims guidance, entitled Environmental claims and the Competition Act (“Environmental Claims Guidance”) on June 5, 2025. Similar to other guidance canvassed above, the Environmental Claims Guidance follows after recent amendments to the civil deceptive marketing provisions of the Act. In particular, two new provisions of the Act introduced specific standards for supporting certain types of environmental claims in June 2024.

The first new provision applies to product-specific claims. It prohibits representations to the public in the form of statements, warranties or guarantees of a product’s or a service’s “benefits for protecting or restoring the environment or mitigating the environmental, social and ecological causes or effects of climate change” that are not based on an “adequate and proper test”.

The second new provision applies to claims about businesses and their business activities more broadly, prohibiting representations to the public relating to the “benefits of a business or business activity for protecting or restoring the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological causes or effects of climate change” unless such representations are based on “adequate and proper substantiation”. (This provision currently requires substantiation be “in accordance with internationally recognized methodology”, but Parliament has subsequently introduced legislation to change the requirement to require “adequate and proper” substantiation.)

The Environmental Claims Guidance contains a number of helpful takeaways to assist market participants in understanding the Bureau’s approach to the new amendments. Most importantly, it clarifies that the Bureau’s enforcement focus is on “marketing and promotional representations made to the public, rather than representations made exclusively for a different purpose, such as to investors and shareholders in the context of securities filings.” In the context of securities filings in particular (which have previously been used as the basis for complaints to the Bureau in connection with alleged greenwashing), examples of representations that are outside the Bureau’s enforcement focus include both voluntary and mandatory communications to current and prospective securities investors.

Drip Pricing Enforcement

In June 2022, the Act was amended to expressly provide that drip pricing (as defined in subsection 74.01(1.1) of the civil deceptive marketing provisions) constitutes a false or misleading representation for the purposes of the civil provision (parallel modifications were also made to the Act’s criminal misleading marketing regime). Further to this provision, representing a price that is “not attainable due to fixed obligatory charges or fees” constitutes a false or misleading representation, unless the fees are imposed on the buyer by a government (e.g., taxes).

In 2025, the Bureau doubled down on drip pricing enforcement, bringing two separate cases. In Commissioner of Competition v Wonderland, the Bureau has alleged that tickets, passes, and other products sold by a Canadian theme park operator (“Wonderland”) are advertised at headline prices that cannot actually be obtained because mandatory “processing fees” are excluded from the initial price. The Bureau’s application states that Wonderland has imposed a “processing fee” on nearly all online transactions, while disclosing these fees in subsequent webpages only accessible after spending substantial time choosing products.

Similarly, in Commissioner of Competition v DoorDash Inc., the Bureau has alleged that DoorDash Inc. and certain affiliates engaged in drip pricing by advertising lower prices for deliveries than consumers ultimately paid on their websites and apps. According to the Bureau, mandatory add-on fees (such as service, delivery, small order, and regulatory response fees) were disclosed only at checkout, meaning the advertised price was not attainable upfront. The Bureau has argued that this practice caused consumers to pay higher prices or receive smaller discounts than advertised and that DoorDash has engaged in the conduct for nearly a decade, collecting close to CAD1 billion in mandatory fees from consumers.

Finally, in October 2025, the Federal Court of Appeal heard Cineplex's appeal of the Tribunal's decision finding in favour of the Bureau's allegation that Cineplex had violated the Act's drip pricing provisions. At the hearing below, the Tribunal agreed with the Bureau that Cineplex had made price representations on the tickets page of the company’s website and mobile application that were not attainable due to the requirement to pay online booking fees. The Competition Tribunal held that this constituted reviewable conduct both under the general ‘materially misleading representations’ deceptive marketing provisions of the Act and the newly-introduced drip pricing provision. As part of the remedies ordered, the Tribunal imposed an administrative monetary penalty of over CAD38 million. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Cineplex's appeal, holding that the Tribunal had not “made any error that warrants this Court’s intervention” (Cineplex Inc. v Commissioner of Competition). In doing so, the Federal Court of Appeal applied an “ordinary consumer” lens for the purposes of evaluating the “general impression” a consumer would derive from reviewing digital representations for reviewing the Tribunal’s findings as to whether the representations were misleading in a material respect. Cineplex has indicated that it will seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Conclusions

The year 2025 was largely marked by the coming into force of the final series of amendments (currently contemplated) to the Act and the beginning of the process of absorbing what those amendments will mean for competition law enforcement in Canada.

The enactment of these amendments may be seen as  a success story for Matthew Boswell, who was Commissioner of Competition during the multi-year amendment process and advocated for the changes. How the next stage unfolds, however, will now largely be the responsibility of his successor – whoever that might be – as Commissioner Boswell resigned his position effective December 17, 2025.

Looking forward, it is expected that other issues will attract Bureau attention in 2026 and beyond, especially as it relates to the digital economy. For example, over the course of 2025, the Bureau published the results of its consultation on artificial intelligence, participated in the Canadian Digital Regulators Forum, conducted an extensive consultation on algorithmic pricing, and conducted skills and technical capacity building to ensure the Bureau could keep pace in the digital economy. In sum, the Bureau spent 2025 retooling and readying itself for enforcement under Canada’s new and amended competition law regime; it seems that much of that renewed enforcement effort may be focused on the unique challenges posed by the evolving digital economy.