Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – Brazil

In 2025, the Tribunal of the CADE had a busy year. According to official data from the authority’s public statistics platform (Cade em Números), the Tribunal reviewed 843 merger filings, decided 29 administrative proceedings related to anticompetitive conduct, ruled on 9 procedures for prior assessment of potentially anticompetitive acts (APACs), and examined 20 voluntary appeals.

This broader enforcement landscape sets the stage for an interesting feature of 2025: the record use of negotiated solutions through cease-and-desist agreements (TCCs), confirming the consolidation of consensual enforcement as a central feature of Brazilian competition policy. A total of 75 TCCs were reported, with over BRL 357 million in contributions to the federal diffuse rights fund (FDD). Beyond their sheer number, these agreements played a strategic role in addressing complex competitive concerns, particularly in digital markets and concentrated industries.

During the year, CADE also underwent an institutional transition, which will continue into 2026. The presidency of CADE changed hands following the departure of Alexandre Cordeiro, with Gustavo Augusto Freitas de Lima assuming office as interim president until the end of his term in April 2026. Commissioner Victor Fernandes and Superintendent General Alexandre Barreto will also have their term ending in June 2026. As a result, three out of the seven Tribunal seats (including the presidency) of the Tribunal and the position of Superintendent will demand new appointments that could influence CADE’s enforcement orientation.

Digital Markets

In May 2025, CADE’s Tribunal unanimously upheld the interim measure imposed on Apple in Voluntary Appeal No. 08700.009932/2024-18, confirming that the authority was willing to intervene early when platform rules risk entrenching market power in digital ecosystems. The decision addressed the substantive question at the core of the case: to what extent can a dominant platform rely on contractual and technical restrictions to lock developers and users into a single distribution and payment channel? The interim measure targeted specific practices that structure developers’ dependency on the platform, notably anti-steering clauses and the mandatory use of Apple’s in-app payment system. These rules were examined not in isolation, but as part of an integrated ecosystem in which distribution and monetization are tightly coupled.

In his vote, Commissioner Victor Fernandes adopted an ecosystem-based approach and identified two complementary leverage strategies at play: an offensive and a defensive one. According to the vote, it can be seen a strong plausibility that tying App Store distribution to Apple’s payment solution, under a commission structure often referenced as “30%”, could amount to unlawful tying, with concrete downstream effects, such as higher costs for developers and less room for innovation/variety. CADE’s Tribunal upheld the interim measure after Apple’s voluntary appeal.

After SG/CADE concluded the investigation and recommended condemnation in June 2025, Apple entered into settlement talks, and in December 2025 CADE reported a majority in favor of a cease-and-desist agreement (TCC). Under the settlement, Apple committed to allowing alternative in-app payment processing, lifting anti-steering restrictions that prevented developers from communicating external offers, and moving toward the admission of alternative app stores, subject to implementation deadlines and monitoring. The TCC thus translated the concerns identified at the interim stage into concrete obligations aimed at reopening key bottlenecks in the iOS ecosystem.

The Google case is different in architecture, but similar in competitive logic: it targets the contracts that determine what users see “out of the box.” CADE’s investigation looked at three agreements used in the Android ecosystem, AFA/ACC (anti-fragmentation), MADA (mobile app distribution), and RSA (revenue sharing), and flagged the risk that these instruments could condition access to essential Android services on manufacturers pre-installing, prioritizing, or granting exclusivity to Google apps such as Search and Chrome. The TCC requires, among other things: (i) the prohibition of conditioning the licensing of Google Play on pre-installing or giving privileged placement to Search or Chrome; (ii) no retaliation against manufacturers that choose not to adopt those apps; (iii) the renunciation of exclusivity clauses and a ban on linking RSA payments to search exclusivity; and (iv) communication duties.

Finally, Wellhub, another popular digital platform in Brazil that matches corporate clients and consumers with gyms and studios, also signed a TCC with CADE. The company had already settled terms in 2022, allowing exclusivity within capped limits, but the 2025 settlement went one step further: it further reduced both the percentage and the absolute number of gyms that may remain under exclusivity, and also addressed “exclusivity by other means”. CADE thus maintains its protective approach toward dominant intermediaries that use exclusivity as a means of reducing multi-homing in digital markets, as seen in previous cases such as iFood in 2023.

In the legislative arena Brazil is currently debating a new bill on digital markets, Bill No. 4,675/2025, which replaces the former proposal (Bill No. 2,768/2022). The new bill introduces a designation mechanism inspired by European standards, aimed at identifying economic agents with systemic relevance in digital markets.

The designation process combines more objective quantitative thresholds with broader qualitative criteria, allowing authorities to assess whether a given undertaking should be classified as an economic agent of systemic relevance. Once designated, the company becomes subject to asymmetric regulatory obligations, to be enforced by a new unit within CADE, the proposed Digital Markets Superintendence. It would apply for a ten-year period, covering the entire economic group. The bill provides a non-exhaustive list of potential obligations, but requires that each measure be tailor-made and economically justified by the Digital Markets Superintendence, based on the specific competitive risks identified in each case.

Although the bill is still at an early stage of the legislative process, its adoption could lead to significant changes in the institutional design and regulatory framework governing digital markets in Brazil.

Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)

Merger control also featured prominently on CADE’s 2025 agenda. Among them, the merger between Petz and Cobasi stood out as the most discussed and scrutinized transaction of the year.

The operation was ultimately approved with restrictions through an Agreement on Merger Control (ACC), requiring the divestiture of 26 physical stores, primarily in the state of São Paulo. While the remedy package enabled clearance, the Tribunal’s deliberation revealed significant divergences among commissioners, not only regarding the adequacy of the measures imposed, but also as to the degree of confidence with which their competitive effects could be assessed ex ante.

During the judgment, several commissioners stressed that the transaction could not proceed without remedies, yet expressed concern that the proposed package might fall short of fully addressing competitive risks in local markets. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that divestitures should not be assessed solely by their number, but also by their geographic location and effective revenue transfer, which are critical to ensuring the emergence of a viable and competitive buyer (as highlighted in Commissioner Victor Fernandes’ vote). Others argued the case should not be read as a signal of broader changes in the definition of relevant markets in retail (as stated in Commissioner Diogo Thomson de Andrade’s vote).

The most critical position came from the sole dissenting vote (Commissioner Camila Alves), which highlighted the lack of sufficient data and time to evaluate whether the divestitures would, in practice, give rise to a robust new competitor. From this perspective, the remedy package did not provide adequate assurance that competition would be restored in all problematic markets, even after implementation. As a result, the Petz/Cobasi decision became emblematic not only for its economic impact, but also for exposing different visions within the Tribunal on evidentiary standards, remedial design, and acceptable levels of residual risk in merger control.

In contrast, CADE’s review of the incorporation of BRF by Marfrig followed a more conventional path, albeit in a strategically sensitive sector. The transaction was approved subject to remedies aimed at mitigating potential competitive concerns arising from vertical integration and portfolio effects in the food industry. Although the case did not generate the same level of controversy as Petz/Cobasi, it illustrates CADE’s continued attention to market structure in essential goods markets and its preference for targeted commitments over prohibition when risks can be addressed through enforceable obligations.

Collusive Conducts

Sustainability has become a relevant topic in competition law debates worldwide and featured on CADE’s agenda in 2025. The most controversial case in this context was the Soy Moratorium (Moratória da Soja). The Soy Working Group was initially created in 2006 as a temporary agreement and later became permanent in 2016, through an arrangement among grain traders aimed at preventing the purchase of soybeans originating from areas deforested in the Amazon after 2008.

Following a complaint filed by the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, CADE’s General Superintendence adopted an interim measure to suspend the moratorium, arguing that the participating companies engaged in excessive sharing of sensitive information, induced uniform market behavior, and effectively operated as a cartel. In response, the Ministry of the Environment and the Brazilian Environmental Agency (IBAMA) obtained an injunction from a federal court to uphold CADE’s decision, citing the risk of irreversible environmental damage in the Amazon. CADE’s Tribunal later upheld the interim measure issued by the General Superintendence, allowing the Soy Moratorium to remain in force until December 2025. The dispute then reached the Brazilian Supreme Court, where Justice Flávio Dino ordered the suspension of all judicial and administrative decisions related to the case until a final ruling is issued by the Court.

As of early 2026, no agreement had been reached among soy producers, grain traders, lawmakers, and CADE. Following changes in tax incentives introduced by the State of Mato Grosso, several global traders withdrew from the Soy Working Group, raising concerns about the potential collapse of the initiative. From an antitrust perspective, the Soy Moratorium case reflects an enforcement pattern in which sustainability-related arrangements are assessed through traditional competition law tools, particularly the framework on sensitive information sharing. This approach had already been applied in earlier cases, such as the Sustainlt case.

Sensitive information sharing also remained a relevant issue beyond sustainability. In 2025, CADE entered into cease-and-desist agreements in labor market cases involving Dow Brasil Sudeste Industrial Ltda., Monsanto do Brasil Ltda., and IBM Brasil – Indústrias Máquinas e Serviços Ltda., aimed at preventing the exchange of competitively sensitive information between employers.

Across these cases, CADE’s General Superintendence adopted a stricter analytical approach, applying a standard of proof closer to that traditionally used in cartel investigations than in other forms of collusive conduct.

Gun Jumping

CADE also updated its approach to merger notification and gun jumping enforcement, issuing interim measures, imposing fines, and entering into TCC agreements. Two cases were particularly relevant: the codeshare agreement between Gol and Azul, two of Brazil’s leading airlines, and an investigation into the creation of football leagues formed to jointly negotiate commercial and broadcasting rights for national championships.

In the football leagues case, CADE imposed an interim measure suspending the admission of new members after identifying indications of gun jumping. In the Gol-Azul codeshare case, CADE concluded that notification was not required at the stage at which the agreement stood, on the grounds that competitive conditions remained preserved. The authority noted, however, that should the agreement be fully implemented, notification would become mandatory and its competitive effects would be reassessed.

Conclusion

CADE had an active year in 2025, with decisions that placed competition law firmly on Brazil’s public agenda. The authority’s focus on digital markets was reflected in the Cease and Desist agreements with Apple and Google, which addressed core issues related to platform power, ecosystem governance, and contractual restrictions. At the same time, emerging topics in competition law, such as sustainability and labor markets, also featured prominently in CADE’s enforcement practice. The Soy Moratorium case, in particular, illustrates how these issues can give rise to institutional tensions, especially in relation to the Judiciary.

Looking ahead to 2026, the outlook remains uncertain. Significant changes in CADE’s leadership are expected, including the appointment of a new Superintendent General and a new President of the Administrative Tribunal. In addition, should Bill No. 4,675/2025 advance through Congress and be enacted, CADE may assume new regulatory functions and operate under a redesigned institutional framework for digital markets.