Impact of the EC decision on Google’s AdTech – Stakeholder Analysis and Remedies

On 5 September 2025, the European Commission ordered to end Google’s abusive practices in its dominant position (EEA-wide) in (i) publisher ad servers and (ii) programmatic ad-buying tools for the open web, which it has done since 2014. The EC also ordered Google to implement measures to cease inherent conflicts of interest along the adtech supply chain. Google has until 5 September 2025, to propose these measures. Simultaneously, a fine totalling €2.95 billion was imposed on Google by the Commission (AT.40670).

The decision is the outcome of a formal inquiry launched in June 2021, which was subsequent to an investigation of the French Competition Authority into Google's ad tech business (concluded with a decision from on 7 June 2021 on the same subject). Moreover, the decision was promulgated shortly after the opinion of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in the analogous case was delivered. The EC decision had been anticipated for a protracted period, particularly by media representatives and advertisers from EU Member States, who perceive Google's AdTech industry as a pivotal factor in the diminution of European businesses' autonomy and the curtailment of free media, a cornerstone of democracy.

The Commission provisionally determined in June 2023 that: “in this particular case, a behavioural remedy is likely to be ineffective in preventing the risk of Google continuing such self-preferencing conduct or engaging in new conduct”. This is attributable to the fact that Google is active on both sides of the market with its publisher ad server and with its ad buying tools and holds a dominant position on both ends. Moreover, it operates the most substantial ad exchange. This creates an inherent conflict of interest (self-preferencing) for Google. The Commission's first thoughts on the matter were: “[...] that only the mandatory divestment by Google of part of its services would address the Commission's competition concerns”. However, after concluding its long-running investigation, the Commission did not order a divestiture. Although the text of the decision has not yet been published, the press release provides clear information on the remedial issues in the case.

Effects on Google’s business model

Google has to craft a remedy proposal within 60 days to address the Commission’s concerns. The appeal doesn’t suspend Google’s obligation to comply with obligations imposed on it in the decision. Therefore, operationally, Google must immediately cease the identified self-preferencing practices.

According to the Commission, this means Google can no longer, for example, have its publisher ad server (DFP/Ad Manager) feed insider information to AdX about rival bids, nor can Google Ads/DV360 systematically avoid non-Google exchanges. Implementing these changes quickly is a complex task. Google should have engineers modify auction algorithms and bidding strategies to remove any preferential treatment. It could also issue new guidelines to its teams ensuring a formal separation (at least in the interim) between its buy-side and sell-side operations to avoid further conflict of interest.

In the short run, these adjustments could slightly diminish Google’s ad revenues from the open web: if AdX no longer wins every auction by default, some volume might shift to competitors, and if Google’s DSP bids on other exchanges, AdX’s fill rate could drop. Google might also lose some fee revenue if competition forces its take rates down.

However, these immediate impacts are likely marginal – Google’s overall “ad empire” (which includes Search and YouTube ads and are not touched by this case) will keep generating enormous income. The bigger short-term risk for Google is strategic uncertainty: the Commission has made it clear that if Google’s proposed fixes are insufficient, stronger action (like a break-up order) is on the table. This puts Google in the position of either offering voluntary concessions that are quite far-reaching or facing an imposed remedy later. In essence, the next 2–3 months are a high-stakes period where Google will try to convince regulators that it can solve the conflict of interest without a forced divestiture.

If Google avoids a breakup by proposing robust behavioural remedies, it will still face ongoing compliance obligations. We could see Google under strict monitoring by an EU trustee to ensure it truly treats rival exchanges fairly, shares data appropriately, and doesn’t find new ways to self-prefer. This kind of oversight could last years, adding friction to Google’s business decisions. Google might have to regularly report to regulators about how it’s preventing conflicts of interest. Such scrutiny can slow down product launches or changes (for fear of raising antitrust flags) and may open doors for rivals if Google is less agile due to regulatory shackles.

Over time, as the market opens up, Google will likely lose some market share in the AdTech segments affected. For instance, Google’s ~90% share in publisher ad servers could drop as publishers explore alternatives or as a divested Google Ad Manager faces new competition. Its 50% share in ad exchanges might also erode if competitors (like AppNexus/Xandr, Index Exchange, or new European exchanges) gain traction in a fair environment. This means Google’s overall ad revenue (excluding search) might see slower growth or even declines as a portion shifts to competitors.

It’s worth noting that Google’s advertising machine is huge – in 2024, about 75.6% of Alphabet’s revenue came from advertising of all types – so even a small percentage loss in share could be billions of dollars. However, Google may compensate by focusing on areas outside the open web: expect Google to double-down on ads in its own ecosystems (Search, YouTube, Maps, etc.) and on new frontiers like Connected TV or retail ads, which are not directly impacted by this case. In other words, Google might shift strategy to rely more on its “walled gardens” where it can maintain control, if its open-web dominance is curtailed.

Under the shadow of regulatory enforcement, Google may become more cautious about integrating services in ways that raise antitrust alarms. This could influence its future product designs. For example, any plans to further unify user data across services for ad targeting might be re-evaluated with an eye to competition law. Culturally, Google might instil greater internal checks, compliance officers ensuring new ad features won’t be seen as exclusionary. In the long run, this could foster a more modular approach to Google’s offerings, perhaps even a mindset shift that being an advertising gatekeeper comes with responsibilities. On the flip side, some fear that regulation might dampen Google’s incentive to innovate in AdTech, if it sees diminishing returns in that area. Google could pull back investment in the open-web ad products (for instance, scaling down features of Google Ad Manager or deprioritizing it if it’s to be sold anyway) and put more R&D into AI, cloud, or other units. In any case, the era of unbridled expansion in AdTech is likely over for Google. The company will have to operate within confines set by regulators and competitors’ presence.

Potential effects on publishers, advertisers, SMEs and large media groups

The landmark decision from 5 September 2025 has significant short-term and long-term implications for different stakeholder groups.

Publishers

First of all, for publishers (small and large),  in the short-term, the Commission’s decision offers immediate validation of their long-standing grievances. Google’s practices (e.g. giving its own exchange AdX an informational advantage in auctions run by its DoubleClick/Ad Manager ad server) have been suppressing competition, which publishers say translated into lower revenues for their websites.

Thus, in the short run, the order for Google to cease self-preferencing may start to level the playing field in programmatic ad auctions. If Google promptly stops sharing competitors’ bid data with AdX and allows its advertiser tools to bid on other exchanges, publishers could see marginal improvements in yield as more exchanges get a fair chance to compete for their ad inventory. However, any immediate revenue uptick for publishers is likely to be modest until more substantial remedies take effect. Small publishers (e.g. independent blogs or local news sites) that rely heavily on Google’s AdSense/Ad Manager might not notice drastic changes overnight, apart from a hope that auction pricing becomes a bit more competitive. Large publishers, on the other hand, may already be exploring alternative ad platforms or “header bidding” solutions; they will be encouraged that regulators are backing their push for a fairer marketplace.

Notably, publishers welcomed the EU’s findings but warned that a fine alone is “not enough” to fix the problem. The European Publishers Council (EPC), which initiated the complaint, lauded the decision as a “long overdue” step yet lamented the absence of an immediate break-up order : “(…) Google will simply write off the fine as a cost of business while consolidating its dominance (…). A fine will not fix Google’s abuse of its adtech”, said EPC Executive Director Angela Mills Wade, urging “strong and decisive action” to end the illegal practices. In the short term, publishers are, therefore, pressing to ensure Google’s 60-day compliance plan is meaningful. There is cautious optimism among content publishers that the EU’s enforcement stance will, at least, deter any further discriminatory tweaks in Google’s adtech in the immediate future. Major publishing groups have indicated they will be closely involved as complainants in the remedy phase to push for changes that genuinely improve market fairness.

Advertisers

Secondly, for advertisers (the brands and agencies buying ad space), the Commission’s decision promises improved fairness but with limited immediate change in daily operations. The ruling explicitly recognized that Google’s self-preferencing harmed advertisers by inflating the costs they pay and restricting their options. In the short term, the direct order for Google to halt these practices should begin to remove hidden biases in the ad auction process. For example, if Google’s ad buying platforms (Google Ads and DV360) are no longer automatically steering budgets to AdX and start considering rival exchanges on equal footing, advertisers’ programmatic bids may reach a wider pool of publisher inventory. This could incrementally increase competition for ad impressions, potentially yielding better return on ad spend (as their bids find the most efficient matches, not just those within Google’s ecosystem). Additionally, stopping the advance bid information to AdX means more honest auctions. Advertisers stand a fairer chance that the highest bid wins, rather than Google’s exchange secretly outbidding others by a penny. In the aggregate, such changes should put downward pressure on the “ad tech tax” that advertisers indirectly pay.

Though these benefits won’t be immediately obvious in every campaign, advertisers have welcomed the regulatory scrutiny. Many large advertisers have long been concerned about the opaque fees and data black boxes in programmatic advertising. “(…) Advertisers face inflated costs [and] the opacity of the system means only Google knows where the money goes,” as one expert described the status quo. The EC’s action signals that greater transparency is coming. In the near term, we might see Google being more cautious (possibly improving reporting to advertisers about where their money is spent) in order to show goodwill during the remedy period. It’s also likely that advertisers (and their trade bodies) will use the momentum to demand more data access. Under Europe’s new Digital Markets Act (DMA) rules, for instance, Google is obligated to provide advertising clients with more information on campaign performance and pricing. The combination of this decision and the DMA could reinforce each other, empowering advertisers with data that was previously kept siloed.

Over the longer term, a restructured AdTech market would significantly boost advertisers’ position. If Google is forced to divest parts of its ad business or otherwise open up the ecosystem, advertisers should gain more choice and leverage in how they buy ads. The implementation of EC remedies in an appropriate manner can result in the observation of several potential effects.

• More Competition for Ad Budgets: Currently, Google’s share across the ad buying chain (from demand-side platform to exchange) gave it outsized influence over ad pricing. A breakup – say, separating Google’s ad exchange and ad server from its advertiser tools – would create or strengthen independent platforms eager to attract advertisers’ spend. Competing exchanges and demand-side platforms (DSPs) would likely lower their fees or innovate on service quality to win business that once defaulted to Google. For advertisers, this means lower transaction costs and potentially reduced ad prices as intermediaries take a smaller cut . In other words, more of each advertising euro will go directly to reaching the audience (publisher), rather than to Google’s margins. This improved efficiency can either save advertisers money or allow them to achieve greater reach for the same budget.

• Improved Transparency and Data Access: A less vertically-integrated market should shine more light on the ad supply chain. Advertisers could insist on end-to-end transparency – seeing exactly how each euro flows from their pocket to various adtech vendors and finally to the publisher. Independent exchanges and DSPs, as newer entrants or specialists, may differentiate themselves by offering full fee breakdowns and log-level data to earn trust. Even Google (or its successor entities) might be compelled to share more data once it no longer dominates every link of the chain. As a result, advertisers – including small and medium businesses – will be better able to measure performance and detect any unreasonable charges. This addresses one of advertisers’ chief complaints: under Google’s dominance it was extremely difficult to audit where budgets went, with 15% of spend simply “disappearing” in the supply chain according to industry studies. Long term, we expect greater accountability for every intermediary, making the digital ad market more transparent and trustworthy to those who invest in it.

• Fair Access to Audiences: The Commission’s 2025 investigation also examined whether Google’s control over user data (from its ecosystem) gave it an unfair advantage in ad targeting. /Post-remedy, advertisers might see a more level playing field in data. If Google’s ad businesses are separated, they might no longer be able to exclusively combine insights from Google Search, Gmail, YouTube, etc. with open-web advertising. Competitors (or publishers themselves) could gain comparative access to valuable advertising data – for instance, via shared industry data pools or through regulations that force data portability for ad campaigns. In the EC’s view, breaking the silo could spur “innovation in adtech” and new privacy-friendly targeting techniques that aren’t under one giant’s control  . Advertisers in the long run benefit from a more innovative, diversified ecosystem, rather than being tied to Google’s products for lack of viable alternatives. Google itself noted there are “more alternatives than ever” in ad services ; if the decision succeeds, that claim will become reality, with robust competitors eroding Google’s market share.

Small and medium-sized enterprises 

Thirdly, the impacts on SMEs (which in this context includes smaller publishers and local businesses that use digital advertising) warrant special attention. In the immediate aftermath of the decision, many SMEs may be uncertain about what it means for them. Google has argued that the required changes: “(…) will hurt thousands of European businesses by making it harder for them to make money”. This is a reference to the many small websites and app developers that monetize via Google’s ad platforms, as well as small advertisers who depend on the easy, one-stop services Google offers.

In the very short term, these SMEs are unlikely to experience negative disruptions. Google’s ad services (AdSense, Google Ads, etc.) will continue to operate, so an SME retailer can still run ads and a small online publisher will still see ads served on their site. Status quo operations remain for now.

If anything, SMEs could see subtle benefits even in the short run. For a small advertiser who uses Google Ads to reach customers, the cessation of Google’s self-preferencing might mean their ads are more widely distributed beyond Google’s own exchange. For example, if Google Ads (the platform many small businesses use to buy ads) stops avoiding non-Google ad exchanges, a local shop’s banner ad might now appear on a broader range of websites, potentially improving its effectiveness. Similarly, a small publisher using Google’s ad server might quietly benefit as bids from multiple exchanges compete for its ad slots, possibly raising ad rates by a small margin. These effects won’t be drastic initially, but they counter Google’s warning of harm. In fact, initial compliance steps could help SMEs by beginning to break Google’s stranglehold on ad demand.

It should be noted that one short-term challenge is informational: SMEs typically lack dedicated legal or tech teams, so they may not fully understand the changes underway. There might be confusion or worry, seeded in part by Google’s messaging, that new regulations could complicate the simple setup that small businesses rely on (for instance, concern that a more open system means more contracts or technical work for publishers who only ever used Google). Regulators and industry groups will need to communicate clearly to SMEs that the goal is to empower, not burden, them. Already, small publisher alliances and business associations in Europe are voicing support for the decision, framing it as protecting the little guy from Big Tech overreach. In the immediate term, SMEs should keep an eye out for any improvements in transparency from Google. Under the DMA, a Google “gatekeeper” must give business users (including SMEs) access to performance data – so a small merchant might soon see better reporting on how their ad dollars were spent across Google’s network.

In the long run, SMEs stand to gain significantly from a more competitive and transparent AdTech ecosystem. The prospective changes will have the following impacts on them:

• For Small Advertisers: These are local businesses, startups, and mid-sized companies that rely on online ads to reach customers. Today, many default to Google Ads because it offers unparalleled reach (across Search, YouTube, and a large display network) with minimal effort. After the EU’s intervention, Google’s ad network will continue to be important, but it will no longer be the only game in town. Competing ad platforms – perhaps some led by European tech firms or consortiums – could emerge as viable alternatives for SMEs, offering comparable reach or specialized audiences (for example, an EU-based DSP that focuses on local European publisher inventory). More competition could drive down advertising costs for SMEs, as platforms cut fees to attract their limited budgets. Even if an SME sticks with Google, they may indirectly benefit from Google lowering its take rate or improving its tools in response to competition. Moreover, with greater transparency, a small advertiser will better understand the value they’re getting. Instead of having 15–30% of their ad spend lost in a murky supply chain, they can see which portions go to fees and demand those be reasonable. In essence, advertising will become a bit more SME-friendly: easier to trust, potentially cheaper per result, and not wholly controlled by one giant that could change terms at will.

• For Small Publishers and Creators: This includes independent news sites, niche blogs, and app developers – many of whom monetize via Google AdSense or similar. Under the Google-centric regime, small publishers had little negotiating power and often took whatever revenue share Google offered. In a post-remedy world, these publishers should benefit from higher revenue shares and new monetization options. If Google’s publisher ad server (DoubleClick/Ad Manager) is forced to interoperate, small publishers might gain access to multiple ad exchanges without needing to manage complex tech (the hope is that an independent ad server would plug in many demand sources by default). This means more advertisers competing to fill their ad slots, which tends to drive up the price of ads (more demand for the same supply). Indeed, the rationale behind the EC case is that Google’s conflicts kept bids artificially low on non-Google exchanges, siphoning revenue away from content creators. Removing these conflicts could unlock those revenues. Industry observers note that publishers – including small ones – could see a greater portion of advertiser spend flowing back to them if Google’s high intermediary fees are curtailed. In concrete terms, where a small website might have received (for example) 55% of an ad’s value previously, it might receive a significantly higher cut once there’s a fair auction among exchanges and lower fees. This can be a game-changer for SMEs like local news outlets; more ad income helps sustain their operations. As the International Federation of Journalists put it, ensuring ads are bought and sold in a free and fair market is “the surest way to guarantee the future of journalism” and media pluralism – a statement very relevant to small, independent publishers.

• Levelling the Playing Field: The EU’s action also aims to level the field between smaller AdTech companies and the dominant player. So another long-term effect is that more SME AdTech firms (e.g. independent ad exchanges, regional ad networks, analytics providers) might thrive. This is indirect, but important: if those businesses grow, they offer tailored services to small advertisers/publishers, who might get better customer service or custom solutions than they did as tiny fish in Google’s ocean. For instance, an SME might work with a niche ad platform that specializes in their industry or local market, yielding better results than the generic Google system. Previously, Google’s might and data advantages made it nearly impossible for such small AdTech firms to compete – the Commission’s remedy could change that dynamic, fostering a diverse ecosystem. Ultimately, SMEs benefit from an ecosystem that is less monopolistic and more diverse, because it spurs competition for their partnership and reduces any single company’s gatekeeper power over their success.

Large media groups

Fourthly, Europe’s large media groups (major news publishers, broadcasting companies, and multimedia conglomerates) have been some of the most vocal stakeholders in this case. In fact, the complaint that launched the EC investigation came from the European Publishers Council, representing many of Europe’s biggest media firms. In the immediate term, these large media organizations see the Commission’s decision as a validation of their concerns and a strategic win, albeit one that is only the first step.

Their initial reactions mix relief and determination: relief that the EU agrees Google’s ad practices “weakened news media and publishing companies”, and determination to ensure the follow-up remedy is strong. Large media groups likely feel emboldened in their public calls for breaking Google’s monopoly. They will also be coordinating with U.S. counterparts, note that the News/Media Alliance (a major U.S. news publisher group) similarly said the EU’s move is “in the right direction” but “falls short of an appropriate remedy”, aligning with U.S. efforts to hold Google accountable.

On an operational level, the next few months won’t radically change how large media groups monetize their content. They will still mostly use Google’s ad server and exchange (as those remain dominant for now). However, many big publishers have already diversified their revenue (subscriptions, direct ad sales, etc.) and some have started investing in alternative ad technologies. The Commission’s decision gives these initiatives a boost: large media houses may accelerate partnerships with independent AdTech firms or even collaborative ad platforms that bypass Google. In the short term, merely the threat of regulatory action could improve media groups’ negotiating power with Google. Google will be keen to show it’s not punishing or neglecting media partners, so we might see Google offering slightly more favourable terms or support to large publishers to keep them on side while the legal process unfolds (this could be subtle, e.g. improved revenue shares for those who use its tools, or grants/investments in news initiatives). Nonetheless, large media groups remain wary, as one publisher representative noted, without decisive enforcement, Google could simply treat fines as “a cost of business” while continuing to entrench its dominance. Therefore, in this interim period, big media is gearing up for a fight: they will gather evidence, mobilize public opinion (linking the case to saving journalism), and possibly coordinate litigation for damages. Indeed, in 2024 a group of 30 European publishers, including giants like Axel Springer and Schibsted, sued Google for €2.1 billion in lost advertising revenues. The EU’s finding of liability strengthens these claims, so large media companies may pursue compensation in parallel with regulatory remedies.

In the long term, a robust remedy could significantly reshape the competitive landscape in favor of large media conglomerates. These organizations have the scale and resources necessary to take advantage of a more open advertising market. They stand to recover a substantial portion of advertising revenues that were previously diverted to Google’s coffers. As described earlier, Google’s stranglehold on AdTech enabled it to take high fees and advantages that “drained” publishers’ monetization potential. Even a few percentage points improvement in revenue share translates into millions of euros for major media sites. Analysts suggest that fully restoring competition could unlock billions in additional yearly revenue for content producers globally. This financial boost could be reinvested in journalism, content production, and new media services, exactly what many large media CEOs have been clamouring for. In strategic terms, it helps redress the imbalance where tech platforms sucked up digital ad growth while traditional media struggled.

The decision also has a broader effect of shifting market power. Over the past decade, Google’s dominance meant even the largest media brands had limited leverage in negotiations (whether over ad revenue shares, data sharing, or compliance with platform policies). If Google’s role is diminished, large media groups collectively gain bargaining power. They can push for better terms – for example, demanding that any remaining Google ad services share data and insights with them rather than operating opaquely. They can also insist on fair access, no more preferential “insider” knowledge for Google’s exchange that isn’t available to others. In a more competitive environment, media groups could negotiate deals with multiple AdTech partners (including potentially Amazon, The Trade Desk, or up-and-coming European AdTech firms) to ensure no single partner can strong-arm them. Essentially, the balance of power in digital advertising could rebalance, with content providers regaining some control over monetization which Big Tech had seized.

Behavioral Remedies First, Structural Breakup Later

Having examined the impacts on various stakeholders, it’s important to understand the remedy aspect of the Commission’s decision – specifically, the choice to pursue behavioral changes first and hold structural remedies in reserve. This “behavioral-first” approach – imposing conduct remedies now and deferring a structural breakup unless proven necessary – has both advantages and drawbacks.

Potential Advantages of a Behavioral-First Approach:

• Speed and Adaptability: Behavioral commitments can often be implemented faster and with more flexibility than an immediate breakup of the company. Dismantling part of Google’s adtech empire through divestiture would be complex and time-consuming (potentially years of restructuring and litigation), whereas instructing Google to modify its conduct can yield changes in the short term. Google’s internal systems can be adjusted (e.g. changing auction logic or data-sharing protocols) relatively quickly once a remedy is agreed, minimizing ongoing harm to competitors. Moreover, a conduct-based remedy can be tuned to the technical complexities of the ad auction ecosystem. The adtech market’s algorithms and APIs are highly complex and constantly evolving; a flexible behavioral solution allows for tweaks and optimizations over time without immediately dismantling infrastructure. Competition experts note that regulators often favor a principles-based or outcome-based order in such dynamic markets, letting the firm itself figure out the precise technical measures needed to comply. This flexibility means the remedy can adapt to new developments and be refined in detail, rather than relying on the one-time, irreversible step of a breakup. In short, the Commission’s approach can deliver quicker initial relief and can be more easily adjusted to address nuanced issues in Google’s ad platforms as they arise.

• Legal Proportionality and Process: The Commission’s strategy reflects the EU law principle of proportionality in antitrust remedies. Under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission can only impose structural remedies (like a divestiture) if no equally effective behavioral remedy is available, or if a behavioral remedy would be too burdensome for the company. In past abuse-of-dominance cases, the Commission has traditionally been cautious about immediately breaking up companies, favoring behavioral solutions and rarely pursuing structural separation. By initially opting for a conduct remedy, the EU is respecting this hierarchy – attempting a less intrusive fix first – which could strengthen the legal defensibility of the decision if challenged in court. This measured approach also preserves the Commission’s credibility: it demonstrates that Brussels is not rushing to dismantle companies without giving them a chance to mend their ways. Importantly, the divestiture threat remains credible in the background. Google now knows that if its proposed changes do not actually eliminate the conflicts of interest, the Commission is prepared to escalate to a forced sale of part of its adtech business. Keeping that sword hanging maintains pressure on Google to propose meaningful changes. In essence, the behavioral-first route establishes a proportional, stepwise enforcement – satisfying the requirement to try a viable behavioral remedy – while still enabling the Commission to “dial up” to structural remedies if needed.

• Room for Technical Specificity: By ordering Google to “cease the conflicts” and end self-preferencing, rather than prescribing an exact structural outcome upfront, the Commission can demand very specific operational fixes in Google’s adtech services during the compliance plan phase. This creates an opportunity to craft remedies that target the concrete mechanisms of Google’s advantage. For example, regulators can insist that Google eliminate any “bid leakage” pathways – i.e. stop sharing rival bidders’ information with AdX – so that Google’s exchange no longer has an unfair bidding advantage . They can require neutral auction parameters in Google’s ad server, ensuring that AdX does not get to win auctions by default or have last-look privileges over competitors. Similarly, the Commission could mandate buy-side neutrality – changes in Google Ads and DV360 so that these advertiser tools do not systematically route spending to AdX unless AdX truly offers the best price or match. All these safeguards are aimed at eliminating the conflicts of interest in practice, short of a business breakup. Because the remedy is behavioral, the Commission has latitude to negotiate and refine these technical conditions with Google when reviewing the proposal. The forthcoming compliance plan gives the EU a chance to scrutinize Google’s operations in detail and embed precise checks (e.g. firewalls between business units, detailed data-sharing transparency requirements, equal-access APIs for rival ad exchanges) to level the playing field. In theory, this tailored approach could address the specific competition harms more directly than a blunt divestiture, by surgically removing opportunities for self-preferencing while preserving beneficial integrations until and unless a breakup is proven necessary.

Potential Drawbacks and Risks of a Behavioral Approach

• Enforcement Complexity & Evasion Risk: A major challenge with behavioral remedies is ensuring the dominant firm actually follows the rules in practice, and continues to follow them as time goes on. Google’s adtech operations are essentially a black box of algorithms and proprietary processes, which makes monitoring compliance extremely difficult for outsiders. Seemingly minor tweaks in Google’s code or auction configuration could reintroduce bias in ways that are hard to detect, enabling Google to circumvent the spirit of the remedy while technically claiming compliance. Enforcing conduct rules in real-time, high-frequency ad auctions places a heavy burden on antitrust authorities to audit technical details and data flows – it requires ongoing oversight that can be error-prone and resource-intensive. Past experience suggests these concerns are well-founded. In the Google Shopping case, for instance (an EU antitrust case in 2017), the Commission’s decision required Google to give equal treatment to rival comparison shopping services; yet Google’s subsequent “compliance” changes did not stop it from favoring its own service in practical terms. Google’s rivals argued that the company found subtle ways to continue privileging its own shopping results despite the EU order. Likewise, in the Google Android case (2018), the remedy of offering a “choice screen” to users (to pick a default search engine/browser) proved largely ineffective at restoring competition in those markets. These examples highlight how behavioral fixes can fall short: without constant vigilance, a dominant firm may adapt and find new loopholes or simply wait out regulators. The adtech arena is even more technically complex, raising fears that Google could comply on paper but still leverage its integrated stack through obscure means (data advantages, opaque fee arrangements, bundling incentives for clients, etc.). In summary, a behavioral-first strategy runs the risk of regulatory “cat-and-mouse” – creating rules that Google might gradually weaken or work around, which would blunt the remedy’s effectiveness. If enforcement is not extremely rigorous, Google’s inherent advantages could persist.

• Conflict Persists in an Integrated Stack: The core concern in this case is Google’s conflict of interest from operating multiple layers of the adtech stack simultaneously. A behavioral remedy, no matter how well-crafted, leaves the underlying structure intact – Google would still own the key marketplace components (the ad server, the exchange, the buy-side tools) that give it both the incentive and the ability to favor itself. As long as that integrated monopoly structure remains, critics argue, Google will have ongoing temptation and countless ways to self-preference (many of which may not be expressly covered by a narrow remedy). Even the Commission acknowledged that a “true” fix may require more than promises: Commissioner Ribera observed that “the only way for Google to end its conflict of interest effectively is with a structural remedy, such as selling part of its ad tech business.” In other words, splitting Google’s adtech vertically – for example, separating the ad exchange business from the advertiser and publisher services – would remove the built-in conflict by preventing Google from acting as both the auctioneer and a bidder in the same marketplace. Behavioral conditions can mitigate abusive conduct, but they cannot eliminate the fundamental fact that Google’s businesses still share aligned incentives to help each other. This is why many industry observers (especially publishers and adtech rivals harmed by Google’s dominance) remain skeptical that conduct remedies will be enough. The European Publishers Council, for instance, lamented that the EU fine and conduct order alone won’t truly fix the problem: “Google will simply write this off as a cost of business while consolidating its dominance… Only a break-up will fix Google’s monopoly.” Many stakeholders believe that nothing short of a divestiture can structurally level the playing field in adtech. Thus, the Commission’s interim step, while useful as an immediate measure, might ultimately fall short of restoring full competition if the basic conflict of interest inherent in Google’s integrated ad stack is not removed.

• Remedy Lag and Uncertainty: By taking a phased approach, the Commission is inevitably introducing a time lag before a full resolution is achieved. Under the decision, Google has 60 days to propose its compliance plan and then (if the plan is accepted) an additional short period to implement changes . This means at least a few months will pass before the behavioral measures take effect – and during this period, the status quo of Google’s market power remains largely in place. If Google’s proposal is deemed inadequate and the Commission then moves to impose a stronger remedy, the process will stretch on further (as additional legal steps or negotiations ensue). In the meantime, Google may continue to reap benefits from its dominant position (and could even use the delay to further entrench its market power or shift tactics in anticipation of future rules). Critics worry that a drawn-out remedy timeline gives Google breathing room to prolong its competitive advantage. The longer it takes to implement an effective solution, the more revenue and data Google accumulates in the interim, which can be leveraged into new advantages (for example, expanding into AI-driven ad services or locking in clients with long-term contracts). There is also inherent uncertainty in a behavioral-first plan: nobody knows yet if Google’s eventual commitments will truly fix the problems. If they fail to do so, the Commission will have to pivot to a divestiture remedy later – but by then, considerable time may have been lost, with competition still stifled in the interim. In short, the “wait-and-see” approach trades off immediacy for process: it delays a definitive cure (structural separation) in hopes that a quicker, cooperative fix will work. The risk is that if it doesn’t work, enforcement will end up a step behind, and harm to publishers and advertisers will have continued longer than necessary. As one observer put it, the EU’s fine and initial conduct order are just “the first crack in Google’s monopoly” – the real break may only come later, if at all.

Conclusion and Outlook

The European Commission’s decision to pursue behavioural remedies first in the Google adtech case is a calculated balancing act. On one hand, it reflects regulatory restraint and pragmatism: a fast, adjustable fix that adheres to legal norms of proportionality, while keeping the ultimate threat of breakup in reserve. This approach could prove effective if Google’s compliance measures genuinely remove the self-dealing advantages from its advertising business. On the other hand, many questions remain on whether any set of behavioral conditions can truly neutralize the inherent conflicts in Google’s vertically integrated ad stack. The success of this strategy will hinge on rigorous enforcement, and on Google’s willingness and ability to fundamentally reform its conduct. If the “soft” approach falters, the Commission has signalled it is ready to “get tough” with structural remedies.

In the coming months, Google’s 60-day remedy proposal and the Commission’s assessment of it will be crucial. They will reveal whether a cooperative, rules-based solution can truly open up the adtech market, or whether European regulators will ultimately decide that breaking up Google’s ad empire is the only way to ensure a fair and competitive digital advertising ecosystem. Either way, this case has set a powerful precedent. It reaffirms a critical principle: that digital markets must serve the many, not be controlled by the few, and that when markets fail, regulators will act.

Looking further ahead, the overall outlook in the wake of the Commission’s 5 September 2025 decision is one of significant change in the digital advertising industry, especially in the EU, but with repercussions worldwide. In the short term, the decision validates complaints that Google’s vertical integration harmed competition, and it imposes immediate obligations that could start to open the market. Publishers have received official recognition that their reduced ad revenues were due in part to Google’s conduct, and they stand to benefit from even modest near-term improvements in auction fairness. Advertisers have been assured that regulators are tackling the hidden fees and biases that raised their costs, setting the stage for greater transparency and choice. SMEs, often at the mercy of dominant platforms, gain an empowered voice from this regulatory action, even if they won’t notice dramatic changes on day one. Large media groups see this as a critical first step in re-balancing the digital economy in favor of content creators, and they will push hard to ensure it leads to the structural reforms they seek. Google, meanwhile, faces both a financial penalty and a clear warning that its decades-old ad monopoly is under serious threat.

In the long term, the effects of this decision (and the remedies that follow) could be far-reaching. We may witness a new equilibrium in market power: one where no single company can control the entire ad supply chain, and publishers and advertisers transact on more neutral, competitive platforms. Access to advertising data and insights should become more democratized, no longer locked inside one dominant ecosystem, but available across a range of players, enabling all participants (from big brands to small websites) to better understand the value chain. Transparency is set to greatly improve; the black box of programmatic advertising pricing is likely to be dismantled by both regulatory mandate and by the emergence of competitors that differentiate themselves through openness. The digital ad market could shift from being “efficient but exploitative” under a monopolist, to “efficient and fair” under a truly competitive regime, a change that would benefit businesses and consumers alike.

Importantly, the competitiveness of the adtech sector seems to increase. European adtech firms and alternative advertising intermediaries around the world shall find new opportunities to innovate and capture market share once Google’s entrenched advantages are curtailed. This aligns with the EU’s broader digital strategy (including the DMA) to ensure that no gatekeeper can foreclose entire markets. We can expect a period of adjustment. The digital advertising ecosystem will need to recalibrate to new rules and new entrants. There could be transient challenges: for instance, if Google is broken up, publishers and advertisers might need to manage relationships with multiple entities instead of one, and new technical standards may be needed to ensure seamless interoperability among various ad services. Regulators will also have to remain vigilant to ensure that Google (and any other big tech firms) do not find substitute ways to undermine competition, and that new dominant players don’t simply take Google’s place in the absence of proper oversight. But the general trajectory is toward a healthier market that more equally balances the interests of publishers (who supply audiences), advertisers (who seek consumer attention), and intermediaries (who must earn their place by adding genuine value rather than exploiting monopoly power).