Competition Policy for Digital Markets in Chile

Introduction

Chile has a comprehensive development in digital markets. Between 2019 and 2026, the Chilean Competition Authority (Fiscalía Nacional Económica, or “FNE”) conducted 24 investigations into local (such as delivery apps and marketplaces) and global industries (involving cases against Big Tech in the app stores and social networks markets).

In general, the FNE’s main enforcement priority concerns local digital markets with a significant number of business sellers. In this context, it explicitly held that an ex-ante regulation of digital markets is unnecessary, given the current state of the Chilean Competition Act (Decreto Ley N^o 211, or “DL 211”). In parallel, it argued that business users should be free to set their prices without further intervention from platforms.

These statements suggest a special competition policy for digital markets in Chile: the FNE would intervene in local digital markets using traditional competition law enforcement and advocate for the independence of business users from platforms. In this regard, how does the FNE develop this policy, what are its limitations, and how can it be evaluated?

I.              Enforcement and Advocacy Priorities

The FNE’s recent activity in digital markets suggests a particular preoccupation with markets characterised by a high concentration of business users who depend on a small number of platforms. In Chile, business users typically consist of small and medium-sized enterprises that are in an asymmetric position against the platforms.

Regarding enforcement, the FNE has been active in assessing vertical restraints in delivery apps (Uber Eats, PedidosYa, Rappi, 2023) and in the online travel agency market (Booking, 2026). In general, the FNE settled the elimination of contractual and de facto price parity obligations. A further complaint against a delivery platform was filed regarding the breach of one of these settlements (PedidosYa, 2026). A lawsuit against Google for restraints in its app store remains pending (Google, 2025). In contrast, complaints that resembled European case law were dismissed for lack of evidence, such as cases involving self-preferencing in marketplaces (Mercado Libre, 2020) and degradation of privacy in social networks (WhatsApp, 2025).

Regarding advocacy, the competition authority published market inquiry reports regarding hotel accommodation (Hotels, 2024) and marketplaces (E-Commerce, 2026). In the first case, the FNE recommended initiating enforcement investigations after noting widespread use of Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses. In the second case, the FNE proposed a remedy based on the P2B Regulation to establish general terms and conditions for sellers (as explained infra).

II.            Competition Law and the Debate of an Ex-Ante Regulation

In this context, the debate over the need for ex-ante regulation of digital markets is active in Chile. Some commentators argue that the ex-ante prohibitions of the Digital Markets Act should be considered for incorporation into the Chilean Competition Act. Other scholars hold that the current tools of DL 211 can effectively tackle anticompetitive conducts in digital markets.

In a recent OECD forum, the FNE confirmed this last opinion. It argued that “Chile’s competition law framework (amended and significantly strengthened for the last time in 2016) currently provides an adequate institutional basis for addressing the challenges posed by the digital economy.” As a matter of fact, the FNE has used a wide range of enforcement and advocacy tools granted by the Chilean Competition Act for digital markets.

The FNE’s recent activity in digital markets can explain its view on the need for ex-ante regulation: the usual enforcement and advocacy mechanisms can address competitive concerns in local digital markets. The absence of evidence in more complex cases would imply that enforcement priorities can remain in a local scope, using the current tools granted by the Chilean Competition Act. Therefore, the FNE’s enforcement levels in digital markets can dissipate a general sense of under-enforcement that may prompt calls for an ex-ante regulation.

The recent market inquiry report on marketplaces follows this logic: the FNE acknowledged risks of abuse of economic dependence in the relationship between platforms and sellers. In this regard, the report proposed that large marketplaces (with sales levels above a threshold of EUR 3,7 million) should have general, objective, and transparent terms and conditions for sellers. These provisions include a detailed description of the reasons for the suspension or elimination of the seller account, a 15-day period before the effective date of the new terms and conditions, and the criteria for altering search results.

This proposal does not include a specific enforcement mechanism. Therefore, any infraction would be assessed by traditional enforcement. Although the abuse of economic dependence is not explicitly mentioned in the Chilean Competition Act, it can constitute an abuse of dominant position under local case law. In parallel, it can imply an infraction of Chilean unfair methods of competition and consumer protection statutes.

As seen, the FNE’s competition policy for digital markets, at first glance, involves assessing specific local digital markets under preexisting substantive categories. For these purposes, the Chilean competition authority relies on traditional enforcement, rather than a complementary regulation.

III.          Competition Policy and the Debate of Sellers’ Independence

As explained supra, the FNE has been active on cases involving vertical restraints in digital markets. Its conclusions are provocative: a price-parity clause whose breach results in a loss of positioning in search results (rather than the platform's removal) would have the same effects as a Most-Favoured-Nation Clause (Pedidos Ya, Booking, 2026). In contrast, parity effects arising from “efforts in any competitive dimension to obtain better prices or conditions” (such as reductions in platform fees or joint financing of rebates by platforms and business users) would not raise competition concerns (E-Commerce, 2026). Under this logic, the FNE would not consider Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses as pro-competitive under any circumstances.

It appears that these statements by the FNE suggest, as a general principle, that business users should be independent in setting their prices without further influence from a platform. However, this independence is a competition policy argument rather than a practical consequence of competition law enforcement.

From one perspective, the Chilean Competition Act does not have a per se prohibition on vertical restraints (unlike the prohibition on hard-core cartels). Therefore, turning this policy proposal into law would require either a legal reform of the substantive provisions or a complementary ex-ante regulation (which the FNE deemed unnecessary). From another perspective, traditional case law assesses vertical restraints as an abuse of dominant position, requiring proof of market power and anticompetitive effects. Hence, it is unclear whether the FNE can establish a general rule for the independence of business users without relying on traditional competition assessment.

Conclusions

In sum, Chile’s digital competition policy involves three levels of intervention. At the first level, the Chilean competition authority has been active in local digital markets where anti-competitive risks (such as Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and abuse of economic dependence) are related to the relationship between business users and platforms. At the second level, these local concerns can be assessed under traditional competition law enforcement, without the need for an ex-ante regulation. At the third level, actual enforcement would imply that business users should be independent in setting their prices without further intervention by platforms.

Although the Chilean approach is robust on the first two levels (i.e. cases with broader local impact have been successfully assessed by traditional competition law enforcement), the third level remains unclear. Contemporary Chilean competition law and case law cannot ensure the independence of business sellers as a goal. In other words, it is unclear whether this digital competition policy should rely solely on competition law, on ex-ante regulation, or on both.

In any case, the first level can distinguish competitive concerns that have a broader impact on small and medium-sized enterprises than cases that resemble foreign experiences, where the local impact is unclear. The second level allows deciding which tool is better suited to assess the previous competitive concerns. The third level shows the practical consequences of the chosen tool. This framework can be useful for identifying and evaluating further competition policies for digital markets, especially in emerging economies.