The English Arbitration Act, 2025: What Can Nigeria’s Arbitration Regime Adopt?

Both Nigeria and England, Wales and Northern Ireland have been active when it comes to legislation recently. Nigeria itself underwent thorough revamping when it replaced its nearly 20-year-old law with the Arbitration and Mediation Act, 2023 (AMA), which brings the country in line with international norms. This review resolved flaws in the Nigerian arbitration system, providing strong platforms for both domestic and international arbitrations. Conversely, on August 1, 2025, England, Wales and Northern Ireland became formally more surgical in its implementation of a more refined approach through its Arbitration Act, 2025 (AA). Notably, this Act applies only in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  England, Wales and Northern Ireland did not contemplate wholesale reform but, instead, tackled particular practical segments pinpointed in the course of years of judicial interpretation and stakeholder feedback. This article explores these opposing schools of thought highlights refinements in the AA in England, Wales and Northern Ireland that Nigeria can borrow from strategically to complement its recently enacted AMA and to strengthen its status as an arbitration hub in Africa.

Lessons from the AA for Nigeria’s AMA

While the AMA is a comprehensive reform, the AA introduces targeted improvements aimed at boosting efficiency and clarity. Several of these refinements may offer useful insights for Nigeria.

Summary Dismissal Powers

Section 39A of the AA, is a significant procedural amendment which formally authorizes arbitral tribunals to issue an award on a summary basis on the grounds that a party has “no real prospect of succeeding” on “the claim or issue” or in “the defence of the claim or issue”. It is comparable to the rules of Nigerian Rules on Civil Procedure on summary judgement, in recognition that arbitration lacks the rigidity of the court system and must have a means of deterring abuse in the form of frivolous or wholly unmeritorious claims.

This amendment was influenced by the practice of untenable claims resulting in prolongation of proceedings and enlarged costs, hence impairing the efficiency of arbitration. The AA gives legal certainty and procedural clarity, on a statutory basis, as to the tribunal's power to conclude the disposition of likewise frivolous cases at an early stage, which was previously a matter of the tribunal's inherent powers to manage its cases or the agreement of parties.

Conversely, the AMA has no explicit express option of summary dismissal. Although Section 15 expressly grants tribunals extensive powers to manage cases, and Section 31 deals with the determination of rules of procedure, neither of them expressly confers powers on tribunals to make an early disposal of unmeritorious claims. The lack of power to summarily dismiss claims in Nigerian seated arbitrations may reduce Nigeria’s attractiveness as a seat for resolving international business-related disputes. Tribunals are likely to fear throwing the baby out with the bathwater of untenable claims being rejected without any express statutory power and possibly weaken the effectiveness of arbitration through delaying tactics. For Nigeria to adopt a similar provision under the AMA, any amendment would need to expressly empower arbitral tribunals to issue awards on a summary basis. Incorporating such statutory authority in a future review of the AMA would provide a practical solution for disposing of unmeritorious claims efficiently, while at the same time preserving the safeguards of due process.

Arbitrator's Duty of Disclosure

The AA adds Section 23A, codifying arbitrators’ duty of disclosure as a major step towards modernizing the common law provisions considered and set out in Halliburton Company (Appellant) v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48. This provision entails arbitrators revealing any circumstances which may cause a reasonable doubt in the minds of arbitrators to have justifiable doubts in regard to their impartiality, and gives certainty in regard to arbitrators under the question of arbitrator impartiality. Significantly, it further targets the state of knowledge of the arbitrator, that he or she is obliged to disclose as to what the arbitrator knew and what the arbitrator “ought reasonably to be aware of” (Section 23A(3), AA). This objective requirement has set a greater diligence criterion as it entails placing responsibilities on arbitrators to make reasonable inquiries into possible prejudice instead of focusing exclusively on immediate memory.

Similar disclosure requirement expressly provided for under Section 8 of the AMA states that when circumstances exist that are "likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator’s impartiality or independence" (Section 8(1), AMA), such circumstances must be disclosed. The provision in the AMA, however, adopts a narrower approach to the AA, with regards to arbitrators disclosing what arbitrators “ought reasonably to be aware”. This can arguably be regarded as one of the fundamental disclosure standards. In the case of Nigeria, this shortcoming may neutralize its desire to establish itself as an arbitration centre of Africa. Standards of disclosure in arbitrations are also becoming a major consideration for international commercial parties as to the choice of arbitration seats, especially disputes of high value whose undisclosed conflict might cause arbitration awards to be set aside.

Jurisdictional Challenges

The AA amends Section 67 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996, which deals with challenges to an award on the ground of lack of substantive jurisdiction, by introducing restrictions aimed at preventing the strategic manipulation of challenge proceedings before the Court. The reforms eliminate the introduction of new evidence or arguments by the losing parties seeking a challenge under Section 67(3C), thus eliminating full re-hearings as well as delays and unnecessary expenses. Evidence may not be re-examined other than in exceptional cases in the interest of justice and the courts can now consider only new arguments or facts in very few instances, as evident in Section 67(3C)(b). The reform addresses a key deficiency in the English Arbitration Act 1996, whereby parties were effectively given a second opportunity to seek justice by presenting new information or arguments before the courts, even though they had deliberately withheld such information from the arbitral tribunal.

In contrast, the express provision on jurisdictional challenges in Section 14 of the AMA, does not restrict the types of review that can be conducted by the courts regarding decisions on jurisdiction and does not expressly provide for exercise of any limitation on the quality of evidence that may be relied on. This allows parties to hold back their strongest jurisdictional arguments until the matter is brought to court, which weakens the tribunal’s authority and makes the dispute last longer. In Nigeria, the procedure allows parties to institute weak arbitration cases before tribunals, while withholding valuable evidence and arguments for when the matter is filed in courts before a judge for a decision.

The Award of Costs Where a Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction

The AA addressed a certain procedure gap faced in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, with Clause 6 confirming that in circumstances where the tribunal or court decide that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute, the tribunal has the power to order the cost of arbitration proceedings, provided for in Section 61 of the Act. This rule fortifies the position that parties, who have spent legitimate resources in defending meritorious jurisdictional objections, are able to recover costs for the proceedings leading up to the Tribunal’s award on jurisdiction.

In contrast, there is no equivalent provision under the AMA. Section 50 of the AMA confers wide powers on tribunals to allocate costs, including in cases where jurisdictional challenges are raised. This means that a Respondent who successfully contests jurisdiction can ordinarily recover its costs through the tribunal’s award. However, uncertainty may still arise where a court later sets aside the award for want of jurisdiction, raising the question of whether the cost order survives. This gap can create room for tactical manoeuvres, with parties bringing jurisdictional objections not necessarily to succeed but to delay proceedings or increase costs. While Section 50 provides a flexible framework, clearer legislative guidance could help ensure that costs are not lost in such circumstances and that arbitration in Nigeria continues to reflect the twin principles of efficiency and fairness.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The gaps in AMA can be addressed through targeted reforms when opportunities for legislative amendment arise. Key priorities include empowering tribunals to summarily dismiss meritless claims, thereby saving time and costs, and adopting stricter disclosure standards, similar to those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, which would require arbitrators to actively investigate and disclose potential conflicts of interest. It is also necessary to limit the misuse of jurisdictional challenges, often deployed as tactical tools to delay proceedings. In addition, the reform should expressly provide for cost recovery even where a tribunal is later found to lack jurisdiction, promoting fairness and discouraging frivolous objections. These targeted reforms would enhance efficiency, fairness, and credibility while consolidating Nigeria’s role as a leading arbitration hub in West Africa.