A Shield of Justice or a Sword Through the Seat? The Delhi High Court’s Contentious Anti-Arbitration Injunction

In a judicial development sending ripples through India’s arbitration community, the Delhi High Court (“Delhi HC”) on 25 July 2025, in Engineering Projects (India) Ltd. v. MSA Global LLC (“EPIL v. MSA”) granted an anti-arbitration injunction to halt proceedings in a Singapore-seated arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Rules. The decision, rooted in the Delhi HC’s inherent power to prevent vexatious and oppressive conduct, has resurrected the long-laid spectre following Bhatia International vs. Bulk Trading S. A. & Anr (“Bhatia International”), a controversial legal era where Indian courts frequently intervened in foreign seated arbitrations, on the ground that Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) applies to all arbitrations, except when expressly excluded.

The Delhi HC framed its intervention as a necessary shield to protect an Indian public sector undertaking from procedural injustice. This ruling can lead to an increased intervention by the Indian courts against the ethos of arbitration, tainting India’s reputation as an arbitration-unfriendly jurisdiction. This post explores how EPIL v. MSA acts as a sword, undermining the spirit of the seat principle—the cornerstone of international arbitration that grants exclusive supervisory jurisdiction including procedural issues to the courts at the seat under the curial law, e.g., interim measures, appointment of arbitrator(s), and others.

The Case for Intervention: Why the Delhi HC Stepped In

An analysis of three main factors reveals the exceptional procedural unfairness that prompted the Delhi HC’s intervention in EPIL v. MSA.

1.     The Tainted Arbitral Tribunal: A Fundamental Breach of Impartiality

The dispute’s epicentre was the alleged non-disclosure by the co-arbitrator appointed by MSA, Mr. Andre Yeap. Under Article 11 of the ICC Rules, as well as the 2024 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest, arbitrators have a continuing duty of disclosure. Mr. Yeap’s failure to disclose his previous appointment by Mr. Atwal—the managing director, chairman, and promoter of MSA—amounts to a material lapse on his part. This lapse strikes at the core of the principles of natural justice, namely nemo judex in causa sua. The Delhi HC found that this concealment by the arbitrator goes to the root of its proper constitution, rendering any subsequent hearings before it highly questionable.

2.     "Vexatious and Oppressive" Conduct

Deeming MSA’s conduct vexatious and oppressive, the Delhi HC granted the injunction to prevent the manifest injustice of forcing EPIL—a public entity—into an expensive proceeding before a potentially biased tribunal. MSA aggressively pushed the arbitration forward—demanding evidentiary hearings and seeking wasted costs—even while EPIL’s legitimate challenges to the tribunal’s composition were pending before both the ICC Court and the Singapore High Court. This conduct, coupled with MSA’s move to obtain an ex-parte interim anti-suit injunction from the Singapore court to block EPIL’s case in Delhi, was perceived as a form of vexatious and strategically manipulative litigation manoeuvre.

3.     Invoking the Court’s Residual Jurisdiction

The legal hook for the Delhi HC’s intervention was Section 9 (power to try all suits of civil nature) read with Section 151 (inherent power of the court in the interest of justice and prevention of abuse of process) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court is not completely ousted and therefore the court may act as a sentinel of justice in exceptional cases. Keeping in mind the vexatious and oppressive conduct of MSA and referring to O.N.G.C. v. Western Co. of North America (“ONGC v. Western America”)—wherein the Supreme Court of India (“SC”) granted an injunction restraining the award holder from enforcing a London seated award before the U.S. courts on the ground that the proceeding before the U.S. courts would be oppressive to ONGC—the Delhi HC invoked its residual power to grant an anti-arbitration injunction.

A Troubling Déjà Vu: The Long Shadow of Bhatia and BALCO

To grasp the full significance of the EPIL decision, a brief journey into India’s arbitral history is necessary. For a decade, Indian arbitration was defined by the SC’s 2002 judgment in Bhatia International, which unleashed a period of judicial pandemonium, allowing Indian courts to routinely intervene in foreign-seated arbitrations. This positioned India as an outlier, disregarding the globally accepted seat principle.

This confusion was finally put to rest in 2012 by the SC in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (“BALCO”). BALCO decisively overruled Bhatia International and many others, holding that Part I of the Arbitration Act is not applicable to foreign-seated proceedings, aligning India with international best practices and restoring the sanctity of the seat principle. It is against this backdrop that the EPIL injunction is so alarming. It appears to be a throwback to the interventionist era that BALCO worked so hard to end.

The Critical Analysis—Jurisdictional Overreach and its Dangers

While the Delhi HC’s intentions may have been noble, its outcome represents a critical and dangerous misstep that undermines the tenets of international arbitration.

Undermining Party Autonomy

By intervening in a foreign-seated arbitration via an anti-arbitration injunction despite the parties’ explicit agreement to arbitrate under Singapore law and ICC rules, the Delhi HC disregarded the parties’ chosen forum. This decision blurs and undermines the fundamental principle of party autonomy in international arbitration, casting doubt on the finality and predictability that parties seek when they contractually opt for arbitration as the preferred mechanism to resolve their disputes.

Disparaging the Seat Principle

The Delhi HC’s decision to issue an anti-arbitration injunction is a direct usurpation of the seat principle. Singapore courts had the exclusive jurisdiction regarding all procedural issues, including the issue of an anti-arbitration injunction. And it had already considered and ruled upon the matter which the Delhi HC considered as one of the determining factors for granting the order—the perceived lack of the arbitrator’s impartiality. Furthermore, the Singapore courts also issued an anti-suit injunction against EPIL’s Indian proceeding. Nevertheless, the Delhi HC overlooked these decisions and passed a conflicting judgment by clothing the conduct of MSA as oppressive. Such conflicting judgments create an untenable situation of judicial conflict, where parties are caught between competing orders from courts in different countries and pivotal concepts get diluted, such as the seat principle in this case.

Moreover, the Delhi HC’s reliance on ONGC v. Western America, a case from the erstwhile arbitration regime, lacks merit. Post BALCO, under the Arbitration Act, there are cases which underscore the non-interventionist approach of the SC in foreign-seated arbitrations. This includes cases such as Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd.—wherein the SC affirmed that a seat of arbitration is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, and World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd vs MSM Satellite(Singapore) Pte. Ltd—wherein the SC refused to grant an anti-arbitration injunction in a Singapore-seated arbitration merely on an allegation of fraud.

The Injunction’s Practical Ineffectiveness

Beyond the doctrinal issue, the injunction’s real-world power is questionable. The ICC tribunal and the Singaporean courts are not bound by an order from the Delhi HC concerning the standing of a Singapore-seated arbitration. Under the seat principle as enshrined within the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration1  and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”),2 they are permitted—and indeed, likely—to overlook the anti-arbitration injunction. The arbitration will likely proceed ex parte if EPIL refuses to participate, as was also witnessed in Devi Resources Limited v. Ambo Exports Limited, where, despite an anti-arbitration injunction, the tribunal in London continued the proceedings and issued an award. The anti-arbitration injunction’s real “teeth” will only be within India. Whereby, EPIL could challenge the enforcement of a potential adverse foreign award by arguing that enforcing an award arising out of an injuncted arbitral proceeding would be contrary to India’s public policy.

Undermining India’s Pro-Arbitration Reputation

Despite years of legislative and judicial efforts following BALCO to become a pro-arbitration jurisdiction, the EPIL v. MSA decision severely dents India’s reputation and undermines that progress. The judgment portends that even with a foreign seat, international users who resort to aggressive legal tactics in arbitral proceedings may find themselves dragged into parallel litigation in Indian courts under the guise of vexatious and oppressive conduct. This reintroduces the very uncertainty and risk of interventionism that made foreign investors wary of India following Bhatia International. Moreover, it encourages Indian parties to engage in forum shopping, approaching Indian HCs to disrupt foreign seated arbitrations they are dissatisfied or unhappy with.

In conspectus, the arbitrator’s failure to disclose a prior relationship with MSA’s chairman was not a material lapse. The previous appointment was made in a personal capacity, not by the corporation, and a significant amount of time had passed between the two events. Furthermore, MSA’s actions were not “vexatious,” but rather standard—albeit aggressive—legal tactics to enforce the arbitration agreement. Thus, the Delhi HC’s intervention represents a breach of the seat principle, positioning it as an unauthorised appellate body, second-guessing a final decision.

A Well-Intentioned Remedy in the Wrong Forum

The Delhi HC was faced with a sympathetic claimant and troubling facts concerning an arbitrator’s non-disclosure. Although its desire to provide a remedy and uphold the principles of natural justice is understandable, the decision it rendered was a well-intentioned misstep with perilous precedential value. The precedent it sets directly contradicts India’s established pro-arbitration stance and risks destabilising the arbitration framework by encouraging forum shopping and jurisdictional conflicts. In attempting to act as a shield of justice, the Delhi HC has inadvertently wielded a sword against the seat principle, a cornerstone of the international arbitration framework India has painstakingly tried to embrace.

• 1

  The seat principle can be inferred by reading UNCITRAL Model Law Article 5—proscribing court interference unless otherwise provided in the state legislation, in light of numerous other articles, namely Articles 11, 13, 14, 16, 27, and 34, which entrust state courts at the place of arbitration with functions of supervision and assistance to arbitral proceedings.

• 2Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention furthers the seat principle by allowing a court to refuse the enforcement of a foreign award if it is set aside at the seat of the arbitration.