2025 in Review: United States

Compared to other areas of U.S. law in 2025, international arbitration was relatively quiet.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a single (unanimous) decision clarifying federal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and continued to consider another FSIA case following a petition by Spain for the dismissal of an arbitral award.  At the Circuit Court level, there was still more FSIA action, with the D.C. Circuit holding that challenges to the existence of an arbitration agreement impact subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA while challenges concerning the scope of the arbitration agreement go to the merits and therefore should be considered by a court.  Aside from the FSIA, the Second Circuit provided some helpful contours to U.S. courts’ power to vacate foreign-seated arbitral awards (read: they cannot).

Read on for the U.S. cases that caught our attention in 2025.

CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd.

The legal issue in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. (2025) involves an unlikely combination of two aspects of U.S. law:  (1) personal jurisdiction and (2) the FSIA.

As a matter of U.S. constitutional law, U.S. courts require subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over litigants.  For litigants outside of the country, a court may still exercise personal jurisdiction if that litigant has “minimum contacts” with the United States, often satisfied through directed action that would foreseeably create legal consequences in the United States.

Foreign sovereigns are ordinarily immune from lawsuits in U.S. courts, except under the listed exceptions to immunity prescribed by the FSIA.  As many readers of the Blog will know, under the so-called arbitration exception, the FSIA waives immunity for suits to confirm arbitral awards where the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other international agreement,” like the New York Convention, which requires signatory states to enforce international arbitration awards (FSIA 1605(a)(6)).

By the terms of the FSIA, however, personal jurisdiction exists when (1) an exception to sovereign immunity applies—such as the arbitration exception—and (2) service is made in accordance with the statute’s rules, without any reference to minimum contacts (FSIA 1330(b)).

Notwithstanding the text of the FSIA, the Ninth Circuit held that both an exception to the FSIA and “minimum contacts” must be established before a U.S. court could exercise jurisdiction.  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, unanimously holding that the FSIA does not include a statutory “minimum contacts” requirement to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign state or its agencies when an exception to sovereign immunity applies and proper service of process is effected.

The Court emphasized that since Congress did not include a minimum-contacts standard in the FSIA’s text, courts should not import it. The Court stressed that many of the FSIA’s immunity exceptions themselves contain specific domestic contact requirements when Congress intended them, reinforcing that no separate jurisdictional nexus exists in Section 1330(b). The Court’s decision aligns the Ninth Circuit with a majority of other U.S. courts to consider the issue.

Despite the Court’s clear holding, the issue of minimum contacts may still come up again.  The Court did not address several arguments raised by the appellee, Antrix, including whether another provision of the U.S. Constitution would nonetheless require a minimum contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction over a foreign state or its instrumentalities.  These unresolved questions were remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration and remain pending, with potential resolution in 2026.

Kingdom of Spain v. Blasket Renewable Investments LLC

The Court’s consideration of FSIA issues continued with a 2025 petition for certiorari by the Kingdom of Spain, which the Court continues to consider and, importantly, has not decided to accept or deny as of this writing.

In Kingdom of Spain v. Blasket Renewable Investments LLC, No. 24-1130, Spain seeks review of a D.C. Circuit decision that U.S. courts may confirm foreign awards against Spain under the FSIA’s arbitration exception without first determining whether Spain validly consented to arbitration with the claimant. Spain argues that the question of a sovereign’s consent to arbitration with the specific private party is a jurisdictional threshold requirement, not a merits issue for arbitrators, and that this question is contested among federal circuits (FSIA 1605(a)(6)).

As covered by the Blog in its 2024 Year in Review, the underlying disputes stem from investor-State arbitrations brought under Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) by European energy companies claiming Spain breached its obligations under the ECT when it revoked a green energy subsidies regime. After the European Court of Justice’s rulings in Achmea and Komstroy precluding recovery for intra-EU arbitral awards, including those under the ECT, claimants moved to confirm in U.S. courts.

In the lower courts, results were mixed.  One court sided with Spain finding that no valid arbitration agreement existed (and therefore Spain was immune under the FSIA), while another held that the existence of an arbitration agreement was a merits issue inappropriate for judicial review (and therefore Spain was not immune under the arbitration exception to the FSIA).  The D.C. Circuit agreed with the latter view, holding that the existence of a valid arbitration agreement was a question for the arbitral tribunal’s own resolution, deferring to the arbitral tribunal’s determination and allowing enforcement under the arbitration exception to the FSIA.

Spain has appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that it never consented to arbitrate with the claimants under the ECT, particularly because intra-EU offers to arbitrate under the ECT have been deemed invalid under EU law.  Spain also challenges the D.C. Circuit’s categorical rejection of forum non conveniens dismissals in foreign award confirmation cases and has raised the issue of a Circuit split among the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits on this defense. 

Numerous amicus briefs supporting Spain’s petition have been filed by European States as well as the European Union, emphasizing the stakes of the case.

Deutsche Telekom A.G. v. Republic of India

Combining the two cases above, in Deutsche Telekom A.G. v. Republic of India, the D.C. Circuit applied the same holding from Blasket, to enforce an arbitral award against India arising out of the same facts as in CC/Devas.  Deutsche Telekom successfully brought a claim under the Germany-India bilateral investment treaty, securing an arbitral award for $93 million, and sought enforcement in D.C. court.  India argued that Deutsche Telekom was not a protected “investor” and that its investment was not a “covered investment,” placing the dispute outside the treaty’s arbitration clause.  The D.C. Circuit held that challenges to the existence of an arbitration agreement are jurisdictional under the FSIA, but disputes about the scope of an existing agreement go to the merits of enforcement. Because an arbitration agreement, award, and treaty basis were established, the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied. India’s objections concerned scope, not existence, and therefore did not defeat jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding, the D.C. Circuit held that the lower court must still consider India’s merits defenses after finding jurisdiction noting that sovereigns may raise “colorable” immunity defenses and pursue related merits arguments when and if jurisdiction is confirmed.

Molecular Dynamics, Ltd., et al. v. Spectrum Dynamics Med. Ltd.

In Molecular Dynamics, Ltd. v. Spectrum Dynamics Medical Ltd., the Second Circuit clarified the outer boundary of U.S. judicial authority over foreign-seated arbitral awards.  The case arose from an arbitration seated in Geneva.  After losing in the arbitration, Spectrum Dynamics attempted to vacate the award in federal court in New York, relying on a forum selection clause giving New York courts exclusive jurisdiction over arbitration-related disputes.

The district court dismissed the petition and, on appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.  The Second Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act confers jurisdiction only over proceedings that “fall under” the New York Convention and that, by design, the NY Convention governed recognition and enforcement of awards, not annulment. 

The Second Circuit held that vacatur is reserved for the courts at the arbitral seat, which exercise primary jurisdiction, and that U.S. courts operate solely in a secondary role.  The Second Circuit emphasized that the parties’ forum selection clause could not expand the bounds of U.S. courts’ jurisdiction beyond statutory limits and that allowing contractual vacatur in non-seat courts would undermine the New York Convention’s structure by enabling parallel annulment proceedings, destabilizing the finality of awards.

Conclusion

International arbitration in the United States in 2025 was not defined by blockbuster rulings, but rather set the stage for some groundbreaking developments in FSIA jurisprudence going to the heart of American courts’ relationship to international law.  Taken together, the year’s decisions reinforced statutory limits and jurisdictional discipline, while pending petitions and remanded constitutional issues carry forward into 2026.