Who Should Verify Digital Evidence Under the UN Tax Convention?
November 18, 2026
Ahead of the sixth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, to be held in Nairobi from 30 November to 10 December 2026, attention remains fixed on distributive questions: how taxing rights should be allocated under the Zero Draft (A/AC.298/CRP.32) and how far draft Protocol 1 (A/AC.298/CRP.33) should extend source taxation of cross-border services.
A less visible question will decide whether those answers work in practice. Once a market State is entitled to tax income from automated digital services or fees for remote services, the facts needed to exercise that right, about users, revenues and expenses, will often be generated, held and controlled abroad. Receiving digital data across borders does not, by itself, establish a taxable fact. A transmitted electronic record can be technically intact and still convey an inaccurate or unverified factual assertion.
The July 2026 drafts say a great deal about exchanging information and little about how a receiving administration turns received data into sufficiently established facts. Negotiators could fill that gap with a functional rule: verification responsibilities should follow access to and control over evidence.
1. The Institutional Stake: Exchange as the Legal Basis for Joint Verification
At the Fifth Session in New York (3 to 13 August 2026), the bracketed Article 11 of the Zero Draft on exchange of information divided delegations. Several considered it too operational for a framework convention and duplicative of existing instruments, and proposed its deletion; others, mainly from source States, defended it as the legal anchor that States outside existing exchange networks would otherwise lack.
The choice has a consequence that the duplication argument tends to overlook. Draft Protocol 2 on dispute prevention and resolution (A/AC.298/CRP.34) makes several of its cooperative mechanisms, including simultaneous and joint audits (Articles II.5 and II.6), available only where a “tax information exchange instrument” is in force between the parties concerned, and it counts the Convention among such instruments only insofar as the Convention provides for exchange. The co-leads made a similar point when presenting the draft to the plenary: for parties that have no bilateral tax treaty, several mechanisms may operate on the basis of an existing exchange-of-information relationship. For States that have no bilateral treaty or multilateral convention in force between them, removing an operational exchange provision without an equivalent replacement could leave the joint verification procedures of Protocol 2 without sufficient legal support. The point is functional rather than numerical. What must be preserved is a legal basis for exchange on which joint verification can rest, whichever article carries it.
2. Three Responsibilities Distributed by Access
Traditional international tax rules presume that taxpayers hold their books locally and that the local administration has audit jurisdiction over them. In automated digital services and platform intermediation, much of the relevant data (user location signals, server logs, revenue attributions, shared cost pools) sits with non-resident entities or third-party hosts beyond the market jurisdiction’s reach. To connect information exchange with evidentiary reliability, the Convention package should distribute three duties in proportion to access.
i. Taxpayers substantiate what they know and control. Taxpayers should substantiate claims within their reasonable sphere of knowledge and control (contracts, transfer pricing files, billing profiles). They should not bear impossible negative burdens (the probatio diabolica, a proof that cannot be produced) requiring them to deliver third-party server data or foreign cost pools to which they have no lawful access. An unsupported assertion may be insufficient to sustain a claim, but what the taxpayer cannot lawfully obtain cannot be the measure of its diligence.
ii. The authority holding the record discloses its provenance and verification status. The competent authority of the jurisdiction with access to a record, which is not always the taxpayer’s State of residence, should not act as a passive conduit. It should identify the source of the record, describe the verifications actually performed, and communicate known limitations and later corrections, stating, for instance, whether a figure comes from an unaudited self-declaration, an algorithmic estimate or an audited filing. This is a duty of transparency about the record, not a guarantee of the truth of its content, and it does not require every record to be audited before it can be transmitted.
iii. The authority using the record states its inferences and allows correction. The arrival of a record through a treaty channel cannot create an irrebuttable presumption of accuracy. The receiving administration should state the factual inferences that connect the record to a taxable fact and give the taxpayer a timely opportunity to review the evidence, cure deficiencies and contest automated inferences before an assessment becomes final.
3. Three Examples from the Early Protocols
The practical significance of this allocation emerges from three situations in the July 2026 texts.
• Conflicting indicators of user location. Article 6(7) of draft Protocol 1 locates income from automated digital services first by the consumer’s residence, then by end users in the State, then by user data generated there. The indicators available for each limb may diverge, since an IP address, a mobile country code, a billing address and a contractual customer record can point to different States. Which territorial fact each limb requires is a question for the sourcing rule; which evidence suffices to establish it is a separate question that the drafts leave open. The allocation proposed here does not rank indicators. It requires the administration that relies on one indicator over another to say why, and to let the taxpayer contest that choice.
• Net-basis taxation of a non-resident provider. Articles 5(4)(b) and 6(6)(b) allow a non-resident provider to elect taxation under Article 9, which taxes a reasonable allocation of its profits from the relevant business activity by reference to the gross revenues generated in the source State relative to its gross revenues from that activity, under procedures set by the source State. The provider exercises the election, produces the records it controls and justifies the computation. Most of those figures are documented in its home jurisdiction, so the source administration can test them only with proportionate documentation standards and, where relevant records sit abroad, competent-authority assistance on an applicable legal basis. Without both, the election will be either refused in practice or accepted on figures no one has examined.
• Automated attribution to the wrong taxpayer. Article 11(1)(b) of the Zero Draft contemplates transaction information allowing exports and imports of goods and services to be matched. Matching at scale generates mismatches, from timing differences, reclassification and identifier errors, that attribute revenue to the wrong taxpayer. A mismatch should trigger an enquiry, not an assessment; Protocol 2 should provide a procedure for correcting factual discrepancies and communicating the corrections between administrations, so that the same error is not reproduced in a later mutual agreement procedure.
4. What the Negotiators Could Add
Three additions, one in each of the July texts, would translate this allocation into treaty language. In the Convention, a commitment that exchanged records travel with their provenance and verification status, whichever article carries the exchange obligation. In Protocol 1, proportionate documentation standards for the territorial indicators of Articles 5 and 6 and for the figures supporting an election under Article 9, coupled with assistance where supporting records are held abroad. In Protocol 2, a right for taxpayers to see the foreign material used against them and to have factual errors corrected, which would also remove one source of the information asymmetry that already weighs on mutual agreement procedures.
Expanding taxing rights without a way to verify cross-border evidence would leave the Convention with rights that are difficult to exercise fairly. Anchoring verification in access to evidence connects the new rights with the means to use them. The question will not close in Nairobi. It arises whenever an administration must act on a record it did not produce, and it will return at each stage of implementation, whatever the final texts provide.
Antonio Lopo Martinez is a LE STUDIUM Visiting Researcher at the University of Tours, France, and a Tax Auditor at the Receita Federal do Brasil (Brazilian Federal Revenue Service). He holds doctorates in law and in accounting and is a Collaborating Researcher at the University of Coimbra Institute for Legal Research.
The views expressed are personal and do not represent the Receita Federal do Brasil or any other institution with which the author is affiliated.
You may also like