To Tariff or Not to Tariff? That is the Question (before the U.S. Supreme Court)

Pramod Kumar Siva and William Byrnes of Texas A&M University School of Law’s International Tax Risk Management graduate program

In response to a question from some of our non-U.S.-educated tax law colleagues, we read through the U.S. Supreme Court’s 185 pages of oral arguments transcript of the tariff case Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump.1 Our initial assessment of the pointed questions posed by the majority of justices is that the Supreme Court will likely decide that the Executive branch may not impose import duties (i.e., tariffs) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (‘IEEPA’).2 At least six justices, a mixture of those on the indicated via commentary, as we typically learn in a first-year federal income taxation course, that the authority to levy tax remains the exclusive purview of Congress.3 Several respected financial news organizations, such as the Wall Street Journal,4 are also reporting this likely result. But would it be the correct decision?

Upon studying the entire transcript and analyzing the cases referred to therein, we discern a contrarian path forward for the Supreme Court to decide in favor of President Trump. A path lit by three arguably persuasive federal Appellate decisions and, more relevant, a Supreme Court decision. How bright is this path? The three Appellate-level decisions are based on substantially similar statutory language in the precursor statute of the IEEPA. These three cases upheld the use of an across-the-board 10 percent tariff as a regulatory device, afforded by Congress to the President, to address a U.S. trade imbalance with other countries. But the Appellate decisions also provide reservations of such use. More importantly, after these appellate-level holdings, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the equivalent of an import duty imposed on oil was an allowable Congressional delegation of monetary exactions to the President to address a national security concern:5

“… the President's authority extends to the imposition of monetary exactions, i.e., license fees and duties, and belies any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the statute itself, intended to confine the President's authority to the imposition of quotas and to bar him from imposing a license fee system …” (emphasis added).

In this article, we start with an overview of the tariffs imposed since January 2025. We then proceed to a summary of the central arguments presented by the administration, statements from Supreme Court Justices countering the administration’s arguments, and the holdings of the previous tariff cases mentioned above. While news organizations and AI are reporting that the Supreme Court will rule against the use of tariffs, we offer our contrarian take on how the Supreme Court may moderate a path forward for some tariffs but not for others, thereby deferring the inevitable determination to the trial court. Before concluding, we include some contextual commentary on the U.S. legislative system for the Senate’s required ‘advice and consent’ for a treaty but not for an administrative agreement, regarding where the administration may tread if the Supreme Court rejects the proposition that Congress has authorized, or is entitled to delegate to, the President the power to levy tariffs as a regulatory tool to remediate a national trade imbalance emergency. Finally, we provide an appendix of the MS Pilot prediction.

1.      Tariffs Imposed in 2025 Pursuant to

For his second term through October 2025, President Trump has issued more than 23 executive orders, four memoranda, and three proclamations related to trade tariffs.6 Many of these tariff actions rely upon the IEEPA by declaring a national emergency:7

I have declared a national emergency arising from conditions reflected in large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, which have grown by over 40 percent in the past 5 years alone, reaching $1.2 trillion in 2024. …

The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the transfer of resources from domestic producers to foreign firms, reducing opportunities for domestic manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost manufacturing jobs, diminished manufacturing capacity, and an atrophied industrial base, including in the defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign firms are better positioned to scale production, reinvest in innovation, and compete in the global economy, to the detriment of U.S. economic and national security.

The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial sectors—another outcome of the large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits—also compromises U.S. economic and national security by rendering the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain disruption. Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial capacity, have compromised military readiness; this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States. Such impact upon military readiness and our national security posture is especially acute with the recent rise in armed conflicts abroad. (emphasis added)

On April 2, 2025, President Trump released an Executive Order ‘Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits’.8 The order states that, according to the WTO, the U.S. has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in the world at 3.3 percent. In comparison, U.S. trade partners like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5 percent), the European Union (EU) (5 percent), India (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4 percent) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher. The U.S. imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10 percent), India (70 percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher duties. The Executive Order imposes a 10 percent base customs duty on many countries’ goods entering the U.S. However, President Trump imposed a 25 percent duty on goods from Canada and Mexico that are not listed in the USMCA.9

On May 12, 2025, President Trump announced that all articles imported into the U.S. from China, including Hong Kong and Macau, are subject to an additional ad valorem rate of duty of 10 percent but for applicable exceptions.10 If China and the U.S. have not entered into a trade agreement within 90 days (August 11, 2025), then the duties will increase to a range of 34 percent and 54 percent.

On June 16, 2025, President Trump announced the outline for an initial trade agreement with the UK, addressing specifically UK automotive imports to the U.S., U.S. agricultural exports to the UK, US imports of steel and aluminum, and of pharmaceuticals.11

On July 7, 2025, President Trump extended until August 1, 2025, the imposition of the steep tariff rate increases that will impact U.S. trading partners that have not entered into a trade agreement in 2025 directly with the U.S.12 Examples of increased base tariffs on many imported goods from trading partners include 20 percent on the European Union, 25 percent on Japan and Korea, 26 percent on India, 31 percent on Switzerland and 32 percent on Taiwan. However, on July 31, 2025, President Trump announced several bilateral trade deals, all with substantially reduced overall rates, including with Japan (15 percent), South Korea (15 percent), and the European Union (15 percent).13 Any country not listed in Annex I is subject to a 10 percent baseline reciprocal tariff, except for Canada,14 Mexico, North Korea, Russia, and Belarus.

2.      The Crux of the Arguments of President Trump’s Administration

To exercise powers granted by Congress within the IEEPA, the President must first declare a national emergency with respect to an “unusual and extraordinary threat” … “to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States…”.15 In the first instance of its IEEPA analysis, the Supreme Court (the “Court”) will need to rule whether the President has met this IEEPA statutory language requirement for a declared national emergency. To this point, the Administration’s (the Executive branch, i.e., President Trump) case, represented and argued by the U.S. Solicitor General John Sauer, opened the oral arguments with the presentation of the Administration’s basis of an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’:16

“On April 2, President Trump determined that our exploding trade deficits had brought us to the brink of an economic and national security catastrophe. He further pronounced that the traffic of fentanyl and other opioids into our country has created a public health crisis, taking hundreds of thousands of American lives. … President Trump has declared that these emergencies are country-killing and not sustainable, that they threaten the bedrock of our national and economic security …”

The current administration is hardly the first to declare a national emergency pursuant to the IEEPA. The non-partisan Congressional Research Service (the ‘CRS’), which provides research reports to Congress at Congress’s request, reports that 77 national emergencies invoking the IEEPA (which was enacted in 1977) have been declared by Presidents, of which 46 continue to be in effect as of September 2025.17 Moreover, the CRS found that such national emergencies often have a shelf life of nearly a decade, yet some remain considerably longer.18 Presidents average just under four IEEPA national emergency declarations per term.

3.      What Powers Did Congress Grant the President in the IEEPA?

If the Court determines that the declared national emergency of President Trump’s administration has achieved the statutory standard of a national emergency required by the IEEPA, then the Court must next turn to address the crux of the issue. What Presidential remediation actions has Congress authorized in the IEEPA, and are these allowable delegations from the legislative branch to the executive one? The pertinent language of the IEEPA that the administration is relying upon for its remediation action in the form of tariffs is as follows:19

“… the President may … investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; …” (emphasis added).

The above IEEPA paragraph does not mention the term tariffs. Typically, Presidents have exercised authority granted by the IEEPA in the form of sanctions and asset seizures of property owned by a foreign government or its nationals or its state enterprises.20 Until 2025, no administration has mandated tariffs as a remediation tool afforded by the IEEPA.21 Tariffs, a form of taxation collected via import duties, are an aspect of governance granted by the U.S. Constitution to Congress, as follows: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises …”.22

Emphasizing this aspect of Article I, Chief Justice Roberts asked the Solicitor General:23 “[W]ho pays the tariffs?” The Solicitor General responded that tariffs are borne by a combination of foreign manufacturers and importers, i.e., foreign taxpayers, but, to the Chief Justice’s point, also by U.S. taxpayers.24 Then the Chief Justice followed that: “…it's been suggested that the tariffs are responsible for significant reduction in our deficit. I would say that's raising revenue domestically.” To which the Solicitor General defended: “…there certainly is incidental and collateral effect of the tariffs that they do raise revenue, but it's very important that they are regulatory tariffs, not revenue-raising tariffs (emphasis added).”25

4.      Appellate Decisions Related to Similar Language in the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917

In order to understand the language within the 1977 IEEPA, the Solicitor General pointed the Court to a previous statute, the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act (‘TWEA’), that contains substantially similar language from whence the IEEPA language was drawn.26 The TWEA contained similar language concerning regulation of foreign commerce and did not include the term tariff.27 The TWEA states that during war time, the President may:28

“…investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest …”.

Three federal appellate court decisions held that, pursuant to the language of the TWEA, President Nixon had been afforded by Congress the authority to declare a state of emergency because of an imbalance of trade of the U.S. with its trading partners, and pertaining thereto, afforded the authority of Congress to impose a 10 percent supplemental tariff on all dutiable goods entering the United States in order that the President may regulate foreign commerce.29 We will examine the first decision as representative of the three.

In the decision U.S. v. Yoshida International, the Appellate Court provides a contextual historical statement that is potentially applicable to President Trump’s underlying justification of a national emergency: “During the summer of 1971, the United States was faced with an economic crisis. The nation suffered under an exceptionally severe and worsening balance of payments deficit.”30 President Nixon’s authority for levying the 10 percent tariff on all trading partners was enunciated by the President as follows:31

“… pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act of 1930, … and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962…, the President entered into, and proclaimed tariff rates under, trade agreements with foreign countries;”

In its analysis of the executive branch’s issuing of the tariff, the Appellate Court acknowledges the elephant in the room:32

“But neither need nor national emergency will justify the exercise of a power by the Executive not inherent in his office nor delegated by the Congress. Expedience cannot justify the means by which a deserving and beneficial national result is accomplished. To indulge in judicial rationalization in order to sanction the exercise of a power where no power in fact exists is to strike the deadliest of blows to our Constitution.”

Thus, the Appellate Court undertook a deep dive into understanding whether Congress which levies duties as a regulatory tool to regulate imports, delegated to the President this same power to regulate imports using the same regulatory tool, for use in national emergencies.33 

Cutting to the chase, it concluded that, via the TWEA, Congress authorized the President during an emergency: “to exercise the delegated substantive power, i.e., to "regulate importation," by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other means appropriately and reasonably related, … to the particular nature of the emergency declared.34

However, the Appellate Court cautioned that the President may not “impose whatever tariff rates he deems desirable simply by declaring a national emergency”.35 Each Presidential action requires a facts and circumstances analysis to determine if it is appropriate and that it will not subvert the manifest Congressional intent to maintain control over its Constitutional power to levy tariffs. In the context of President Nixon’s tariffs, the Appellate Court observed that the relevant notice specifically stated that the imposition of the additional duty of 10 percent would only be charged up to the maximum tariff rate already promulgated by Congress, i.e., the tariff rate before any concessions.36 The Appellate Court’s analysis found that:37

“It is clear that the surcharge herein had, as its primary purpose, the curtailment, i.e., the regulation, of imports. What was sought was an offset to actions of our foreign trading partners which had led to loss of our favorable balance of trade and to a serious negative balance…”.

In conclusion, the Appellate Court reasoned that President Nixon’s limited surcharge, as a temporary measure, calculated to meet a particular national emergency, did not fall afoul of imposing “whatever tariff rates he deems desirable”.38

5.      Back to the Case at Hand

The primary hurdle for President Trump’s Administration is that it must demonstrate to the Supreme Court that the IEEPA’s statutory term “regulation” includes the authority for the President to impose tariffs without usurping Congress’ exclusive authority of Article I of the Constitution, in line with the previous federal Appellate decisions. In light of this hurdle, the Solicitor General then presented the Administration’s fundamental argument that Congress authorized the Administration’s use of tariffs within the context of the IEEPA:39

“The phrase "regulate ... importation" plainly embraces tariffs, which are among the most traditional and direct methods of regulating importation.”

Justice Kagan made the comment that tariffs traditionally are considered powers exclusively afforded the legislative branch (i.e., Congress), not also afforded the executive one: “…because tariffs, … are the power to impose taxes, the power to regulate foreign commerce. These are not things that are thought of as Article II powers. They are quintessential Article I powers.”40

The Solicitor General responded to Justice Kagan: “Now there's been debates about exactly how far it goes and how to draw the boundary between the President and Congress, but Egan, Garamendi, other cases, Curtiss-Wright, the Court has recognized the President has broad inherent authority to address foreign situations, foreign affairs, foreign policy, including foreign-arising emergencies.”41 And then the Solicitor General delivers the crux of the administration’s position: tariffs are not necessarily taxation pursuant to the U.S. Constitution’s Article 1 but may instead be a regulatory tool to be exercised by the executive in the context of the power to regulate foreign commerce pursuant to Article II. “We don't contend that what's being exercised here is the power to tax. … These are regulatory tariffs. They are not revenue-raising tariffs.”42

Justice Sotomayor interjected that there are 16 statutes that, “when Congress intended "regulate" to mean taxing, that it used taxes simultaneously.”43 The Solicitor General referred to the previous federal appellate court decisions, adding that President Nixon, like President Trump, used a tariff in part as leverage to force the U.S. trading partners to the negotiating table.44

6.      What A Summary of the Justices Likely Reasoning Based on AIs Reading of the Transcript and Personal Thoughts

MS Pilot informed us that Chief Justice Roberts will likely argue that taxation remains Congress’s domain because the IEEPA is silent as to any delegation otherwise. MS Pilot also stated that six other justices would also follow a line of reasoning leading to the outcome of a quashing of the 2025 tariffs (see the Appendix).

However, we think that this conclusion, albeit fairly constructed based on the Justice’s comments, as we briefly included above, is too simple an understanding of the Court’s dynamics.45 We would not be surprised if the Chief Justice identifies a coalition that weaves together a test that allows the Court to remand the case back for consideration of whether some of the tariffs may either continue, or perhaps suggests a pathway for the original orders to be modified, after which some of the tariffs may be upheld. 

7.      Are the Trade Agreements ‘Treaties’ or Something Else?

The tariffs in dispute have, like for President Nixon, brought the trade partners reluctantly to the negotiating table. The results of the negotiations are termed trade agreements in many of the announcements.46 The question is whether these trade agreements are treaties, like the USMCA and the GATT/WTO, or are they executive agreements (e.g., tax information exchange agreements or FATCA competent authority agreements) like the U.S. Treasury signed with scores of foreign countries regarding the exchange of financial information for tax purposes.47

For a treaty to enter into force, at least from an income tax perspective, which is within our wheelhouse (e.g., Double Tax Agreements), it must win an advice and consent vote in the U.S. Senate. This process starts with the Executive branch forwarding the signed agreement to the Senate, which in turn submits it to its Foreign Relations committee for initial discussion. Just one senator can block a vote on a treaty (e.g., Senator Rand Paul held up any votes on tax treaties for several years because he is concerned about information exchange and FATCA) unless the Senate, like for a filibuster, imposes cloture with a 60-member favorable vote.48 But 60 votes in favor are not enough for an advice and consent vote. The advice and consent vote requires a supermajority of 67 votes of the 100 members of the Senate for passage. To avoid the necessity of the advice and consent requirement, we think it is more likely that the administration will categorize the trade agreements as executive agreements.49

Appendix: What does GPT-5 MS CoPilot predict as the likely outcome?

Justice's Positions

Against Tariffs under IEEPA (Majority)

Leaning For Tariffs under IEEPA

Predicted Outcome

●        Likely Holding: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.

●        Predicted Vote: 7–2 against tariffs under IEEPA (Majority: Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson, Barrett, Gorsuch, Alito; Dissent: Kavanaugh, Thomas).

●      Reasoning: Tariffs are constitutionally and statutorily distinct from embargoes/quotas; Congress must speak clearly to delegate such power; Major Questions and Nondelegation Doctrines apply.

• 1The case is a consolidation of two cases. See the previous appellate decision Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24105 and the Supreme Court current citation is Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 2783; and the second case’s current citation, consolidated with Learning Resources, Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., 2025 U.S. LEXIS 2782. The oral arguments transcript is available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf.
• 2The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Title II, Pub. L. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626 (Dec. 28, 1977).
• 3U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1, available at https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C1-1-1/ALDE_00013387/.
• 4Supreme Court Appears Skeptical of Trump’s Tariffs, WSJ (Nov. 5, 2025), available at https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/supreme-court-tariffs-case-stock-market-11-05-2025.
• 5Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 562 - 571 (1976), available at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/426/548/. Note that the Supreme Court cautioned that its ruling was in no way compels the further conclusion that any action the President might take, as long as it has even a remote impact on imports, is also so authorized.
• 6See Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status, CRS R48549, (Rev. Sep. 16, 2025), available at https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48549.html. Significant examples include: E.O. 14256 (Apr. 2, 2025), E.O. 14257 (Apr. 2, 2025), E.O. 14289 (Apr. 29, 2025), E.O. 14323 (Jul. 30, 2025), E.O. 14324 (Jul 31, 2025), E.O. 14329 (Aug. 6, 2025), E.O. 14323 (Jul. 30, 2025). E.O. 14329 (Aug. 6, 2025). Pres. Mem. “Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs" (Feb. 13, 2025), Pres. Proclamation 10947 (Jun. 3, 2025) and Pres. Proclamation 10962 (Jul. 30, 2025).
• 7Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits, E.O. 14257 (Apr. 2, 2025). Available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/07/2025-06063/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and.
• 890 F.R. 15041, E.O. 14257 (Apr. 2, 2025). Available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/07/2025-06063/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and.
• 990 F.R. 9117, E.O. 14194 (Feb. 1, 2025); 90 F.R 9183, E.O. 14197 (Feb. 3, 2025); 90 F.R. 11429 (Mar. 6, 2025), Notice of Implementation of Additional Duties on Products of Mexico Pursuant to the President’s Executive Order 14194, Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border.
• 1090 FR 21831, EO 14298 (May 12, 2025), Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Discussions With the People’s Republic of China.
• 1190 FR 26419, EO 14309 (Jun 16, 2025), Implementing the General Terms of the United States of America-United Kingdom Economic Prosperity Deal.
• 12EO Extending The Modification Of The Reciprocal Tariff Rates (July7, 2025). Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/extending-the-modification-of-the-reciprocal-tariff-rates.
• 13EO Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates (July 31, 2025). Available at
• 14See U.S.-Canada Trade Relations, CRS IF12595 (July 18, 2025).
• 1550 U.S. Code § 1701 [Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of national emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities] available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1701.
• 16Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 4.
• 17For an overview of the history of the IEEPA, see The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use, CRS Rep. 45618 (Sep. 1, 2025) available at https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45618. Referred to hereafter as the ‘CRS IEEPA Report’.
• 18CRS IEEPA Report at 18, 20. President Jimmy Carter’s declaration of a national security emergency regarding Iran, pursuant to the IEEPA, remains in place over fifty years later to this day. See E.O. 12170 of Nov. 14, 1979, 44 FR 65729.
• 1950 U.S. Code § 1702 [Presidential authorities] available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1702.
• 20CRS IEEPA Report at 32.
• 21CRS IEEPA Report at 60.
• 22U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1, available at https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C1-1-1/ALDE_00013387/.
• 23Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 37.
• 24Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 38.
• 25Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 38.
• 26An Act to define, regulate, and punish trading with the enemy, and for other purposes, Pub. L. 65–91, 40 Stat. 411. Commonly referred to as the Trading with the Enemy Act (‘TWEA’).
• 27CRS IEEPA Report at 64.
• 2850 U.S.C. § 5(b)(1)(B).
• 29In United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1975), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that it was "incontestable that [TWEA] does in fact delegate to the President, for use during war or during national emergency only, the power to 'regulate importation'" and upheld the President's action imposing a 10 percent tariff to all trading partners because it was reasonably related to the emergency confronted. Cited at CRS IEEPA Report at 64. Also see Alcan Sales v. United States, 534 F.2d 920 (Cust. & Pat. App.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S. Ct. 506 (1976). Also see Alcan Sales, Div. of Alcan Aluminum Corp., v. United States, 693 F.2d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
• 30United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 17; 526 F.2d 560, 567; 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *5-6.
• 31United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 18-19, 526 F.2d 560, 568, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *8-9.
• 32United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 21, 526 F.2d 560, 570, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *15.
• 33United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 25, 526 F.2d 560, 574, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *25.
• 34United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 28, 526 F.2d 560, 576-577, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *32.
• 35United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 28, 526 F.2d 560, 577, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *33.
• 36United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 28, 526 F.2d 560, 577, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *34.
• 37United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 31, 526 F.2d 560, 579, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *40.
• 38United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 29, 526 F.2d 560, 578, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *35-36.
• 39Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 5.
• 40Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 8.
• 41Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 9.
• 42Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 10.
• 43Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 15.
• 44Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 26.
• 45Neither of us is a constitutional law scholar, thus, take our reading of the Court’s tea leaves with a grain of salt.
• 46See for example, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strikes Deal on Economic and Trade Relations with China, Nov. 1, 2025, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china/. For another example, see Joint Statement on a United States-European Union framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade, Aug. 21, 2025, available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en.
• 47See https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/tax-policy/tax-information-exchange-agreements-tieas.
• 48For an explanation of cloture and filibuster, see https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/filibusters-cloture.htm.
• 49For an analysis of the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement, see Congressional and Executive Authority Over Foreign Trade Agreements, CRS R47679, Sep. 25, 2025, available at https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47679.